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Between 1500 and 1800, Spaniards and their Native allies captured hundreds of Apache 
Indians and members of neighboring groups from the Rio Grande River Basin and 
subjected them to a variety of fates. They bought and sold some captives as slaves, exiled 
others as prisoners of war to central Mexico and Cuba, and forcibly moved others to 
mines, towns, and haciendas as paid or unpaid laborers. Though warfare and captive 
exchange predated the arrival of Europeans to North America, the three centuries 
following contact witnessed the development of new practices of violence and captivity 
in the North American West fueled by Euroamericans’ interest in Native territory and 
labor, on the one hand, and the dispersal of new technologies like horses and guns to 
American Indian groups, on the other. While at times subject to an enslavement and 
property status resembling chattel slavery, Native peoples of the Greater Rio Grande 
often experienced captivities and forced migrations fueled more by the interests of 
empires and nation-states in their territory and sovereignty than by markets in human 
labor.  
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Introduction: Captives in Unexpected Places 
 
In the fall of 1802, the city council, or cabildo, of Havana, Cuba received repeated 
reports that a gang of runaway slaves was stealing livestock, breaking into homes, and 
setting fire to fields in the countryside northeast of the capital. Though the council had 
commissioned militia captain José Gavilan and twenty men to pursue and capture them, 
this palenque, as fugitive slave communities were often known in Spanish America, 
proved remarkably adept at eluding capture. In October, the governor and captain general 
of Cuba issued a new order that declared a bounty on the heads of the palenque’s leaders, 
“El Chico” and “El Grande.” They were to be brought in dead or alive: 2,500 pesos dead, 
3,000 pesos alive.  By February of 1803, Captain Gavilan had killed “El Grande,” cut off 
his head, and shipped it to the governor in Havana in a vat of brandy to claim his reward. 
El Grande’s companions, however, remained on the lam.1 
 In a slave society like Cuba, it is not surprising that city council meetings might 
be occupied with the task of tracking runaway slaves or breaking apart palenques that had 
set fire to haciendas. Social disorder stoked fears of larger uprisings—especially after the 
Haitian Revolution—and in the interests of maintaining their slave society, elites moved 
quickly (and often violently) to quell rumored insurrections and recapture slave 
runaways. What is striking about the Havana council’s meetings in 1802 and 1803 is that 
the palenque they described as “of the highest concern” included escaped Apache 
captives from the North American West. El Grande and El Chico—two Apache men—
had joined with runaway slaves of African descent to raid for livestock and pillage 
                                                            
1 For documents regarding the Apache-led “palenque” and efforts to apprehend escapees see AGI-Cuba 
1720, especially “Extracto del sumario formado por D. Joséf Lopez Gavilan comunicado por el S.or 
Presid.te Governador Capitan General a esta Junta en oficio de 9 de Febrero de 1803.” See also AGN-PI, 
Vol. 238, f. 475.  
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ranches in the Cuban countryside.2  
The story of an Apache-led palenque raises the central questions of this 
dissertation. What were American Indian captives from the North American West doing 
so far from home? What was their experience like in diaspora and how did captors and 
captives alike understand their social status? How do the fates of such Native captives fit 
into broader understandings of captivity and slavery in the Americas? This project traces 
the journeys of hundreds of Native men, women, and children like El Grande and El 
Chico who between 1500 and 1800 faced capture and exile from homelands in the North 
American West at the hands of their Spanish and Native neighbors. Though warfare and 
captive exchange predated the arrival of Europeans to North America, the three centuries 
following contact witnessed the development of new practices of violence and captivity 
fueled by Euroamericans’ interest in Native territory and labor, on the one hand, and the 
dispersal of new technologies like horses and guns to American Indian groups, on the 
other.3 
                                                            
2 Ibid. For broader context of slavery and slave uprisings in Cuba see Matt Childs, The 1812 Aponte 
Rebellion in Cuba and the struggle against Atlantic slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006). On Haitian Revolution and its implication see Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: 
the story of the Haitian Revolution, 1st ed. (Cambridge  Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2005). 
3 Studies of captivity in the North American West have emphasized continuity rather than change over 
time. In exploring the latter, I am influenced especially by Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: 
The changing face of captivity in early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). For 
alternative approaches see James F. Brooks, Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the 
Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and “‘This Evil Extends 
Especially...To the Feminine Sex’: Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands,” Feminist 
Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 279-309; Ana Alonso, Thread of blood!: colonialism, revolution and gender in 
Mexico’s Northern Frontier (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Ramón Gutiérrez, When Jesus 
came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846 
(Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991). On diffusion of European technologies see Pekka 
Hämäläinen, “The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System,” Western 
Historical Quarterly 29 (Winter 1998): 485-513; “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” 
Journal of American History 90 (December 2003): 833-862; "The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, 
Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power In the Southwest Borderlands," WMQ 67, 2 (April 2010), 173-
208. 
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Examining shifting practices of captivity that characterized social relations in the 
North American West across three centuries could easily be a vast and unmanageable 
task. Thankfully, other scholars have already begun to cast light on captivity and slavery 
within the region commonly termed the “Southwest Borderlands.” Their efforts have 
helped fuel a vibrant literature that has begun to fill in a continental portrait of the diverse 
forms of bondage characteristic of early modern North America. James Brooks’ path-
breaking Captives & Cousins, for example, examines the cross-cultural implications of 
captive exchange in the New Mexico Borderlands. As captives of war crossed ethnic 
divides, Brooks reveals, they interlinked individuals and families through relations of 
kinship, allowing for the exchange of needed resources through a “Borderlands slave 
system” that made long-term, if often painful, coexistence possible.4 Historians have now 
begun to link this portrait of a political economy of captivity to broader regional 
dynamics of trade and diplomacy. Examining the Great Basin to the north of New 
Mexico, Ned Blackhawk has revealed the long-distance effects of slave raiding for New 
Mexican markets on Paiute and other peoples. He has shown how even groups who never 
saw Europeans were affected by colonialism indirectly as violence “spilled over the land” 
in waves.5 Joaquín Rivaya Martínez and Juliana Barr have turned to present-day Texas, 
showing how the adoption of European technologies by Comanche Indians helped 
enable, first, their participation in long-distance slave trades and then, in the nineteenth 
                                                            
4 Brooks’ compelling work is what sparked my interest in captivity in the first place. See Captives & 
Cousins, “This Evil Extend Especially,” and “Served Well by Plunder: La Gran Ladronería and Producers 
of History Astride the Rio Grande,” American Quarterly 52 (Mar. 2000): 23-58.  
5 Ned Blackhawk, Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the early American West, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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century, the adoption of captive laborers en masse for internal labor needs.6  As part of 
broader studies of Spanish colonialism in neighboring areas to the south, Chantal 
Craumessel and Susan Deeds have addressed the recruitment of Native captives as 
laborers in Nueva Vizcaya and its surroundings. Craumessel’s work in particular has shed 
new light on the demographics of Indian slavery there and its relationship to broader 
Spanish strategies of labor recruitment and coercion.7   
This renewed scholarly interest in captivity and Indian slavery transcends the 
North American West or “Southwest Borderlands.” Alan Gallay’s The Indian Slave 
Trade examines the links between slave trading, diplomacy, and the rise of the English 
empire in the Southeast, for example. His work casts attention on the surprising 
demographic significance of Indian enslavement, the export of thousands of Native slaves 
from Charleston to the Caribbean, and the ways in which the commodification of war 
captives benefitted some Native groups at a devastating cost to others. Much as Brooks’ 
Captives & Cousins served as a foundation for new inquiries into captivity in the 
Southwest, Gallay’s work has sparked exciting new studies of Indian slavery in the 
Southeast.8 Cristina Snyder has recently taken up the question of how contact with 
Europeans and enslaved Africans shifted Native practices of captivity over time. Through 
deft use of both archaeological and historical evidence, she reveals important changes in 
                                                            
6 Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez, “Captivity and Adoption Among the Comanche Indians” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California-Los Angeles, 2006); Juliana Barr, Peace came in the form of a woman!: Indians 
and Spaniards in the Texas borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), and 
“From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands,” Journal of American 
History 92, no. 1 (June 2005): 19-46. 
7 Susan Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s colonial North: Indians under Spanish rule in Nueva 
Vizcaya (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); Chantal Craumessel, Poblar la frontera: La provincia 
de Santa Bárbara en Nueva Vizcaya durante los siglos XVI y XVII (Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: El 
Colegio de Michoacán, 2006). 
8 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). See also Gallay, ed., Indian slavery in colonial America 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). 
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practices of captivity from pre-contact chiefdoms, through the Indian slave trade to 
Carolina, to the rise of plantation slavery among some Southeastern Native peoples.9 Paul 
Kelton, like Ned Blackhawk, has focused on the relationship between colonialism, 
captivity, and social change. Challenging the notion that disease devastated Native 
peoples in advance of sustained contact with Europeans, Kelton has instead shown how it 
was the intimate contact produced by Indian slave trades that fueled the worst 
demographic losses.10  
This dissertation builds upon this literature in three key respects. First, as its title 
suggests, the project foregrounds an examination of captive experience, of “captive 
fates.” In part because of the challenges of source material, scholars to-date have shed 
more light on “slaving” and “slave-trading” than on the experience of Native captivity or 
slavery itself. Deepening our understanding of how captors and captives alike understood 
their circumstances will help us better place Indian captivity within the broader practices 
of coerced labor and slavery that characterized New World societies.11  
Secondly, it examines the long-distance connections that practices of violence, 
colonialism, and trade forged between the Southwest Borderlands and the wider world. 
While scholars have often referenced the circulation of Native captives south into New 
Spain or to the Caribbean, they have rarely pursued these connections through sustained 
research. Culminating especially in the final chapter, which examines the experience of 
                                                            
9 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country. 
10 Paul Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement!: Biological Catastrophe in the Native Southeast, 1492-1715 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). 
11 I thank James Sidbury for his insights into the distinction between “slavery” and “slaving.”  I am 
referring in particular here to long-distance captive trades, where scholars have revealed much about 
transport and exchange but been able to speak less to what ultimately happened to captives when they 
arrived at their destinations. See, for example, Brett Rushforth, “‘A Little Flesh We Offer You’: The 
Origins of Indian Slavery in New France,” William & Mary Quarterly 60 (2003): 777-808; Gallay, The 
Indian Slave Trade. Spanish archival records appear to provide more insight into this question than the 
records of other colonial powers.  
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Apaches like El Grande and El Chico who ended up in Havana, Cuba, this dissertation 
uncovers as much as possible what happened to captives in diaspora and why. Attention 
to such long-distance connections maps the surprisingly significant incursions of imperial 
interests and the global economy into a region that has often been posited as somewhat 
isolated.12  
Thirdly, I show how such incursions affected change over time in practices of 
violence, captivity, and slavery in the Southwest Borderlands, as in the North American 
Southeast. It was those areas most affected by empires and the globalizing economy that 
witnessed the greatest innovation in practices of captivity and slavery. South of the 
present-day U.S.-Mexico border in the Spanish kingdoms of Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo 
Leon, for example, alternatives to “slavery” for Indian captives had emerged by the 
eighteenth century. Spaniards and their Native allies began to exile “enemy Indian” 
captives more systematically than ever before, as they transported more than 3,000 
Native captives from regions straddling the Rio Grande to New Spain and the Caribbean 
between 1770 and 1810 alone. Casting light on this history reveals a mosaic of captivity 
and forced migration practices that warns against a homogenous conception of what 
Indian “slavery” was like in early North America.13  
  The contributions of this project build out of its distinct methodological 
approach. On the one hand, the dissertation is a study of captivity in a specific region, 
what I call the “Greater Rio Grande.” Apaches or Spaniards in the 17th century 
                                                            
12 For references to captives being sent to Mexico and the Caribbean in studies focused on other issues See 
David J. Weber Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 150;  Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 78; Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a 
Woman, 189; Alonso, Threads of Blood, 37-39. 
13 Juliana Barr makes a similar point about the multiplicities of captivity practices in the North American 
West in “Captives to Slaves.” More than to emphasize diversity, however, my aim below is to identify 
broader themes and patterns that provides points of comparison to other North American contexts.   
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recognized the mountains, valleys, and waterways of the Rio Grande River Basin as a 
territorial mosaic divided between “their lands” and “ours.”  If the term is my own, I 
argue that because water was so essential to mobility and survival, the Rio Grande River 
Basin did interlink groups in ways that warrant analyzing it as a coherent region. 
Moreover, the concept of the “Greater Rio Grande” allows for an integrated analysis of 
terrain that is often artificially separated in historical inquiry. Scholars of “Southwest 
Borderlands” history, due in part to the links of this field to early U.S. history, have 
focused primarily on present-day California, New Mexico, and Texas. Scholars of Latin 
American history, in turn, have focused most on the region south of the modern border—
present-day Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, or Nuevo Leon, for example. Though both 
fields recognize that this division makes little sense in the period before the border was 
formed in 1848, work remains to be done to understand the relationships between 
Natives, Euroamericans, and Africans that cut across this traditional historiographical 
divide.14  
                                                            
14 These two literatures have pursued distinct thematic interests as well. Much of the recent ethnohistorical 
work on Texas, for example, has been shaped by an interest in narratives that challenge the traditional view 
of the conquest and decline of Native populations and instead emphasize Native dominance and power. See 
Hämäläinen’s Comanche Empire, Barr’s Peace Came in the Form of a Woman and Gary Clayton 
Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1999). For an important exception see Maria Wade, The Native Americans of the Texas 
Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003). Latin Americanists have been less 
interested in spheres of Native dominance, but rather the relationship between missionization, labor, and 
landscape. See for example, Deeds, Defiance and Deference, Cramaussel, Poblar la frontera, and Cynthia 
Radding, Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern 
Mexico, 1700-1850 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
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Map 1: Rio Grande River Basin15 
 
Within this spatial focus on the Greater Rio Grande, my analysis hones in on the 
relationship between migratory Indian peoples and their neighbors, Hispanic, African, 
and Native alike. I pay particular attention to Athapaskan-speaking groups that came to 
be known by Euroamerican outsiders as “Apaches,” though they referred to themselves 
as “Tinde,” “Nde,” or other variants of their term for “the people.” Though Apaches are 
mentioned in almost every study of the North American West, their history before 1800 
remains understudied, in part because of their diversity, lack of pan-tribal identity, and 
mobility. The proliferation of Spanish ethnic ascriptions—with new designations 
                                                            
15 Map sourced from <http://www.riogrande-riobravo.org/Map/riograndemap.html> (Accessed by Author, 
28 April 2011).  
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emerging and then disappearing sometimes within only a few years—has raised 
particular difficulties for historians to make sense of who “Apaches” were and their 
historical significance. Some scholars have gone as far as to suggest that “Apache” was 
more of a Spanish synonym for enemy than a referent to actual Indians.  If the diversity 
and multiplicity of Athapaskan-speaking groups strains the meaning of the overarching 
category of “Apache” or “Apachean,” I argue that these diverse groups warrant collective 
analysis precisely because their mobility, dispersal, and divisions helped make them such 
frequent targets for capture and enslavement. Though Apachean groups also took 
captives of their own—as I will demonstrate—their capture and enslavement by others 
was more important between 1500 and 1800.16  
 
Map$2:$General$Location$of$Apachean$Groups$in$the$pre61800$Southwest17$
                                                            
16 Though historically Spaniards sometimes included Navajos among “Apache” groups, they became 
increasingly differentiated over time as they developed a pastoral lifestyle and I thus exclude them from the 
category “Apachean” in this analysis.  I focus in particular on those Athapaskan-speaking groups that 
dwelled historically in territories in or adjacent to the Rio Grande River Basin, especially Jicarilla Apaches, 
Mescalero Apaches, and Chiricahua Apaches. On the diversity of Apache groups and their cultural 
traditions see relevant entries in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 10 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). For “Apache” as synonym for enemy see Sara Ortelli, Trama 
de Una Guera Conveniente: Nueva Vizcaya y la sombra de los apaches, 1748-1790 (Mexico, D.F.: El 
Colegio de Mexico, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007). 
17 Map from Richard J. Perry, Apache Reservation: Indigenous Peoples and the American State (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1993), 19.  
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A word on terminology is in order. I use the term “captive” below to refer broadly 
to detained outsiders. If Apachean groups do not appear to have developed distinct terms 
for “captivity” and “slavery,” Spaniards elaborated multiple categories for detained 
persons and forced laborers that shifted over time. For them, a “cautivo” was a Christian 
person detained among pagans or infidels, while the terms “prisionero” and “pieza”—
literally “piece” or “coin”—referred to “heathen” Indians captured during warfare. 
Especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spaniards commonly identified 
these “piezas” after sale as “esclavos” or “slaves,” and residents attested to their 
possession of Indian slaves in legal documents like titles and wills. Over time, other 
terms came into existence to reflect shifts in the official legal status of Native piezas, 
especially the term “criado,” meaning literally “one who is raised up.” This term 
reflected the idea that through labor and the watchful care of one’s captor, heathen 
Indians could be turned into productive, and “free,” Christian subjects.18 
The analytical category of “captivity” is useful because it allows for a 
consideration of Spaniards’ shifting conceptions of Native status without privileging their 
understandings over those of detained Indians who likely saw their circumstances 
differently. Moreover, because it is a broad term that does not assume property status or 
forced labor, “captivity” allows for analysis of a variety of fates for detained Natives that 
often did not involve labor as the chattel of a single master, but rather long-term 
imprisonment, assignment to public works projects, escape, or death. While some 
historians have cast aside Spanish terminology as “euphemism” that sought to evade 
                                                            
18 Dorothy Bray, White Mountain Apache Tribe., Western Apache-English dictionary: A Community-
Generated Bilingual Dictionary (Tempe  Ariz.: Bilingual Press, 1998); On Apache captivity practices see 
also Grenville Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
1971). On Spanish terminology see especially Chapters 1 and 2 below and Alonso, Thread of Blood; 
Brooks, Captives & Cousins, especially 6-7.  
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shifting imperial views on the propriety of Indian slavery, I believe this issue warrants 
further attention. If sparked by legal concerns, over time distinct categories for Native 
captives may have “stuck,” helping to fuel distinct fates for Indians captured in warfare 
and further engrain the association of “slavery” with African descent.19  
If a focus on the Greater Rio Grande, captivity, and migratory Native peoples sets 
the general bounds of inquiry, I argue that the history of the Rio Grande cannot be 
understood without considering migrations and processes that extended far beyond it. In 
fact, movement is at the heart of this dissertation, posing both analytical challenges and 
the potential for new historical insights. In this regard, my guiding methodology is 
simple: I have endeavored to trace the subjects of my study, Native captives from the 
Greater Rio Grande, to wherever they might lead me—across gray areas of social status 
and geopolitical boundaries that still shape (and sometimes constrain) our historical 
inquiries.20   
The primary source material for this study reflects this attention to long-distance 
movement and interconnection. For the long-distance transport of Native captive I have 
drawn especially upon newly available documents in the Mexican National Archives in 
Mexico City as well as the Cuban papers in the Archive of the Indies in Seville, Spain. 
For the local dynamics of interethnic social relations, I have relied upon regional archives 
like the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, the Parral Archives, the Presidio of Janos 
                                                            
19 On Spanish terminology as euphemism see Marc Simmons quoted in Gutierrez, When Jesus Came, 155. 
James Brooks similarly implies that Spanish descriptions of captive trading as “rescate” or “redemption” 
might be understood as an “artifice” see Captives & Cousins, 125. 
20 I am influenced here by the transnational methodologies of Atlantic and global history. As Thomas 
Bender has explained: “Again and again, we see that if one is willing to cross inherited historiographical 
boundaries, one’s topic often extends beyond them. The point is not to begin with the global, it is only to 
allow it.” See Bender in Jorge Cañizares and Erik R. Seeman, eds., The Atlantic in Global History (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), xvii. 
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records, and the records of the Provincias Internas, either via the original manuscripts or 
microfilm copies. I was particularly surprised by the frequency with which I found 
testimony from Native captives themselves, especially in Spanish court records and 
investigations, which help shed some (admittedly refracted) light onto how they 
understood their circumstances. In the very least, Native testimony often provided me 
with especially descriptive detail about the nature of household relations and the logistics 
of captivity and transport.21  
I present my findings in chapters organized into two roughly chronological 
sections, each of which identifies and examines a distinct era of captivity in the Greater 
Rio Grande. Part One, “Markets in Indian Slaves,” considers the slave trades that 
developed after the arrival of the Spanish in the region in the mid-1500s. Native groups 
had long engaged in warfare, taken captives, and made decisions about what to do with 
these captives—varying from ritualized killing to adoption as kin. But Euroamerican 
settlement, and the close proximity of newly discovered silver mines central to imperial 
interests, produced new demand for labor and turned captives of war into valuable 
commodities.  
Chapter 1, "Borderlands of Slavery," examines the ways in which pre-contact 
practices of captive exchange intertwined with Spanish labor demands to produce a trade 
in Apache captives from present-day New Mexico to urban centers in colonial Mexico in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Challenging the “tension” scholars have posited 
between restrictions on Indian enslavement in the New Laws of 1542 and the widespread 
practice of slavery on colonial frontiers, I show how royal decrees and orders continued 
                                                            
21 By “refracted” I mean the mediation of scribes and interpreters. In my critical approach to interpreting 
such narratives I draw especially from Irene Silverblatt, Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial 
Origins of the Civilized World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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to allow clear exceptions to the slavery prohibition well into the seventeenth century, 
buttressing long-distance trades in Native captives throughout Spanish America. Rather 
than a “tension,” the relationship between local and imperial views of Indian slavery is 
best seen as an ongoing negotiation between official decrees, customary practices, and 
local concerns of governance. 
Chapter 2, “The Infamous Traffic,” shows how slavery and forced migration were 
of course not solely Spanish or Euroamerican practices. As Comanches overran Apache 
villages in present-day Colorado and Texas, they carried captives of war to trading fairs 
in New Mexico and the Louisiana borderlands. The value of Apachean captives acquired 
during the early 1700s fueled further Comanche expansion by providing access to horses 
and guns that helped them establish a vast trading complex in the South Plains over the 
course of the eighteenth century, displacing many of the region’s former inhabitants—
and especially Apachean groups—in the process. I argue that Spaniards’ continued 
willingness to participate in Apache captive trades reflected the limits of Spanish 
jurisdiction and sovereignty in an increasingly Comanche-dominated world north and 
east of the Rio Grande, more than a voracious demand for slave labor within colonial 
New Mexican society. The slave trade and Comanche power went hand in hand, as 
Comanches offered up Apache captives to Spanish and French buyers, demanding and 
receiving the horses and guns that gave them the decisive advantage over competitors as 
they gained control over much of the plains between New Mexico and Louisiana by mid-
century. 
While markets in Indian slaves were significant in the Greater Rio Grande, they 
were not universal or unchanging. The second part of the dissertation, “When Indians 
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Were Not Enslaved,” considers why alternatives to Indian enslavement emerged amidst 
Native challenges to Spanish sovereignty and renewed efforts to expand the empire 
territorially in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After the Pueblo Revolt 
successfully expelled Spaniards from New Mexico between 1680 and 1692, and Native 
rebellions flared south of the Rio Grande as well, some Spanish governors and residents 
of the region argued that residents should not auction or enslave Indian captives as they 
had in the past, but instead exile them to places from which they could never return.  
Chapter 3, “To Islands Overseas,” pursues a case study of one such context in 
which a coalition of migratory Indian groups that Spaniards had sometimes enslaved in 
the past—the “Tobosos”—faced alternatives fates to enslavement. The capture and exile 
of Toboso groups emerged not to fulfill market demand for slave labor, but rather as an 
attempt to achieve security and sovereignty in a region that remained highly contested in 
the late-1600s and early-1700s. As Tobosos combined talk of “peace” and “obedience to 
his majesty” with raids of Spanish settlements and participation in Nativist rebellions that 
swept across the region in the 1680s and 1690s, Spanish residents and their governors 
explained that such mobile Indians impeded the progress of Nueva Vizcaya and 
threatened its “ruin” and “depopulation.”  They argued that removing Natives “to islands 
overseas” thus represented the only means to bring lasting peace and prosperity to their 
contested kingdom. If new legal restrictions on Indian enslavement may have played a 
role in this decision, the central impetus was not imperial but local, as persistent 
interethnic violence had convinced some Nueva Vizcayans that traditional means of 
interacting with Natives, including enslavement, would be fruitless. Several hundred 
captives were in fact exiled in the 1720s to Mexico City and the Caribbean. Civil officials 
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distributed them at no cost to residents, other than solemn promises to feed and clothe 
them, Christianize them, and treat them well. This history served as a precedent for later 
forced migrations of Apache captives to the Caribbean. 
Chapter 4, “Intimate Enemies,” brings Apachean groups back to the foreground of 
analysis in order to examine their efforts to escape violence and captivity in-between the 
Comanche and the Spanish, and adapt through mobility, diplomacy, and armed struggle 
of their own in the eighteenth century. Challenging the notion that Apache migrants 
initiated devastating raids in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila after midcentury, the chapter 
highlights relatively peaceful trade between Apaches and mission Indian communities 
along the Rio Grande and areas to the south in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila through the 
1760s. It was only after some royal officials chose to target Apache groups for 
participation in what was in fact a multi-ethnic livestock rustling economy that reciprocal 
violence escalated, and residents of the Greater Rio Grande faced the age-old question of 
what fate war captives should receive.  
Chapter 5, “To Put the Sea In-Between,” explains how Spaniards drew upon a 
now well-established custom in choosing to displace hundreds of Apache captives from 
the Rio Grande to central Mexico and the Caribbean between 1770 and 1816. It 
highlights how—ironically—captives’ harrowing resistance to forced migration fueled 
Spanish decisions to send them ever farther away, as Apaches threw themselves to the 
ground and refused to march, escaped and returned north to homelands in the Rio 
Grande, and even jumped into the sea before being embarked to Cuba. As one Spanish 
official put it, experience led them to the conclusion that the only sure solution was to 
“put the sea between” Apaches and their homelands. As the case of an Apache palenque 
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in Cuba reveals, however, even this solution proved far from sure. This analysis 
highlights both change and continuity over time in the fate of Native captives exiled from 
the Greater Rio Grande. If New Mexican merchants had once carried them south to New 
Spain to sell for significant sums, now Spanish administrators directed the capture and 
transport of Apaches and issued regulations for how they should be housed en route, what 
they should be fed, and where they should be taken. If such fates stretch conventional 
understandings of “slavery,” slavery may have remained an important category through 
which individuals understood Apache labor in certain contexts. In a slave society like 
Cuba, for instance, residents drew upon familiar referents in petitioning to receive an 
Apache “slave” or by recording their deaths and baptisms in the ledgers of “pardos and 
negros.” 
The dissertation concludes with an epilogue that considers what the mass exile of 
Apaches and neighboring groups meant for kin left behind in the Greater Rio Grande.  
Attention to the ubiquitous displacements of the late-1700s and early-1800s provides an 
essential context for understanding the emergence of peace agreements between some 
Hispanic and Native groups at the end of the colonial period. As Apaches witnessed men, 
women, and children being sent into exile, and as Spanish military officers threatened to 
send away their imprisoned kin if they did not agree to lay down their arms, some chose 
to enter into alliance with Spaniards and aid them in military campaigns against other 
Apachean groups. By tracing the story of one Apache man who lived through these years, 
the analysis concludes by highlighting the diversity of captivity and forced migration 
practices that continued to characterize life in the Greater Rio Grande at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century.   
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*  *  * 
The startling image of an Apache palenque in the Cuban countryside provides an 
entryway onto a much broader history. From enslaved war captives sent from Mexico to 
the Caribbean for auction in the sixteenth century, to “prisoners of war” exiled from the 
Greater Rio Grande in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Native captives like El 
Chico and El Grande appear in the chapters below in unexpected places and 
circumstances. While at times subject to an enslavement and property status resembling 
chattel slavery, the Native peoples of the Rio Grande often experienced captivities and 
forced migrations generated more by the interests of empires and nation-states in their 
territory and sovereignty than by markets in human labor. Uncovering these dynamics of 
captivity and their effects on Apachean groups and their neighbors serves to better 
integrate American Indian and Borderlands histories into central narratives of colonial 
North American scholarship. As long as the presence of Indians beyond the borderlands 
and frontiers of early America remains startling or unexpected in its own right, work on 
this front remains to be done.22  
 
                                                            
22 On the continued project of integrating Native peoples into the central narratives of American history I 
draw from Philip Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006) See 
also Daniel Richter, Facing east from Indian country a Native history of early America (Cambridge: 












                                                            
23 Map adapted from <http://www.csub.edu/~jreyna/maps.htm> (Accessed by Author 28 April 2011). I use 
this map with reservation, as it should be noted that it includes Spanish settlements that had not yet been 
established before the eighteenth century.  
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Chapter 1 
Borderlands of Slavery: American Indian Captivity in the Greater Rio Grande 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
 
In 1672, the president of the audiencia, or high court, of Guadalajara wrote to the 
Spanish monarch to complain that residents of his jurisdiction traded in Indian slaves. 
“The enslavement of Indians is very common in these provinces,” he noted, “especially 
for Chichimecas, Sinaloas, and Indians from New Mexico.” Such slave trading, in his 
opinion, flew in the face of the sovereign’s wishes, as “nothing has been more prohibited 
since the beginning of the conquest…than Indian slavery.” Given recent news from 
across the empire, this report regarding Northern New Spain may have hit a particularly 
raw nerve with the Spanish crown. Whether responding to concerns about Native 
captives bought and sold in public auctions in Nuevo Leon, transported by the dozens 
from New Mexico to New Spain, or held in service against their will in Venezuela and 
Chile, Queen-regent Mariana directed a series of cedulas across the Atlantic in the early 
1670s that sought to reform the practices of her subjects and liberate Indians and 
“Chinos” alike from slavery. Officials who did not comply with these orders faced 
permanent banishment from the Indies, and a fine of up to 2,000 pesos.24  
Forty years later, Indian “liberty” was still not a universally accepted principal, 
                                                            
24 For royal decrees or orders prohibiting slavery for indigenous groups in both the Americas and the 
Phillipines in the 1660s and 1670s, see AGN-Reales Cedulas Vol. D30, Expedientes 14, 45, and 1309 
[hereafter cited as AGN, RC, Vol. #, Exp. #]; Richard Konetzke, Colección de Documentos para la 
Historia de la Formación Social de Hispanoamérica, Volumen II, Segundo Tomo, 1660-1690 (Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1953), 492-3, 497, 591-593, 597, 612 [Hereafter cited as 
Konetzke, Colección, Vol. #, p. #]. Quote from president of the audiencia, or high appeals court, of 
Guadalajara is from a letter to the King dated 20 March 1672, in Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, 
Ramo Guadalajara, Leg. 12: “No hay cosa más prohibida desde el principio de la conquista de las Indias 
que la esclavitud de los indios que sin embargo en estas provincias es muy frecuente el venderlos y tenerlos 
por esclavos, especialmente a los indios chichimecas, sinaloas y los del Nuevo México y del Nuevo Reino 
de León.” I was pointed to this letter by a citation in Chantal Craumessel, Poblar la frontera: La provincia 
de Santa Bárbara en Nueva Vizcaya durante los siglos XVI y XVII (Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: El 
Colegio de Michoacán, 2006), 187. 
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however. In 1714, Governor Flores Mogollón called for the baptism of Apache captives 
sent to “distinct parts” from the kingdom of New Mexico. He explained that this order 
was rooted in his experience in the ports of the West Indies, where priests boarded 
vessels to baptize African slaves before they disembarked them for sale. Fearing for the 
eternal well being of Indian children that might die en route to their destinations, the 
governor argued that since Christianization was the reason the King “tolerated” the trade 
in Native captives, New Mexicans should draw upon the example of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and baptize Apaches. “The Reverend Fathers should do to them as is practiced 
and I have seen done in the seaports with the loads of Negros,” he reiterated, and 
mandated that public criers make his order heard “in all the Jurisdictions of this 
Kingdom.”25  
Such contradictory understandings of Indian captivity beg for explanation. On the 
one hand, scholars have long noted a tension between slavery prohibitions in the Spanish 
empire after the early sixteenth century and the common practice of enslaving Natives 
captives on colonial frontiers like New Mexico. The “persistence” of Indian slavery 
despite legal prohibition has been explained as a uniquely “frontier” phenomenon that 
reflected ongoing wars with Native groups and the relative weakness of royal authority 
far from colonial centers. In this analysis, Governor Mogollón’s order might be 
understood as illustrating the audiencia judge’s earlier lament: Indian slavery was “very 
common,” despite the fact that “nothing was more prohibited.”26  
                                                            
25 Order of Governor Flores Mogollón, 26 September 1714 in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, microfilm 
copy on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, Reel 4, frame 1102-1106. This order 
is also transcribed in David M. Brugge, Navajos in the Catholic Church Records of New Mexico, 1694-
1875 (Window Rock, Navajo Nation: Research Section, Parks and Recreation Department, The Navajo 
Tribe, 1968), xx.  
26 On the tension between legal prohibition and social practice, see especially Rick Hendricks and Gerald 
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By contextualizing Indian slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Greater Rio Grande within the broader Iberian Atlantic World, this chapter questions the 
tension that scholars have often posited between the illegality of Indian slavery and its 
practice. As recent scholarship in early modern legal history has highlighted, placing 
social customs in opposition to royal decrees and orders reflects a somewhat 
anachronistic conception of the “law.” “Derecho,” or justice, was pursued through 
negotiation between formal legal decrees, long-standing social customs, and local 
concerns of governance. In this vein, Mogollon’s 1714 order is illustrative. It is striking 
that he cast himself as the agent of royal will, and in a public decree that could easily 
have come to the attention of metropolitan authorities, he stressed the king’s “toleration” 
rather than prohibition of a trade in Indian captives. Mogollón believed that the king 
shared his understanding that it was preferable for Natives to be baptized and sold into 
forced labor in exile, rather than retain their liberty among kin and face eternal 
damnation. The “eternal” concerns of the soul, in other words, overrode the “temporal” 
concerns of the present-life.27  In fact, as this chapter will illustrate, the Spanish crown 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mandell, "The Apache Slave Trade in Parral, 1637-1679," The Journal of Big Bend Studies, 16 (2004): 59-
81. For others works that conceptualize the “persistence” of Indian slavery in the North American West as 
reflecting distance from metropolitan authorities see Susan M. Deeds, “Rural Work in Nueva Vizcaya: 
Forms of Labor Coercion on the Periphery,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 69, 3 (Aug. 1989), 
425-449; José Cuello, “The Persistence of Indian Slavery and Encomienda in the Northeast of Colonial 
Mexico, 1577-1723,” Journal of Social History, 21, 4 (Summer 1988), p. 683-700; James F. Brooks, 
Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press 2002). 
27 Order of Governor Flores Mogollón, 26 September 1714 in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, microfilm 
copy on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, Reel 4, frame 1102-1106; On Spanish 
ideologies of slavery I am influenced here by Malcolm K. Read, “From Feudalism to Capitalism: 
Ideologies of Slavery in the Spanish American Empire,” Hispanic Research Journal 4, no. 2 (June 2003): 
151-171. On the legal history of Northern New Spain, and the litigiousness of early modern peoples more 
broadly see Charles R. Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Lauren Benton, A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Law and Colonial 
Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
Brian P. Owensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University 
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commonly sanctioned the enslavement of particular Native groups in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries: those taken in “just war,” purchased from other Indians, or 
sentenced for criminal or rebellious acts. In other words, the audiencia of Guadalajara 
and the governor of New Mexico were both correct in their own way: prohibitions against 
the mass enslavement of Indians and “toleration” for enslaving particular Native groups 
had coexisted since Columbus’s arrival in the Caribbean in 1492.28  
Attention to such legal pluralism in the context of Native enslavement helps 
explain why Indian captive trades in sixteenth and seventeenth century New Spain were 
far from clandestine, as individuals drew upon legal practices like titles, transfers, bills of 
sale, and wills to secure sizeable investments in Native servants and slaves. In fact, 
Indian and African captivity intersected in households from Northern New Spain to 
Mexico City, where even the viceroy and his wife entered into a dispute over Apache and 
Plains Indian captives in the 1660s. The long-distance circulation of Native captives was 
not unique to New Spain either, as similar trades developed in the Caribbean, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere.29 
While Indian captivity was a significant practice throughout Spanish America 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spaniards explained the status of Natives 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 2008); Christopher Albi, “Contested Legalities in Colonial Mexico: Francisco Xavier Gamboa and 
the Defense of Derecho Indiano,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2009).  
28 For a chronological overview of Indian slavery in colonial Mexico see Silvio Zavala, Los Esclavos Indios 
en La Nueva España (Mexico City: Colegio Nacional Luis González Obregón, 1967). 
29 Recent studies addressing the circulation of captives in the North American West have not paid 
significant attention to legal practices within the Spanish colonial sphere, in part reflecting their focus on 
the exchange of captives between Native groups and Hispanic residents on the periphery of colonial 
settlement. See James F. Brooks "'This Evil Extends Especially...To the Feminine Sex': Negotiating 
Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands” Feminist Studies 22, 2 (1996): 279-309 and Captives & 
Cousins; Juliana Barr, “From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands,” 
Journal of American History 92, 1 (June 2005); Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez “Captivity and Adoption Among 
the Comanche Indians, 1700-1875,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los Angeles, 2006).  For 
long-distance captive trades elsewhere in Spanish America see Konetzke, Colección, Vols. 1-2. 
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differently over time. During early colonization, the legal status of “slavery” was ascribed 
similarly to both African and Native captives: it was a life-long condition that individuals 
passed on to their descendants. By the seventeenth century, however, Indian “slavery” 
had become a legally “temporal” condition, usually a ten to twenty year-term of servitude 
that individuals purchased with the understanding that Native captives would be 
emancipated at the end of the term. After 1670, Indian enslavement became more 
restricted than ever before as “slavery” became almost exclusively the status of captives 
of African descent.30 
While taking such legal shifts seriously, this chapter aims to understand how 
shifting Spanish understandings of “slavery” influenced the lives of Native captives over 
time. To what extent, for example, did the divergence in legal statuses for Natives and 
Africans translate into distinct experiences of captivity? In this regard, the evidence is 
mixed. Emancipated Indian slaves often remained in the same households as before, and 
life experiences often depended more on the individuality of masters than on the legal 
status of laborers. At the same time, however, legal changes had the power to disrupt the 
economics of slave markets, as questions about legal status made buyers unwilling to pay 
the sizeable sums they had in the past for Indian captives. Perhaps most importantly, 
“liberty” clearly mattered to those Natives who gained enough knowledge of the law to 
petition for their freedom, even if the range of choices available to them as “free” 
                                                            
30 On the intellectual history of slavery in the Iberian Atlantic, and in colonial Mexico more specifically, 
see María Elena Martínez, “The Black Blood of New Spain: Limpieza de Sangre, Racial Violence, and 
Gendered Power in Early Colonial Mexico,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 61, 3 (July 2004); Anthony 
Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Herman L. Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico: 
Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570-1640 (Bloomington, Ind.: University of 
Indiana Press, 2003); Zavala, Los Esclavos Indios. 
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laborers in colonial society remained circumscribed.31  
 
The Law of Indian Slavery  
 
In his classic study of the incorporation of Aztecs under Spanish rule, Charles 
Gibson suggested that significant changes in Mexican history "rarely occurred as a 
consequence of law." As he saw it, law represented "an approximation of historical 
happening, or a commentary upon it." In the case of Indian slavery, an analysis of the 
outpouring of royal decrees and trans-Atlantic correspondence from early Spanish 
colonization through the mid-seventeenth century serves twin purposes. First, legal 
discussions cast light on Spanish ideologies of slavery and the common acceptance of 
Native enslavement by the Crown and its subjects for particular indigenous groups. 
Second, such discussions often also reveal historical practice and illustrate how qualified 
legal sanctions facilitated the enslavement of Natives in the years after early colonization, 
whether in Northern New Spain and the Greater Rio Grande or within the wider Iberian 
Atlantic World.32  
Declarations of Indian liberty and slavery coexisted from early colonization. Less 
than ten years after Columbus arrived in the West Indies in 1492, Queen Isabella and 
King Ferdinand had formally approved “liberty” for Indians. Echoing this sentiment, 
Charles V affirmed in 1520 that "the Indians [are] free, ought to be treated as such, and 
                                                            
31 I am suggesting here the need for further research on the ways that captors and captives understood their 
own circumstances, motivations, and intentions in the colonial North American West. While trans-
historical definitions of slavery are useful for comparative purposes, we must be careful that theory not 
supplant the particularities of distinct contexts. For a useful example of a historically grounded approach to 
“liberty” as a concept in eighteenth century New Spain, see Ownesby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice.  
32 Charles Gibson, The Aztecs under Spanish rule: a history of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 235.  
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induced to accept Christianity by the methods Christ had established."33 In the early-
1500s, however, Natives were in fact taken as slaves in large numbers, circulated on the 
mainland and in the Caribbean, and even transported back to Iberia. One cleric on 
Hispaniola, for example, explained the he often saw boat captains disembarking “great 
quantities” of Indian slaves transported from New Spain and Panuco. These slaves 
carried the royal brand and Spaniards "sold them publicly." In 1536, the Queen explained 
that "many people passed from the Indies to Spain carrying Indians." She lamented that 
even those that were not slaves, were sold as such. If such practices occasionally 
represented subversions of the law, they more often reflected the fact that royal officials 
declared the liberty of Indians while simultaneously carving out distinctions between 
Native groups and granting slaves to reward the actions of loyal subjects. Thus Charles V 
might have qualified his statement that "the Indians [are] free," by explaining that those 
who resisted Spanish authority, did not listen attentively to the friars, or were among 
especially "barbarous" nations, might be (and were in fact) enslaved.34  
Three key traditions shaped Spaniards’ early practices of slavery in the Americas. 
First, drawing lines of religious difference, they took slaves on the basis of Just War 
against infidel peoples. This first principle was tied to conquest, as Natives who refused 
to accept Christianity or pledge obedience to the Catholic monarch—as mandated in the 
famous requerimiento—were subject to enslavement. Secondly, drawing especially upon 
                                                            
33 Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan 
Gines de Sepulveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (Dekalb, 
Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 11. 
34 On Indians in Iberia and the Queen’s declaration see Kontezke, Colección, Vol. 1, 46: “muchas personas 
que pasaban de las Indias a España llevaban indios y no siendo sus esclavos los vendían como si lo fuesen.” 
See also Zavala, Los Esclavos Indios, 47.  Regarding importation of slaves to Caribbean: See Zavala, Los 
Esclavos Indios, 108. Luis de Morales (clerigo) noted that “estando en la isla Española vio venir muchas 
veces gran cantidad de indios por esclavos en naviós procedentes de Nueva España y de Pánuco, entre otras 
partes; los indios se vendían públicamente, herrados con el hierro del rey.” 
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past relations with Muslims in Iberia, Castilians justified the "rescate," or "redemption," 
of slaves held by infidels or pagans as a means to save them from eternal damnation and 
to instruct them in Catholicism. This custom proved crucial to Spanish participation in 
Native trading fairs, where they might "redeem" the heathen slaves brought by Indians to 
sell to them. Finally, it was generally accepted that criminals, "apostates" or "rebels" 
might be enslaved as punishment for their actions against God and King. In fact, 
enslavement under these circumstances was understood as a sign of the benevolence of 
the monarch, a commutation of the sentence of death that these actions warranted. This 
motive became more influential as time passed and some Natives appeared to have 
rejected the opportunity to accept the gospel and pledge obedience to the Catholic 
monarch, or persisted in their “idolatry” or mobile ways of life.35   
The way early modern Spaniards categorized Native groups illuminates practices 
of enslavement. Ethnic ascriptions like “Carib,” “Chichimeco,” and later “Apache” were 
amorphous designations that reflected Spanish perceptions of the cultural traits and 
character of a given group more than the self-designation or “identity” of particular 
Native men or women. The distinction between bellicose Natives and allegedly "meek" 
Indians receptive to Catholic instruction also buttressed distinctions between "free" and 
"slave" Indians.  In 1511, for example, King Ferdinand issued two cedulas regarding the 
enslavement of Natives in the Caribbean. The first sought to stem what he perceived to be 
early abuses in the enslavement of peaceful Natives. The second distinguished between 
the Indians who had listened to the friars who had preached to them about "our Catholic 
                                                            
35 For a rich primary source explication of these justifications see correspondence between Governor 
Henrrique de Avila y Pacheco and the Audiencia of Gudalajara in AGN Tierras 3286. For scholarly 
discussions see Craumessel, Poblar La Frontera, 186-188; Hanke, All Mankind is One; Pagden, The Fall of 
Natural Man; Brooks, Captives and Cousins, especially 31-36.  
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faith" and a group of Natives—the "Caribs"—who had not listened nor agreed to enter 
into the service of Spaniards. Instead, the Caribs had resisted by killing Christians, 
making war against Spaniards and their new Indian allies, and capturing them "to eat." 
Moreover, they had convinced other Native groups to join them. On the island of San 
Juan (Puerto Rico), Indians had "diabolically" and "treacherously" killed Don Cristobal 
de Sotomayor, his nephew, and other "many" Christians, "rising up" and "rebelling 
against our service." Importantly, Caribs had come to the aid of these rebels, arriving in 
canoes by the dozens.36 
What was to be done with people that had received the "requerimiento" that 
compelled them to become Christians, join with the faithful, and pledge obedience to the 
Catholic monarchy of Castile, but had refused and violently resisted? How were Spanish 
subjects to respond to Natives who, like the Caribs, compelled recent converts to rise up 
and make war against Spaniards? The King granted license to any and all persons to go to 
the islands of the Caribs and the surrounding mainland, make war against them, and 
"capture and take them away to wherever they please." Moreover, they could "sell them 
and make use of them without any penalty," and without paying the customary royal fifth 
in taxes. In fact, the only restriction was that these Carib slaves not be taken out of the 
Indies, and it is apparent that Spanish residents could interpret the cedula broadly, as the 
category of “Carib” and thus “slave” might be applied to any resistant group in the 
region, including the allegedly “diabolical” Natives that Caribs had aided on the island of 
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San Juan.37 
 When Spaniards moved to begin new conquests, they revealed the importance of 
existing Caribbean slave trades while articulating the desire to enslave new captives on 
the mainland. Hernan Cortés and his men, for example, petitioned the King in July 1519 
for permission to bring their Indian slaves from the Antilles.  Anticipating war with 
Natives in the process of conquering new lands, they also requested that they be able to 
take and distribute war captives as slaves, "as is customary in the land of infidels, being a 
just thing." These slaves they branded, and the royal fifth was taken from their sale. This 
practice was affirmed in June 1523, when a cedula noted that "if requeridos the Indians 
did not submit, they could be enslaved," though the King noted that this license should 
not be abused, given the potential incentive it might give Spaniards to incite Indian 
violence solely for the purpose of capturing Natives as slaves.38  
In the early years of conquest and settlement in and around Tenochtitlan, the 
Aztec capital, the Crown sought to negotiate these Iberian customs of slavery with 
concerns that “gentile” Indians warranted special protection so that they might be 
instructed in Christianity. If the case of the Caribs and the enslavement of Nahuas in the 
conquest illustrated the doctrines of "just war" and enslavement as punishment for 
rebellious act against the King, the Crown also condoned rescate, in this case the ransom 
of slaves that Nahuas had incorporated through trade or warfare. While sanctioning the 
use of the brand as a physical mark of legal status, royal decrees noted that it was to be 
kept by a civil official of good repute, and that a distinctive brand was to be applied to 
distinguish slaves taken in war from those obtained through rescate. In October 1522, a 
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cedula affirmed that citizens and settlers of New Spain were just in "rescuing Indian 
slaves and taking them in for however long was the will of the king." Suggesting the 
early importance of slavery as an institution, a January 1527 order designated Antonio 
Cordero as the constable to recover runaway slaves around Mexico City, noting that 
"masters would pay him 5 pesos in gold for every black; half a peso for every Indian 
slave; and one peso for every beast.” Note that Indians slaves were valued less than 
beasts and far less than African slaves, perhaps due to their ubiquity.39 
 Reports of "abuses” did not take long to cross the Atlantic. A cedula titled "may 
the Natives of New Spain not be Slaves nor branded," dated 9 November 1526, for 
example, did not in fact prohibit slavery, but instead noted that no free Indian should be 
taken as a slave or branded as such. It explained that individuals were branding and thus 
unjustly enslaving Indians not taken in just war, sentenced to slavery by the crown for 
rebellion, or ransomed as slaves from other Indians. Such “abuses” may have in part 
reflected attempts by early conquistadors, who had been granted Indian towns in 
encomienda, to overcome the limitations imposed on them by that system by branding 
encomienda Indians as slaves.40 
 Royal officials responded by seeking to monopolize branding, which provided the 
visual and legal marker that distinguished "free Indians" from slaves. In August 1528, 
and January of 1532, new decrees noted that, since residents of New Spain were branding 
free Indians on the face, as if they were slaves, the brand was to be kept locked in a chest 
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with two different keys, one to be held by Bishop of Mexico, and the other by the civil 
official of the jurisdiction. Indians were thus only to be branded in the presence of the 
highest religious official of New Spain, and no Indian was to be branded without royal 
consent, under penalty of loss of possessions. Correspondence from elsewhere in the 
expanding Spanish empire certainly influenced such decrees, as subjects in Peru 
requested and were granted authorization to buy slaves from Native caciques or headmen 
via rescate, Guatemala was authorized to take war captives as slaves in 1533, and news 
arrived that merchants had sold 300 Indian men and women from Brazil in a public 
auction on the island of Hispaniola.41 
 No linear trajectory away from slavery and towards "liberty" is evident in the 
early to mid-1500s, but rather a differentiation of statuses for Native groups. A February 
1534 cedula, for example, sought to clarify the terms of slavery for Natives. First, it 
noted that captives taken in just war could be enslaved, with the stipulation that those 
taken on the mainland could not be taken to sell in the Caribbean islands. Second, it noted 
that "neither the women taken in war, nor the children fourteen years or younger could be 
seen as captives (and thus slaves)," but permission was given for governors and captains 
to capture them and utilize them for service, giving them to homes as "naborias," free 
Indians who labored indefinitely without wages.42  
By the 1530s, distinct statuses of Indian laborers had developed: encomienda 
Indians, who were subject to short-term labor for their encomenderos and paid tribute; 
Indian slaves, who as property could be traded, transported, and whose children were also 
slaves; and "naborias," Indian servants who worked in households or workshops 
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permanently without wages but whose status was not inherited. Royal cedulas had thus 
begun to differentiate between Native and African women and children by restricting the 
enslavement of the former while sanctioning permanent slave status for the latter. In the 
short term, the distinction in experience between a slave African woman and an Indian 
“naboria” was negligible, but for future generations such distinction in legal status would 
not be meaningless, and would serve to solidify associations of Africanness with slave 
status.  At the same time, if new laws sought to change contemporary practices, they did 
so by commenting on the persistent enslavement of Native women and children. In 
February 1541, for example, a cedula noted that “Indios Naborias” were not to be sold or 
transported like slaves, indicating that residents of New Spain were in fact circulating 
them as such.43   
 The New Laws of 1542 weigh large in discussions of Indian enslavement in the 
Spanish empire, and in comparative accounts of European colonization in the Americas. 
These orders of King Charles V “for the governance of the Indies and good treatment and 
conservation of the Indians,” included a declaration against Indian enslavement, a 
statement clarifying that all Natives were “free persons,” and the gradual abolition of the 
forced labor system of encomienda. In this vein, restrictions on Indian slavery are noted 
to be a case of Spanish exceptionalism, as no comparable prohibition emerged in British, 
Dutch, or French colonial projects, especially at such an early date.  The Latin American 
historiography often references this effort to reign in the power of encomenderos as the 
moment when the mass enslavement and circulation of Indians ended, manumission 
occurred, and Indian slavery began to be confined to the margins. It is when “slavery” 
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becomes an African, rather than Native, story.44   
Taking the long view, however, the New Laws appear less transformative than 
incremental in impact regarding Native captivity. Concerns about protecting Indian 
populations emerged out of existing intellectual and legal traditions: the Spanish crown 
had declared the "liberty” of Indians soon after 1492, and Indian freedom was part and 
parcel of the Royal Bull of 1537 that affirmed Iberian sovereignty over the New World. 
Cedulas and decrees also had already begun to elaborate a gendered distinction between 
Indian men and women that sought to reserve “slavery” for male war captives, rebels, or 
slaves redeemed from Native masters.45 
 Looking forward, it is apparent that the New Laws did not produce a blanket 
prohibition on Indian slavery either. While many Indians successfully sued for their 
freedom in the 1550s, and even the practice of "naboria" was revoked in 1550 in an order 
that noted that “no form of involuntary labor” was allowed for Indians, the reality of 
exceptions by royal decree and by Indians’ “character” continued. Merchants continued 
to transport Native men and women from Brazil to Hispaniola and sell them in public 
auctions for 25 pesos each, they transported six thousand Indian captives from Central 
American to Peru around 1550, and soldiers carried more than two hundred Tepehuan 
Indians from Nueva Vizcaya to Durango to sell in 1604.46  
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If anything, new decrees against Indian enslavement in 1553 and 1563 speak 
more to the persistence of "abuses"—the enslavement of Indians that were not war 
captives, rebels, or redeemed slaves—than they do to a consensus that no Indians should 
be enslaved. In this vein, the relationship between law and practice in Chile is illustrative. 
In 1608, for example, a cedula had permitted that Indians taken in war in Chile be given 
as slaves. It noted that both men "older than ten and a half" and women "older than nine 
and a half,” whether taken by Indian allies or by Spaniards in war, could be had as their 
slaves to serve them, and they could be "sold, given, or disposed of as they please." It 
noted that younger children could not be enslaved, but could be taken out of the 
rebellious zones and transported elsewhere, and given to persons who they would serve 
until they were 20 years old, "to indoctrinate them and be instructed in our holy Catholic 
faith as was done with the Moriscos of Granada." Once these Indians stopped rebelling, 
however, slaves could no longer be taken from them.47  
 Like the condemnation of Caribs 100 years before, this order reflected the fact 
that "rebellious" Indians who resisted Christianization and the King's rule could be 
sentenced to slavery as punishment. Unlike that earlier order, however, it demonstrated 
concern to restrict who was subject to this sentence, distinguishing between adults and 
children, for example, while placing a clear limit on when they could be taken: only as 
long as they were rebelling. Furthermore, as in Mexico, Chileans branded these slaves, 
but some questioned whether they should be branded on the face. Both in the order of 
1608 and in a subsequent debate over branding, the source of the practice was explicitly 
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evoked. "As was done with the Moriscos of Granada," noted the King, and those who 
wanted to brand Indians on the face explained "it was the general custom in all the 
provinces of Europe."48  
 Between 1632 and 1635, this debate played out in missives between local 
officials, the viceroy in Peru, and the Council of the Indies in Spain. One the one hand, 
some argued that they should not brand Indians, both due to past legal precedent (the 
1532 decree against it in New Spain) and due to the fact that Indians were responding in 
kind: they were branding Spaniards that they captured in retaliation. On the other hand, 
the governor of Chile argued that it was a custom and consequence of slavery "since its 
beginnings," and that the law of 1532 concerned "more domesticated Indians, less 
rebellious, and those who were being branded who were free." The ability to brand slaves 
was crucial to motivating the troops, he argued, noting that "the soldieries of the army 
would lose morale in noting that their catch would be uncertain, without the security of 
the brand on the face, especially since these are people who easily flee back to their 
lands."49  
 The distinction the governor made between "domesticated" Indians and the 
rebellious ones of his jurisdiction was indicative of broader ideologies of Indian slavery, 
whether Natives in Chile who branded Spaniards and fled easily back to their lands, or 
Caribs who "ate men," or, as we will see, Apaches in the Greater Rio Grande who "had 
always been in rebellion against Spaniards." The flexibility of the Council of the Indies to 
local concerns is noteworthy in this respect. They returned this case of Indian branding, 
for example, to the Viceroy of Peru and ordered that he decide what he saw fit, 
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suggesting that perhaps a brand on the hand would be "enough for security, and leave 
privileged the face, so esteemed by men...without defect." The subtext of this opinion, 
undoubtedly, was the underlying hope that Indians in their reciprocal violence would 
again imitate Spaniards, this time by branding the hand and not the face, or refraining 
from mutilating Spanish bodies altogether.50 
 
Slavery in the Greater Rio Grande 
   
As Spaniards travelled north into the mountains and valleys of the North 
American West, the emergence of new slave trades reflected these broader processes of 
conquest and colonization. Everywhere Spanish settlers, soldiers, and friars travelled, 
they negotiated perceived labor needs with the customs and practices of local 
populations. In central Mexico, the enslavement of local Natives declined in part because 
coercion was not essential. Accustomed to the demands of the Aztec empire, nearby 
indigenous groups proved willing to supply the rotational labor drafts Spaniards needed 
to construct their capital atop Tenochtitlan and drain the boggy lakes of the central 
Valley. In Northern New Spain, labor recruitment proved more difficult. Here Spaniards 
encountered much more migratory and fragmented Native populations, a reality shaped in 
part by the effects of epidemic disease preceding Spanish settlement. In Nuevo Leon, for 
example, ranchers and farmers turned to both the enslavement of migratory Indian groups 
and to innovative forms of seasonal captivity. In this vein, residents captured and chained 
Native family groups, brought them in to labor on a harvest, and then set them free to 
return to the mountains until they captured them again the next season. In Nueva 
Vizcaya, slavery also proved an important institution, initially for all labor tasks, and then 
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for domestic service, especially after successful missionization had provided a pool for 
the seasonal labor drafts of repartimiento.51  
 The emergence of long-distance trades in Indian slaves was not simply a Spanish 
imposition, however, but tied to pre-contact Native captive exchange practices. When 
Spanish conquistador Francisco Vazquez de Coronado traveled into the North American 
West in 1541, for example, he found little gold, but a vast network of trade in everything 
from pottery and jewelry to meat and pine nuts. His party observed Plains Apaches 
exchanging bison hides, deerskins, and pemmican for maize and blankets to the Pueblos 
of the Rio Grande, and found Pawnee and Wichita Indians living as slaves in Pueblo 
communities. One of his captains brought back two such slaves—Ysopete and El 
Turco—to their camp for Coronado to interrogate. It was El Turco who, by signs and in 
the little Nahua he knew, stoked Coronado’s fantasies with tales of a rich Plains 
civilization. As Coronado and his men later recalled, he had described the land of 
Quivira, “ruled by a great lord who traversed lakes in boats with golden oar locks.” 
Calling these grand visions into question, Ysopete had from the beginning articulated his 
doubts that Coronado would in fact find “the richest prize in the Indies,” as he and his 
men hoped.52 
 Coronado never found Quivira, but his expedition did take new captives, 
including at least one Plains Indian woman who had already lived as a slave among the 
Pueblo. These early encounters hint at the roots of what James Brooks has called the 
                                                            
51 Gibson argued in Aztecs Under Spanish Rule that pre-contact labor precedents help explain why 
“Spaniards did not need any mass enslavement of Indians in the valley of Mexico (221).” On 
missionization and the labor history of Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon see Deeds, “Labor Coercion on the 
Periphery,” and Cuello, “The Persistence of Indian Slavery.”  
52 Brooks, Captives & Cousins, 46. See Also Richard Flint and Shirley Cushing Flint, eds., Documents of 
the Coronado Expedition, 1539-1542 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 2005).   
 37 
"Borderlands slave system,” a cross-cultural political economy centered on the exchange 
of captives that was based in indigenous and Iberian traditions. Both Native and Hispanic 
cultural groups allowed for war captives to gradually shed their status as slaves and 
become full, if sometimes subordinate, members of adopting groups. Whether through 
concubinage and intermarriage or institutions like compadrazgo—god parenthood—
captives within Spanish society could forge kin relations with their captors. The tradition 
of rescate, discussed above, also had familial implications, as captives ransomed from 
“non-believers” were to be criado or “raised up” by their new families in exchange for 
domestic service.  Many Native groups also adopted war captives, and after periods of 
ritualized cleansing and forced labor they too might incorporate outsiders as full members 
of society. Navajos, for example, might initially label war captives as “yisná,” reflecting 
their servile status, but through customs of adoption they often assimilated these captives 
as kin. Members of certain groups tended to face longer-term servitude, however, 
illustrated by the fact that the Navajo term for Paiute (báyodzin) had become 
synonymous with slave by the late-nineteenth century.53 
In Brooks’ analysis, this resonance in cultural practices between Spaniards and 
Natives had important long-term implications, as the widespread circulation of captives 
forged new trade linkages and alliances. The mutuality of exchange and the possibility of 
coexistence in a violent world centered on the fact that the “Borderlands slave system” 
extended the obligations of kinships to new groups “as the groups incorporated one 
another’s women and children.” While women and children were captured through acts 
of violence in “men’s contestations for power,” Brooks argues that violence was 
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assimilated into “reproductive exchange relations.” Over time, this political economy of 
slavery blurred cultural boundaries and fostered “the interpenetration of cultures” in the 
Southwest Borderlands still evident today.54  
As in other regions of the Americas, however, some Native groups proved 
vulnerable to forms of captivity distinct from the mutually productive system described 
by Brooks. Six years before Coronado observed Native captive exchange complexes in 
present-day New Mexico, for example, another quixotic wanderer-explorer encountered a 
practice of enslavement that proved highly influential in the decades to come. It was in 
present-day Sinaloa in 1536 that after four years of wandering, Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de 
Vaca finally came across a group of fellow Spaniards who stopped and marveled at him, 
dressed as he was in Indian clothes. Mercifully for Vaca, he had managed to wander his 
way into the hands of Spanish slave hunters.55  
Slave hunting expeditions were part and parcel of early Spanish entrees into the 
Greater Rio Grande, as soldiers and settlers conducted raids for slaves from early 
settlements, especially around the mining town of Santa Barbara.56 Historians studying 
Nuevo Leon and Saltillo have noted similar dynamics there, and José Cuello has argued 
that “the conquest and early colonization of Saltillo and Monterrey was characterized by 
wholesale slave-hunting.”57  From the headwaters of the Rio Grande in present-day 
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Colorado, to its tributaries in present-day Chihuahua, to its delta on the gulf, Native 
peoples of the Greater Rio Grande served as an important labor source for new Spanish 
settlers in the late-sixteenth century. In 1578, for example, the Franciscan visitor Diego 
Rangel returned from the Cuenca del Florido scandalized by what he had witnessed in 
terms of slave hunting. "From Parras to Santa Barbara," he explained, "the native 
population is terrorized by Spanish highway robbers." In San Bartolomé he had seen "a 
great multitude of Indians chained one to the other," guarded by forty Spaniards.58  
 By the 1580s, the mines of Santa Barbara had become "a great slave market," as 
Spaniards captured Natives from around the Rio Grande, allegedly in retaliation for their 
own raids, and marched them south. In 1581, for example, visitors to La Junta, an 
important Native settlement on the Rio Grande, found that Indians were afraid of them 
and described previous slave raids, explaining that “invaders had taken their kinsmen, 
wives, and children captive and carried them away in chains.” In fact, in 1587, Bartolomé 
Hernandez claimed to have enslaved 1000 Indians in recent years, and had received 
blessing for his action from Governor Antonio de Acelga. In practice, actions that sought 
to "punish" or "pacify" in fact generated retaliation, fueling new acts of violence and 
enslavement.  While the precise genesis of hostilities between particular Native groups 
and Spaniards is murky in the early contact period, historians have long pointed to slave 
raids as a contributing factor. The long-distance circulation of Native captives that began 
as a result of Spanish settlement proved to strain diplomatic relations between Spaniards 
and some Native groups—especially Apaches—rather than forge “mutually 
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reproductive” kinship relations.59  
Downstream on the Rio Grande, early settlers of Nuevo Leon also engaged in 
captive-taking and slave trading.  A band of Basque and Portuguese slave-hunters led by 
Alberto del Canto, the founder of Saltillo and Santa Lucia (later Monterrey), went on an 
expedition in search of Indian captives in 1577.  Months later, Canto was on the run from 
the Audiencia of Guadalajara, which had issued a warrant that charged him with 
enslaving “peaceful” Indians. This warrant did little to prevent future slave hunting, 
however, as the founder of Nuevo Leon, Luis Carvajal, led a large group of men into the 
Lower Rio Grande in 1582, scouring an area from Saltillo to the Gulf Coast in search of 
captives. This case drew the viceroy’s attention, who ordered the liberation of the Indian 
slaves taken by Carvajal’s army and arrested him for his crimes in 1588. In fact, when 
Viceroy Villamanrique had arrived to take over the government of New Spain in 1585, he 
had found that across the Northern frontier, soldiers that were supposed to be “pacifying” 
Native populations were in fact enslaving them.60  
As in other contemporary discussion of Indian slavery, however, the key concern 
the viceroy raised was the enslavement of  “free” Indians—peaceful Natives whose 
actions had not warranted slavery. While Villamanrique sought to stem these abuses by 
prohibiting the enslavement of any Indians in the frontier wars, it is noteworthy that he 
substituted a bounty for each hostile Native captured or killed and ordered that women 
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and children be “sold into a type of encomienda to respectable persons in New Spain in 
order to compensate the captors.” Just as the Crown had sought to regulate “abuses” 
during the conquest of the Caribbean and Mexico, the interventions of royal officials in 
Northern New Spain in the sixteenth century highlighted false justifications for 
enslavement rather than slavery itself as the primary cause for concern.61  
The capture of local Indians had initially supplied slave markets in Santa Barbara, 
Nuevo Leon, and Saltillo. In the Northeast, Spanish residents even paid up to one 
hundred pesos for licenses from local officials to go out in search of Native groups and 
bring them into local settlements to “civilize” and “Christianize” them. Such expeditions 
led to the legal enslavement of some of these captives, “in order to reward the 
participants in the expeditions as well was the authorities who sanctioned them.”62 As 
missionization in Nueva Vizcaya began in earnest, however, mission towns there began 
to serve as bases for the labor drafts of repartimiento and the enslavement of local Indian 
groups may have diminished to some extent.63 Missions did not end slavery at the local-
level altogether, however, as criminality or “rebellion” intertwined with the tendency to 
treat Native “nations” as collectivities to justify the capture and sale of neighboring men, 
women, and children. When one or two men stole livestock, it brought the fidelity and 
"obedience" of all their kin into question. In 1621, for example, Indians who labored on 
an estate near the Rio Florido—likely Conchos Indians—killed a Spanish captain and 
fled to the mountains. The Governor responded by initiating a war "by blood and fire" 
against those responsible for having "broken the faith and word they had given to God 
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and King." As a result, he ordered that captives between the age of 14 and 16 be taken as 
slaves "for a just time" and the young children be distributed in Spanish households. That 
those over sixteen were not mentioned suggests that they were not captured, but killed. 
Rebellion, or claims that Indians had “risen up” could thus generate mass enslavement. 
Following the Tarahumara rebellion of 1649, for example, Spaniards claimed to have 
captured and sold four hundred Indian men, women, and children.64 
Over time, the capture and transport of distant Native groups may have become 
more significant than the enslavement of locals, however. Key to the rise of long-distance 
slave trades was the Spanish conquest of New Mexico. If rumors of Quivira or hopes of 
finding another Mexico drew Juan de Oñate north in the 1590s, he also took with him the 
spoils of earlier conquests and conflicts, just as Cortez and his men had done in taking 
Caribbean slaves to Mexico.  Oñate noted that he had more than 40,000 pesos to his name 
before he departed, including "slaves—negroes and Chichimecos, male and female—
clothing, silverware and many other items."65  
By the late-1500s, “slavery” in the Rio Grande was both a Native and African 
experience. The category of “Chichimeco,” like “Carib” earlier in the 1500s, was a broad 
term that cast the “rebellious” Indians of Northern New Spain as enslavable. Oñate not 
only possessed Native slaves, but also Africans who had already made a long journey 
through Africa's internal slave trades, across the Atlantic, and into the heartland of New 
Spain. Scholars have often made the connection between the "liberation" of Indian slaves 
                                                            
64 Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera, 188-189; On the Tarahumara Rebellion see Archivo del Hidalgo de 
Parral, microfilm on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, rl. 1649a, fr. 220-231 
[hereafter cited as AHP, rl. #, fr. or p. #]. 
65 Juan de Oñate declaration is in Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and 
Approaches Thereto, to 1773, Volume I, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Institution of Washington, 1926), 423.  
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in the mid-1500s and the importation of Africans. Bartolomé de Las Casas, the foremost 
Indian advocate, supported the enslavement of Africans as an alternative to Indian 
slavery, until he changed his mind later in life. In practice, however, as illustrated above, 
the "liberation" of Indian slaves was not universal. In fact, in regions like Northern New 
Spain, distant from major ports, African and Indian slaves often toiled in equal 
numbers.66 
Oñate proved no luckier in finding Quivira than Coronado. But he did manage 
terrifying violence, as he and his men massacred 800 Indians at Acoma, sentenced 
captives over the age of twelve to twenty years of forced labor, and severed one of the 
feet of all men over age twenty-five.67 If Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora possessed actual 
silver and gold, one friar later declared that New Mexico’s silver and gold were slaves, 
and nearly every governor of New Mexico during the seventeenth century participated in 
the sale of Native captives.68 Indian slavery in New Mexico, as elsewhere in early 
America, was a significant source of domestic labor and a sign of social status, as non-
Pueblo slaves represented more than twenty-percent of New Mexican subjects by the 
late-1600s.69 It did not take long after Oñate’s conquest of New Mexico for Spanish 
merchants to also discover the potential rewards of transporting New Mexican and Plains 
Indian captives south to towns in Nueva Vizcaya and New Spain. A malleable source of 
capital, they could be sold for substantial sums, used to pay for debts or purchases, or 
                                                            
66 On early African slavery in colonial Mexico see Palmer, Slaves of the White God, Bennet, Africans in 
Colonial Mexico; on Las Casas see Hanke, All Mankind is One.  For relatively equal numbers of Native and 
African slaves see Craumessel, Poblar La Frontera, 200-203. 
67 Ramón Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1991), 54.  
68 For New Mexico governors’ participation in captive exchange see Forbes, Apaches, Navahos, and 
Spaniards, Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, Brooks, Captives & Cousins, AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, and 3286.  
69 For comparative context see Gallay, ed., Indian Slavery in Colonial America. On demographic 
significance of Indian slavery in New Mexico see Brooks, 92.  
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gifted to relatives and friends as symbols of affection.70  
In sum, if Spaniards did not initiate the practice of captive exchange and slavery 
in the Rio Grande, their settlement in the region quickly tied pre-contact practices into the 
trade and transportation networks of New Spain. If captivity in New Mexico could be a 
short-term experience that might end with one’s ransom and return to loved ones, 
transportation south of the Rio Grande posed the threat of breaking captives’ ties to natal 
communities. In fact, Apache and other Indian captives responded to the dislocation of 
long-distance forced migration by taking great risks to journey hundreds of miles back to 
their homelands. If some captives traded locally in New Mexico were, as Brooks notes, 
able to carve out a place for themselves as cultural intermediaries, for most adult captives 
carried south into New Spain, captivity hardly proved to be an opportunity.71  
 
The Apache Slave Trade to Northern New Spain 
 
It was in 1629, according to legend, that Juan Rangel de Biesma picked up a rock 
on La Prieta Hill north of Santa Barbara, licked it, and declared, “there is a mineral 
deposit here.” Within two years, he had struck silver, and settlers began to amass in a 
boomtown christened “San José del Parral.” Though Spaniards had transported Indian 
captives from the lower Rio Grande and the area around present-day El Paso to Nueva 
                                                            
70 For Indian slave sales and prices see AHP 1646A, fr. 357b-379a; 1649C, fr. 1481-1486; 1649D, fr. 2145-
2174; 1653A, fr. 221-226; 1653B, fr. 1090-1100; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1657B, fr. 479-485; 1660C, fr. 1278-
1284, 1660C, fr. 1375-1387. 
71 On natal alienation as a defining characteristic of slavery see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social 
Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). For recent critiques that have 
emphasized that “social death” was an existential problem more than a lived condition see Stephanie E. 
Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), and Vincent Brown, The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of 
Atlantic Slavery (Harvard University Press, 2008). On captivity as an opportunity for some Native captives 
see James F. Brooks, “‘This Evil Extends Especially...To the Feminine Sex’: Negotiating Captivity in the 
New Mexico Borderlands,” Feminist Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 279-309. 
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Vizcaya before, the demand for household labor in Parral, and the continued market for 
Indian captives beyond Parral, established a new opportunity for Spanish merchants, civil 
officials, and even friars to participate in the long-distance captive trade. If shifts in the 
volume of Indian slave trafficking over time are difficult to measure, extant records 
produced in Parral after its founding do allow for a closer examination of the experience 
and practice of slavery in the Greater Rio Grande in the seventeenth century.72  
Indian slave trades “to the mines of New Spain” are frequently referenced in 
Borderlands literature, but only recently have scholars begun to uncover the logistics and 
demographics of such trades through systematic study.  Chantal Craumessel, for example, 
has examined baptismal records in order to provide some indication of the demographic 
significance of Indian slavery over time. In 1650, for example, Apaches represented 
twenty-percent of baptisms in the Parral parish registers, and more than thirty-percent 
between 1660 and 1670. Suggesting the dispersal rather than congregation of captives, 
parish records reveal that 128 Native women who gave birth to children after arriving in 
Parral in the 1660s had been distributed to eighty-seven different homes. Surveying data 
from across the seventeenth century, Craumessel has estimated that there were around 
1,000 Indian slaves in the Parral district by the mid-to-late 1600s. In comparison, there 
were approximately 1,100 black slaves in Parral around 1650, and a similar number of 
free Indians and Hispanic residents.73  
 How did these captives make there way to Parral? If in the late-1500s, Spanish 
                                                            
72 On the legend of Biesma see <http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/187060> (accessed by author 8 
November 2010), see also Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera, 101.  
73 Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera, 200, 203. As Craumessel mentioned to me in a personal conversation, it 
is important to note that baptismal records do not represent a complete record of all imported Indian slaves, 
as it is not clear that all captives were baptized upon arrival, in part because individuals did not want pay 
the required fees to the priests. Andrés Reséndez is also investigating the slave trade to Parral in a 
forthcoming monograph.  
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“slavehunting”—or offensive military campaigns—produced the bulk of Indian slaves, 
by the mid-1600s, rescate appears to have been most important. Spaniards discussed the 
“crude, civil wars” waged between Native groups in New Mexico, and explained that 
they “ransomed” the resulting captives in order to instruct and Christianize them. If the 
Spanish presence did not initiate warfare between Navajos and Puebloans, or Plains 
Apaches and Pawnees, Native groups likely recognized the particular demand for women 
and children that existed within Spanish communities, and shaped their captive-taking 
practices accordingly.74  
Warfare between Native groups beyond the Spanish sphere is not easily 
accessible in archival records, but fragmentary references in correspondence make it is 
possible to hypothesize the journey of an Apachean captive from New Mexico south to 
Parral, Santa Barbara, or Durango. Descriptions of these individuals note the presence or 
absence of smallpox scars, reflecting the incursion of epidemic disease into their home 
communities. Having survived illness, they had perhaps already been out on their first 
raid, or danced in the puberty ceremonies that signaled entrance into adulthood. Then 
Mansos Indians stormed their villages, seized them, and carried them south to their 
camps near El Paso. In El Paso the captives waited, or perhaps labored, until the next 
wagon train carrying goods between Santa Fe and Parral passed by. When the Spaniards 
arrived, the Mansos put Apaches on display, knowing they could glean substantial 
payment in exchange: hides, meat, blankets, pots, pine nuts, slaves—all could be bought 
                                                            
74 See Hackett Historical Documents III, 130 and 186; AHP 1646A, fr. 357b-379a; 1649C, fr. 1481-1486; 
1649D, fr. 2145-2174; 1653A, fr. 221-226; 1653B, fr. 1090-1100; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1657B, fr. 479-485; 
1660C, fr. 1278-1284, 1660C, fr. 1375-1387. See also Rick Hendricks and Gerald Mandell, "The Apache 
Slave Trade in Parral.”  
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or exchanged at trading fairs in the New Mexican borderlands.75  
 Loaded into wagons, likely chained one to each other, captives might have 
imagined or discussed where they were headed and what their fates would be. Perhaps 
they saw their captors come back from visits to the New Mexican governor, carrying the 
traspasos or “transfers” that granted them legal title to carry Indians out of New Mexico 
to sell. Whether they had heard about Spanish practices previously, they certainly could 
have drawn upon familiarity with how their own kin handled captives in order to try to 
make sense of their circumstances. Chiricahua Apaches, for example, generally saw the 
enslavement of war captives as a “temporal” condition before they incorporated them on 
a continuum from dishonored outsider to kin. Like Spaniards, they understood violence 
and enslavement in gendered terms. When Chiricahuas captured a warrior in battle, for 
example, they interrogated him to glean useful information. “If he won’t give it,” one 
Apache later explained, “they usually kill him right there, or else they take him back to 
camp for the women to kill.” Mature men, they reckoned, were simply too dangerous, 
and unlikely to adapt to Apache ways of life. Chiricahuas thus preferred young boys who, 
as one man explained, “becomes a real Chiricahua and later marries into the tribe.” 
Describing the process of adoption, he further noted that “at first they have to act as 
servants. They have to eat as servants. Some escape after a while.” But after this period 
of subservient status ended, “it is taken for granted that they belong in the group…the 
                                                            
75 Ibid. The “Mansos,” possibly an Athapaskan group, were particularly important in trade between Parral 
and New Mexico, both because their lands contained an important mineral for mining silver—salt—and 
because of their role in capturing and trading in Apache slaves. Meaning “tame,” in Spanish, the term 
“Manso” reflected the sense among Spaniards that this group was receptive to embracing Christianity and 
allying with Spanish interests. In particular, Mansos proved their potential loyalty—from the Spanish 
perspective—by capturing women and children from neighboring Apache groups and trading them to 
merchants passing along the royal road between Santa Fe and Parral. On Mansos as Athapaskans see Jack 
D. Forbes, “Unknown Athapaskans: The Identification of the Jano, Jocome, Jumano, Manso, Suma, and 
Other Indian Tribes of the Southwest,” Ethnohistory 6, 2 (Spring 1959).  
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feeling of captivity wears off in time.” Apache captives thus may have understood that 
they would face potentially punishing forced labor, even if they might have expected that 
this experience would not be permanent.76  
 Apache women—among the most common of captives sold in Parral—may have 
had particular fears. If both Apaches and Spaniards demonstrated a particular fondness 
for children over adults, Chiricahuas later distinguished their rejection of female captives 
from the practices of Hispanic groups.  As one Chiricahua man noted, “when Chiricahua 
men are on the raid or warpath and they capture Mexican women…they don’t do 
anything to them. They are afraid to have sexual intercourse with them, for they say, if 
they do, their luck will be spoiled.” If Apaches “[couldn’t] do it” due to cultural taboos, 
Hispanic men, he claimed, “did it every time they got Indian women.”77  
Not all Apachean groups demonstrated this same gendered distinction in their 
understanding of captive-taking and slavery. Western Apaches, for instance, incorporated 
male and female children and adult women. As in the case of other Native and Hispanic 
groups, “youths and grown men were commonly slain,” but as one informant later 
explained, “children and sometimes maidens and grown women were brought home and 
adopted and either placed in the captors’ family or given to another.” While children 
“stood a fair chance” of achieving equal social status, Western Apaches deemed adults to 
be too set in their ways to integrate fully into the community.  
Western Apaches’ clan practices suggest that some adult captives may have 
expected that, among outsiders, they could expect to be treated as a distinct and possibly 
dishonored clan or group. On the one hand, young captives were generally raised by the 
                                                            
76 Morris Edward Opler, An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions of the 
Chiricahua Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, Reprint, 1996), 349-351. 
77 Ibid.  
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captor’s family and became affiliated with the clan of the individual who owned or raised 
them. As John Rope explained, “If I capture a girl in Mexico, she takes my clan because 
she is my property. Her children will take my clan also.” But for adult female captives, 
“the taint of alien blood” remained “as long as their ancestry was remembered.” 
Particular clans came into existence for the purpose of incorporating such adult captives: 
“born from above downward people” or “enemies born one after the other people,” 
designations that reflected these captives retention of “alien” status.78  
 Whether fearing sexual violence, pondering a future of forced labor, or imagining 
escape, captives arrived in Parral aboard wagons to await sale—sometimes for the second 
or third time. In the decades after the founding of Parral, local residents had learned how 
to purchase an Indian captive. On the one hand, one need only inquire with an 
acquaintance that participated in the New Mexican trade, who might either have an 
Indian in his possession or be able to locate one. On the other hand, some residents knew 
to approach recently arrived wagon trains and inquire there. Or, on occasion, one could 
even visit the town square, where in public auctions, Indian labor was sold to the highest 
bidder.79  
 This slave trade often generated only brief references in the historical record, but 
on occasions where perceived abuse or “excess” garnered the attention of local officials, 
judicial records provide a closer window onto the ways it functioned. In March 1649, for 
example, an investigation began after an Indian man named Francisco appeared before a 
magistrate in Parral to allege that Spanish merchants were holding some of his kinsmen 
                                                            
78 Greenville Goodwin and Keith H. Basso, ed., The Social Organization of the Western Apache (Tucson, 
Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 96, 106-111.  
79 For references to logistics of slave sales see note 70 above; see also AHP 1655A, fr. 102-106 for a public 
auction of an Indian woman and child.  
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against their will.80  He explained that the eighteen Mansos recently arrived in Parral were 
“experiencing a nightmare” because they had witnessed merchants sell three Indians 
against their will and they feared that they too might be sold. Francisco also noted that 
four of the Mansos had said they were in Parral involuntarily and that they wanted to 
return to their country. Participation in the captive trade clearly represented a mixed 
blessing for some Mansos, who could themselves fall victim to Spanish slave trading.81  
 Additional testimony shed more light on both recent events and the broader 
logistics of the Parral slave trade. A week and a half earlier, Antonio de Villalengua, a 
Parral resident, had received word that Andres de Gracia, who was in charge of the 
wagons that traveled to the Rio Grande to gather salt, had returned with some Indian boys 
and girls. Villalengua Gracia and his companions had met Tomas, a mulato, and 
Sebastian Muñoz outside town where their wagons were camped. He talked to them 
about buying Indian girls, and Andres and Tomas showed him three, who he guessed 
were seven or eight-years old. After haggling about the price—they were asking 100 
pesos each—Villalengua asked them about the titles, which allowed for their transport 
and sale. They responded that they had no titles. “Recognizing the risk” of buying Indian 
girls without this legal guarantee, Villalengua went on his way, and explained to the court 
that he did not know what had happened to the girls in the days since. Around the same 
time, Pedro de Andrade had similarly received word about the arrival of a wagon train 
from New Mexico. He also traveled with a group of men a league out of town to where 
the wagons were camped, and spoke to Andres de Gracia and Tomas about whether they 
had brought Indians to sell. Andrade recalled that Andres took out a little Indian girl, “9 
                                                            
80 This case can be found in AHP 1649D, fr. 2145-2174.  
81 Ibid.: “le an dicho que estan con pesadunbre por que le dijeron que los dhos carreteros Havian vendido en 
este rreal un Indio llamado Zuma y una India y un muchachuelo…” 
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or 10 years old,” and Tomas brought out two more of the same age, repeating the offer 
they had made earlier to Villalengua to sell the captives for 100 pesos a piece. Andrade 
offered sixty, and asked about the titles to be able to sell them. This time they said that 
for one of them they did have a title, but for the other two they did not. Andrade testified 
that they had not actually shown him any titles, and that he had therefore went on his 
way.82  
The initiation of proceedings against Tomas and Andres centered on concerns that 
they were doing so “without titles” and possibly transporting “free” Mansos Indians 
against their will. As a result of these concerns, Tomas and Andres were apprehended and 
asked to explain their actions. Their testimony highlighted important characteristics of the 
slave trade that other witnesses had also noted: the role of New Mexican merchants, the 
significant cost of Indian slaves, and concern about legal title. Andres testified that he had 
bought two Indian girls from Captain Lucas Montaño, who had purchased them from the 
Mansos Indians near El Paso. They were Apache Indians, one named Lucia and the other 
Ines. He had paid 80 pesos, and Captain Montaño had given him titles for both so he 
could sell them as slaves. He sold one of them to Juan de Santa Cruz, a miner in Parral, 
for 85 pesos, and the other he had given, without any interest (so presumably for 80 
pesos) to Captain Juan Gomez Fernandez, because he had a previous debt to him. He 
explained that he had lied to Villalengua about not having titles because he did not want 
to sell the girls for the low price he had offered.83 
 Tomas similarly testified that they had operated within widely accepted customs 
of Indian slavery. He explained that in the Rio del Norte he had redeemed from the 
                                                            
82 Ibid.: “Reconociendo el rriesgo q. de Conprar las dhas indiçuelas tiene sin titulos.”  
83 Ibid, for contemporaneous discussions of varied labor categories and slave prices in Parral see AHP 
1649c, fr. 951-970; fr. 1411-1421; AHP 1652b, fr. 943-944 
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Mansos Indians an Indian girl of about ten years old that the they had captured from the 
Apaches in war, and since the governor of New Mexico had granted permission to sell 
such Indians, he had received a title and sold her to Pedro de Salvatierra for 85 pesos. He 
also noted that in the wagons of Sebastian Muños they were served by eleven men that 
received salary, five Manso men and four Manso women that worked without salary but 
voluntarily, and six Indian women [not Mansos] with salary. Such testimony highlighted 
the diversity of labor categories that existed in Parral, from Indian and African slaves to 
unsalaried “voluntary” workers, to free wage labor.84  
In deciding the case, civil officials in Parral reviewed legal precedent, including a 
recent cedula that had noted that no Indians that were not taken in just war should be sold 
or gifted in Nueva Vizcaya, as well as a recent order from the governor, likely issued in 
response to the cedula, noting that many Indian children were being sent south from New 
Mexico and sold by individuals who “said they were slaves…without really being able to 
do so by law.” The governor, while on the one handed mandating that anyone holding a 
slave needed to “show the title” and prove they held that slave legitimately, also ordered 
that no “barbarian Indian” be enslaved in the future, until the King ordered something 
differently. For merchants, then, this 1648 decree seems to have represented something of 
a contradiction: On the one hand, the governors of New Mexico produced documents that 
testified to the fact that Apaches warranted enslavement, either through just war or 
rescate. On the other hand, in Nueva Vizcaya, questions had arisen about the propriety of 
this practice, and a public crier had announced that no “barbarian Indians” should from 
                                                            
84 Ibid., for broader labor history of Nueva Vizcaya see Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera; Deeds, Defiance 
and Deference and “Labor Coercion on the Periphery.”  
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that point forward be enslaved.85  
Such dueling messages reflected a much longer tradition: declarations of Indian 
liberty coexisting with permission to enslave Natives under particular circumstances. 
Andres de Gracia claimed to have never heard any order against Indian slavery, for 
example, and instead cited customary practices of enslaving and issuing titles for enemy 
Indians. In New Mexico, he explained, the Apache nation “had always been and 
continued to be common enemies,” and for the “conservation of the province,” Spaniards 
and Christian Indians alike made war on them. Governors issued legal titles for the 
Apaches to be taken out of the province “and given in deposit for 15 years of personal 
service and sold for the amount this labor appears to be worth.” In the end local officials 
largely accepted such explanations: they freed Andres and Tomas on bond to help aid in 
the transport of a new governor and group of friars to New Mexico, and no records of 
them ever being further prosecuted for Indian slavery appear in the Parral archives. It 
certainly also helped their case that the Mansos Indians allegedly being held against their 
will testified that they had come to Parral willingly, though they had since decided that 
they did in fact “want to return to their country.”86 
The sale of Apachean captives under similar terms continued in the 1650s. Don 
                                                            
85 “Bando” dated 6 February 1648 in Ibid.: “vienen muchos indizuelos y indizuelas que los rremite el 
Govern.or de aquellas prov.as…vienen en los dhos carros y otras personas con animo de venderlos en este 
rreal contra toda rraçon y leyes de su Magstad por deçir son esclavos y por otras rraçones fribolas sin q. 
lexitimen. poderlo haçer conforme a derecho.” 
86 AHP 1649D, fr. 2145-2174: “en la dicha probencia del nuebo mejico la nacion de yndios apaches de 
nabajo sienpre ansido y son enemigos comunes”; “sujetos por bia de deposito a serbicio personal por 
quince años y los bendan y se dan por la cantedad q. les pareciere por paga de su trabajo por q. desta 
manera no tendran tanta ocacion de q. siendo mayores se bayan a su tierra…”; On the Mansos wanting to 
return to their country: “mediante el dho interprete y lo que ellos por señas dieron a entender Dixeron que 
Voluntariamente Havian venido con el dho andres de gracia y que del no havian rrezivido agravio, ni les 
devian cossa alguna y que querian Volverse a sus tierras en dhos carros…” For other examples of the 
language of “depósito” see AHP 1646A, Fr. 357b-379a; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1654B, fr. 992-993; AHP 
1660C, fr. 1375-1387; AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, and 3286. 
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Juan Manso petitioned in 1653, for example, to be able to sell six Apache boys he had 
ransomed from Manso Indians in New Mexico, noting that Apaches were “the nation at 
war with all of the Kingdom of New Mexico,” and that the governor of New Mexico, 
Don Juan de Samaniego y Azaca, normally dispatched titles for them so that they might 
be taken out of New Mexico and sold “en depósito” to Spanish households, a fact that 
additional witnesses corroborated.  It was because Manso had not been able to return to 
Santa Fe to request titles that he was now requesting written permission from the 
governor of Nueva Vizcaya to sell the captives.87 By 1658, Juan Manso had in fact sold a 
number of Apaches in Parral for 100 pesos each, including twenty-four year old 
Margarita “of robust body with a scar on the left side of her face,” seven year old 
Sebastian, “with big eyes and smallpox scars,” and 28 year old Marzela, “tall and marked 
with lines (rayada).”88  
 
“Temporal” Slavery in Parral 
 
The fact that Parral residents routinely described Indian captivity as temporary 
“depósito” or “storage” in Spanish households warrants closer scrutiny. On the one hand, 
                                                            
87 AHP 1653A, fr. 221-226. While Hendricks and Mandell have suggested that governors knew that their 
actions were plainly “illegal,” in doing so they underestimate the importance of just war, “rescate,” and the 
enslavement of criminals as sanctioned justification for Indian slavery. A number of witnesses corroborated 
Mansos’ claims by drawing upon similar language: “dixo que lo que save es que la nacion apache que 
rreside en el reino del nuevo mexico siempre aestado alçada y rrevelada contra la rr.l corona Por lo qual los 
governadores de aquel rreino siempre les an echo guerra valiendose de los yndios y naciones amigas y 
fieles Pronunciando sentencias de muerte contra los enemigos y dando en su comformidad en deposito las 
piezas Pequeñas…” 
88 AHP 1660C, fr. 1375-1387; Descriptions of Indian slaves: “margarita que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz 
Robusta de cuerpo y tiene un lunar pardo en la cara en el lado ysquierdo y Junto al dicho lunar una señal de 
herida y agujeradaz entran las orejaz y sera al Parezer de beynti y cuatro años de edad poco maz o 
menos…”; “Sebastian que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz toda la cara con señalez de birguelas, y los ojos 
grandez carra aguileño no esta cristiano y sera al Parezer de siete años de edad Poco maz o menos y es de 
los contenidos en dicha sentenzia”; “Marzela que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz alta de cuerpo y una Raia 
por ensima de la nariz asta el mismo labio de arriba y la boca borada y trez Rayaz sobre la barba…y todos 
los pechos y brazos borados y un lunarsito de lo mismo ensima de las narizes y una señalita redonda de 
herida ensima del dicho lunarzito…” 
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in comparison to forms of chattel slavery characterized by hereditary property status, the 
trade in Apache captives to Parral during the mid-1600s might seem more a form of 
indentured servitude than a “slave trade.” On the other hand, however, if theoretical 
definitions of slavery are useful for comparative context, understanding how captors and 
captives alike understood their own actions and circumstances must remain at the heart of 
historical analysis. To impose theoretical categories upon the past risks obscuring Parral 
residents’ historically specific understandings of categories like “slave” and “servant.”89  
Cross-referencing court testimony with other types of archival records allows for 
some insight into the relationship between ideology and practice. Wills and testaments, 
for example, provide another means of accessing how residents may have understood 
their Apache captives in relation to the African slaves also present in Parral households.  
In October 1653, for instance, Captain Geronimo de Vega—the chief magistrate of 
Parral—received word that Antonio Rodriguez had “passed from this life.” In order to 
execute Rodriguez’s last will and testament, Vega traveled a few weeks later to his ranch 
a few miles from town. The ranch consisted of several houses along the Parral River that 
faced a silver mine. Among other possessions, Vega found several dozen mules, forty or 
so mares, a thirty-year old black slave, Juan Francisco, a forty-year old Apache Indian 
                                                            
89 Scholars studying the North American West have drawn upon the language of “slavery” to describe 
situations that historical actors described otherwise. See Barr, “From Captives to Slaves,” Brooks, Captives 
& Cousins, and Gutierrez, When Jesus Came. This approach reflects in part the assumption that the highly 
restricted nature of Indian slavery in Spanish America generated efforts to skirt the law by calling what was 
in fact “slavery” by other names. “Rescate,” both Gutierrez and Brooks explain, was an “artifice” designed 
to justify profiting off of the sale of Native captives by labeling them with the euphemism “criado”—
meaning literally “one who is raised up”—in order to provide a Christian pretext to the exploitation of 
Indian bondspersons. The fact that this type of reading against the grain of the archival record is not applied 
to laborers of Hispanic or African descent who also were referred to as “criados” appears to reflect, at least 
implicitly, the idea that the illegality of Indian slavery produced a context ripe for deceit and thus 
warranting special scrutiny. As I have sought to illustrate above, however, the illegality of Indian slavery as 
an explanation for Spanish behavior has been overdrawn, and further research into sixteenth and 
seventeenth century understandings of labor, liberty, and “slavery” is warranted. 
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women “in deposit” named Ines, and an Apache boy of about fourteen named Pedro.90 
 In observing Rodriguez’s household, Vega immediately distinguished between his 
black slave and the Apaches “en depósito.” That phrase—“in deposit” suggested a 
significant ideological distinction that distanced Indian captives’ status from African 
slavery in religious terms. It remains difficult to determine what this distinction meant to 
Rodriguez or his Native and African laborers, however. He specified in his will, for 
example, that he had bought his black slave, Juan Francisco, from Capitan Pedro de 
Andrade, as demonstrated by the bill of sale in his records. He also declared “an Indian 
woman of the Apache nation, a slave, named Ines, with a two-year-old son that I bought 
from Francisco de Lima as slaves.” As with his black slave, he noted a document that 
would testify to the sale, in this case “a letter of deposit.” By invoking both the language 
of slavery and the law, Rodriguez stressed that he saw his Indians as possessions, “as 
slaves,” whose possession was secured through legal documentation.91 
 What did Parral residents like Antonio Rodriguez mean when they described 
Indians in their households as “slaves”? First and foremost, slavery was a legal status, 
justified by capture in just war, “rescate” from infidels, or a criminal sentence. Through 
purchase, the holder of an Indian slave was entitled to their labor for a specified period of 
time, even if this labor was “against their will,” or if the Indian might want to “return to 
their lands.” In decrying the abuses of repartimiento, the labor draft system common in 
Nueva Vizcaya in the seventeenth century, individuals—including Indians themselves—
                                                            
90 AHP 1653B, f. 1090-1100.  
91 Ibid.: “Ytten declaro por mis vienes una yndia de nasion Apache eslava llamada Ynes con un hijo de 
hedad de Dos años Poco mas o menos los quales conpre a francisco de lima por tales esclavos como consta 
de la carta de depossito…”; “Ytten Declaro Por mis vienes un Yndisuelo de nasion pache llamado Pedro el 
qual compre del dho francisco de lima por esclavo como consta del dePossito que tengo entre mis 
Papeles…” 
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might explain that they were being “treated like slaves.” This common metaphor shed 
light on what both “liberty” and “slavery” meant, as Spaniards (and many Natives) 
contrasted slavery with Indian’s liberty “to work for who one wishes.” “Liberty” was also 
defined by the ability to return to one’s home, and enjoy a more limited workday. Thus 
while repartimiento could be extremely harsh—and some Indian advocates declared it 
was worse than slavery in its effects on Native demographic decline—it was not 
understood to be the same thing as slavery.92 What defined Apache captives in Parral as 
“slaves” to contemporaries was their sale, forced labor, and exile from their homelands—
not permanent, hereditary bondage. This was true in surrounding regions as well, 
including Nuevo Leon, where men were sentenced to up to twenty years of slavery and 
women and children to between ten and fifteen years. In fact, children represented a large 
proportion of Indian slaves, in part because their term of “temporal slavery” did not begin 
until the age of twelve or fourteen and was thus more valuable. A six or seven-year old 
might labor for a total of twenty or more years before, at least in theory, receiving her 
manumission.93  
 The “temporal” nature of Indian slavery may help explain the price differential 
evident in both Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon between Indian and African slaves. In 
the late-1500s, for example, the price for Indian slaves averaged approximately seventy-
five pesos in Nuevo Leon. In Nueva Vizcaya, it was not uncommon—as noted above—
for an Indian woman to fetch between seventy-five and 100 pesos in the early-to-mid 
seventeenth century. Though such sums were significantly less than the 300 to 500 pesos 
                                                            
92 I draw here upon primary sources as cited in notes 70, 83, and 86 above and also on Brian Ownesby’s 
discussion of how metaphors of slavery revealed Indian and Spanish ideas about liberty in 17th century 
Native petitions for redress of grievances. See Ownesby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice, especially 
Chapter 5. On temporal slavery see also José Cuello, “The Persistence of Indian Slavery.”  
93 Ibid. 
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that an African slave might bring, an Indian slave was nonetheless a significant 
investment, a fact that is illustrated by owners’ concerns over legal title, and attention to 
identifying slaves through physical markings. In December 1654, for example, a Quivira 
Indian woman, with a blue line down her face and nose and both hands painted with 
lines, “seven or eight years old” and “not a Christian” was transferred to Doña Antonia de 
Alarcon Faxardo, the legitimate wife of Juan Lorenzo Bernardo. She then transferred the 
title to Don Andres de Fargo, regidor and citizen of Mexico, who gave her 100 pesos.94 
On the July 11th of that year Francisco de Lima transferred legal title to the personal 
service of an Apache Indian woman named Gracia, “thirty-seven years old more or less,” 
and a little Indian boy, seven or eight years old named Domingo Niculas to Bartolomé 
Hernandez for 100 pesos. Lima noted that Gracia had “three marks, one in the middle of 
the face and one on each cheek.” Domingo Nicolás had a sign made on his stomach “with 
fire.”   In light of practices carried out elsewhere in Spanish America, especially the 
debates in the 1630s and 1650s in Chile over branding Indian slaves, such descriptions in 
Parral slave slaves suggests that exported New Mexican Indians may also have been 
branded.95  
Legal status, price, and bodily markings go only so far in understanding slavery in 
communities like Parral, however. African, Native, and “Chino” laborers in Parral 
demonstrated a wide range of life experiences, whether “slave,” “servant,” or “free.” 
When miner Juan Fernandez de Carrión, for example, acquired five or six Indians from 
the salt fields around El Paso in 1667, the three Native captives that worked with mercury 
in his mine died within four years. On the opposing end of the spectrum, Native children 
                                                            
94 AHP Parral 1654B, fr. 992-993. 
95 AHP 1654B, fr. 778-779; On Chile debates see Konetzke, Colección, Vol. 2, Tomo 1, 349-353.  
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were the most likely to learn Spanish, receive baptism, and upon reaching adulthood, 
labor for wages, though it is difficult to track the degree to which slavery was in fact a 
“temporal” condition for them. Especially for Native adults, the meaning of “liberty”—if 
they in fact received it after 10 to 20 years of labor—was certainly qualified by 
stipulations that Apaches “never be allowed to return” to New Mexico. If in theory Indian 
slaves were distinguished from African slaves in the emphasis on their "good treatment” 
and “Christianization,” in practice there does not seem to have been significant 
divergence in treatment, and both were baptized and expected to attend mass. In some 
cases, slaves and servants exercised significant freedom of moment, in others they were 
kept cloistered in the household.96  
Criminal cases and investigations allow for further insight into household 
relations. Contrary to the common assumption that Indian captives were “sold into the 
mines,” few seem to have been assigned to labor in actual mines. In September 1655, for 
example, two Indian slaves were implicated in a ring of petty thefts. Juan Cortés, an 
"Apache Indian Slave," and Nicolás Bargas "a Mulato Slave" both helped manufacture 
bars of silver at one of Parral's silver smelters. In the process, they had apparently stolen 
"many pieces of silver on different occasions," or so alleged Captain Valerio Cortés, 
Juan's master.  In subsequent investigations, Juan admitted everything, saying that he had 
stolen pieces of silver seven times and that Nicolás, the mulatto slave, had done so 
another four times. They took the silver pieces to various merchants and pawn shops 
around town, where they received a few pesos for each. One of the merchants that had 
bought silver from Juan explained his reasoning--it was simply an old custom to buy little 
                                                            
96 On Carrión and Indians working with mercury see Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera, 196. For the 
permanent exile of Apaches see AHP 1660C, fr. 1278-1284: “los cuales en ningun tiempo Puedan bolver a 
este dho Reyno.”  
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pieces of silver from poor workers.97  
This trial suggests some of the tasks that Indian and African slaves performed in 
Parral, in this case less onerous work than many repartimiento Indians performed.  
Though Juan and Nicolás both had to remain in Parral indefinitely, unlike draft laborers, 
they exercised relatively free movement within the town and slipped pieces of silver into 
their pockets to peddle for a few pesos to local merchants. In fact, it is tempting to even 
find in this case hints of a world of camaraderie between an Indian, African, and “Chino” 
slave, who testified to his interactions with Juan and Nicolás but denied involvement in 
the theft of silver. Such a reading is complicated, however, by the fact that these slaves 
testified against one another and Juan's insistence on Nicolás' role led him to face torture. 
While Nicolás's owner vigorously defended him against the charges of Juan, both were in 
the end sentenced to terms of mortero, a harsh form of convict labor, as punishment: Juan 
for two years, Nicolás for one.98   
If Indian and African men seemed to have enjoyed some opportunity for mobility 
and even personal gain, some female slaves lived more cloistered lives.  In March 1671, 
for example, Nicolás Valderrama notified authorities that an Apache woman that he had 
in his service had hung herself.  When a Parral magistrate journeyed to his house to 
investigate, he explained that in a corral he viewed an Indian woman, who appeared to be 
dead, with a rope tied around her neck and blood seeping from her mouth.99  
                                                            
97 AHP 1655B, f. 823-882: "Es costumbre en los r.s de minas y en este lo ha sido desde que se descubrio el 
comprar plata los mercaderez a qualquiera genero de gente que la llegan a bender aun que sean esclavos." 
For a similar case of collusion between Indian and African slaves see AHP 1672b, f. 1291-1323. On “sale 
into the mines” see for example Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire,  
98 Ibid. A sentence to “mortero” meant physically demanding labor: public works projects or ore 
processing, for example. 
99 AHP 1670b f. 878-883: Niculasa testified that “lo q. save y pasa es que anoche v.te y tres del corriente 
estando en la cocina y casa de su amo a la ora de dormir como otras muchas noches la encerro su amo 
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In the ensuing investigation, both African and Indian slaves testified about her 
state of mind and the circumstances and conditions of labor in Valderrama's household. A 
“Mulata” slave named Niculasa, for example, explained that the past night, "like many 
nights before," she had been chained to a pole in the kitchen, where she slept next to an 
Apache Indian woman named Francisca and two others named Magdalena and Mariquita. 
They fell asleep, but Francisca was not feeling well, and before dawn she had left the 
other women. In the morning, upon rising, Elena, "la negrita," unchained her and she 
began to prepare chocolate for her masters, "as she had done other times," and going to 
give a little stew to Francisca, she discovered her dead, noting that she had hung herself. 
Asked if her masters had whipped her, or how they treated their servants, “whether slave 
or free,” she noted that she was chained because she had tried to escape once after being 
whipped. Her master and mistress lashed her and the other servants frequently, “both the 
Apaches and the blacks.” Manquita, an Apache Indian woman, similarly noted that she 
had been enclosed in the kitchen with the other servants the night before and explained 
that her mistress lashed all of them frequently but they had not lashed Francisca the night 
before because she was sick. She also explained that an Indian woman named Jazinta had 
died from a whipping several years ago.100   
The testimony generated in this case provides a stark, if fragmentary, view of 
what one household in Parral was like—Indians and African slaves sleeping side by side 
in a kitchen, facing frequent lashings, one of them chained to a pole. It also illustrates 
how slavery in Parral was characterized by labor in households and workshops that often 
contained both Indian and African captives. Residents bought Native men, women, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 




children transported from New Mexico and the South Plains as “temporal” slaves and 
drew upon legal practices to secure their investments. Occasionally, decrees sought to 
rein in “abuses” of widely accepted customs of Indian enslavement, but such decrees 
often clarified particular categories of Native that could be enslaved, rather than 
expressing any blanket prohibition.  
Correspondence between the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, the audiencia of 
Guadalajara, and the Crown in response to one such order in 1659 illustrates well the 
ways in which local residents understood Indian slavery by the mid-1600s. After a public 
crier had announced that all Indians that had been taken as slaves in recent years in 
Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and Nuevo Leon should be freed, local residents brought 
forward forty-seven Indian slaves that had been captured in the wars of Nueva Vizcaya’s 
previous governor. Writing to the court in Guadalajara, however, the present governor 
explained that the order had generated widespread confusion. As he explained it, there 
were Indian captives of several different “conditions” in his jurisdiction, and he had 
doubts about whether they too should be freed.101  
Governor Pacheco’s “doubts” illustrate both contemporary practices and how 
local residents understood their actions to be justified.  First, he inquired about the 
Indians captured in New Mexico in “just wars” and exported with titles issued by New 
Mexican governors. There were “many of this type” in Nueva Vizcaya and some were 
also passed on to New Spain, he explained. Asking if they too should be set free, he also 
inquired about whether the buyers should be allowed to request the sale prices from the 
                                                            
101 Correspondence between King Philip IV and Audiencia of Guadalajara begins with phrase “Tocante a la 
libertad de los naturales,” 15 April 1660, AGN Tierras 3286: the King here was summarizing the 
correpondence of Governor Pacheco, noting that “por aber otros [Indios] de diferente calidad osabia 
paresido consultar a la dha mi audiencia sobre su estado.” 
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original sellers. This “doubt” stressed legal practices—just war, titles—and clearly 
indicated that local residents had not interpreted the royal order to encompass their New 
Mexican slaves.102  
 Secondly, Pacheco inquired about Indians that had committed crimes in the 
province and had received sentences of forced labor in local mines or workshops, given 
that lashings or banishment “were not sufficient punishment.” Reflecting the tradition of 
temporary slavery for convicts, this doubt intertwined with Pacheco’s third point of 
confusion: what to do with the women and children captured in the lands of Indians who 
had “risen up in rebellion” after local officials had caught them “in the act of stealing 
horse herds.” Indicating how contested sovereignty in Northern New Spain intertwined 
with questions of captivity and slavery, this third doubt also spoke to the long-standing 
question of whether Native women and children could be enslaved.103  
 In response, an audiencia judge in Guadalajara explained that the first category, 
Indians transported from New Mexico, should be set free, and buyers could request a 
refund from the original sellers. The second practice—the enslavement of Indian 
criminals—was deemed acceptable as long as trials for the crimes had been conducted in 
accordance with the law. Finally, in regards to the third category, the audiencia noted that 
cases should be brought against Indian aggressors who stole the horse herds, but that 
women and children should be allowed to live “in their barbarous way of life in their 
lands.” The fiscal explained—incorrectly, it must be noted—that since none of these 
Indians had received the opportunity to be baptized or had pledged obedience to the royal 
                                                            
102 Ibid:  “de los quales abia muchos en esa prov.a por donde pasavan otros a mi nueba españa.”  
103 Ibid.: que se aria de los que abiendo cometido delitos en esa prov.a y no meresiendo por ellos pena 
Capital ni siendolo p.a dhos yndios bastante la de destierro…o alotes.”  
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crown, they needed to be brought into the Spanish sphere “through love, not force.”104  
Like occasional cedulas in preceding years that sought to mitigate the worst 
“abuses” of the Indian slave trade, the 1659 decree did not restrict Indian slavery 
altogether. Both Pacheco’s “doubts” and the Audiencia of Guadalajara’s response 
illustrate acceptance of the idea that some Native groups warranted capture and 
“temporal” slavery or “permanent” exile. One the one hand, the order challenged the 
circulation of Indian slaves as a result of “just war,” but on the other hand, it sanctioned 
the “temporal” enslavement of criminals and male “rebels.” In this vein, a decree the next 
year mandated that Apache rebels be shipped out of the region “to make their return more 
difficult.” If it produced the emancipation of some Indian slaves, then, the 1659 cedula, 
and the surrounding discussion of it, also illustrated and responded to contemporary 
practices: in particular, the circulation of Native slaves beyond the Greater Rio Grande.105  
 
The Circulation of Indian Captives Beyond Parral 
 
For a surprising number of Natives, the experience of displacement did not end in 
Parral. Spanish residents sold more than two hundred Tepehuan Indians in Durango in 
1604, friars in New Mexico lamented that governors there sent “many” Indians to 
Mexico, and residents in Nuevo Leon reportedly exported Indians from that region from 
early settlement into the mid-1600s.106 While references to such long-distance 
displacements often provide only tantalizing hints rather than descriptive detail, 
                                                            
104 Ibid: no alla por donde puedan ser conprehendidos dha chusma de mujeres y muchachos ygnozentes y 
que se contienen en su modo barbaro de bibir en sus tierras sin aber meresido en la gua del bautpismo ni 
aberestado nunca en la obediencia de nra R.l corona que a estos mas por amor que por Rigor se an de 
reducir al gremio de la s.ta fe catholica.” 
105 Ibid. and AHP 1660C, f. 1278-1284. 
106 See Craumessel, Poblar la Frontera, 189; José Cuello, “The Persistence of Indian Slavery”; Zavala, Los 
Esclavos Indios.  
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occasionally records do provide some indication of the circumstances under which some 
captives were sent to Mexico City and other urban centers. In 1652, for example, Spanish 
soldiers captured a Toboso Indian woman named Isabel and her two-year-old son. In 
front of Parral authorities, Isabel explained that she had escaped from a convoy of Indian 
captives bound for Mexico City. This shipment was rooted in recent campaigns by 
Spanish soldiers and Native allies against Tobosos who had alleged engaged in livestock 
rustling. The captain of these efforts had reportedly killed 300 Tobosos and managed to 
capture 180 women and children in one autumn campaign in the mountains. As they had 
done in the past, the soldiers sold some of these captives in Parral, while attempting to 
transport others further south—in this case to Mexico City.107  
On the way to Mexico, however, some captives had escaped, including Isabel. 
Asked to explain the motives for her escape from the convoy bound for Mexico, Isabel 
noted that neither she nor other captives had “[wanted] to take their children to Mexico.” 
Carrying her two-year-old child, she had gone in search of her relatives in “her country,” 
and had unfortunately crossed paths with Spanish soldiers who re-captured her. On the 7th 
of June in 1652, a public auction for Isabel and her son proceeded, with “many citizens 
and miners” present. Juan Andres, the town crier, asked in a loud voice if “any one wants 
to buy this Indian and her son,” specifying that the son’s ten years of temporal slavery 
“would not start counting until he was 14.” Captain Juan Leal, a citizen and miner in 
Parral, offered 100 pesos—a typical sum—and since no one exceed his bid, he received 
title to the two captives.108 
                                                            
107 For the campaign against the Tobosos see AGI Guadalajara 29 (1652), AHP 1652B, fr. 301-620; Case of 
Isabel is in AHP 1655A, fr. 102-107.  
108 Ibid.: “salio en publica almoneda en la plaza deste R.l la dha Yndia con su hijo contenida en el y en pre.a 
del S.or Gov.or y de otras personas vezinos y mineros, se pregono en altas Bozes por voz de Ju.o andres 
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 Isabela and her son’s experience reflected local practices of Indian slavery while 
hinting at the circulation of Native captives beyond Parral to central New Spain. Captured 
and transported far from her homeland in Greater Rio Grande, she had attempted to 
escape “to keep her son from being sent to Mexico.”  While journeying home in search of 
kin, she had been recaptured and sold in a public auction for a sizeable sum. Her sale was 
understood to be “temporary” and she was supposed to be instructed in Catholicism and 
“treated well.” For both her and her son, the “crimes” of their kin served as a legitimate 
justification for slavery; a two-year old child, who clearly had made no contribution to 
the decision to rebel or flee a mission, or steal livestock, or kill Spaniards, thus faced 
more than twenty-years of forced labor.109 
 But what of the other Toboso, Tepehuan, or Apache captives sent to central New 
Spain?  Power struggles between ecclesiastical and secular elites occasionally produced 
documents that shed further light on what the broader experience of Native captives sent 
beyond Parral may have been like. One of the most vivid conflicts of mid-seventeenth 
century New Mexico was the Inquisition trial of Governor Bernardo de Mendizabal. 
Governor Mendizabal had from the beginning of his term run into conflict with the head 
of the Franciscan missions that dominated religious life in the province by asserting 
secular over religious authority, and intervening in ecclesiastical affairs. Supported by 
Santa Fe’s cabildo, or town council, he had irritated many local residents by raising the 
daily wage for Native laborers from ½ to 1 real and requiring that they be fed. Of even 
greater concern to the Franciscans, he had proved remarkably tolerant of Native religious 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
yndio Ladino, quien quisiere comprar esta Yndia, con su hijo por diez años de Serv.o cada uno, 
spezificando en dho pregon q. los diez años de serv.o del Yndiesuelo ande empezar a correr desde edad de 
catorze años…” 
109 Ibid: “dixo que por no llevar sus hijos a mexico se huieron…” 
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rites, and had allegedly encouraged them to perform the Katsina dance, which the friars 
had long associated with the work of the devil.  Eventually, the friars built up enough 
complaints to initiate an inquiry by the Holy Inquisition, based on his heretical 
statements, lack of religiosity, and even possible Judaism.110  
The dispute between Mendizabal and the custodian of the Franciscan missions 
sparked discussion of the enslavement of local Indians and their transport out of New 
Mexico. Custodian Juan Ramirez explained to the viceroy in 1661 that recent governors 
of New Mexico, including Mendizabal, had demonstrated “very great covetousness,” by 
sending squadrons of men to capture heathen Indians in order to “send them to the camp 
and mines of El Parral to sell.” He argued that this slave trade sowed "mortal hatred for 
our holy faith and enmity for the Spanish nation.” In response to these serious charges, 
Mendizabal countered that it was in fact Fray Juan Ramirez who had seized large 
numbers of heathen men and women, “who due to their suffering from hunger, had 
entered the Christian pueblos in quest of succor.” He explained the Ramirez took “forty-
three of those in this condition, sold and disposed of them, and charged the deed to the 
accused.” In fact, Ramirez admitted to these actions in part, though he cast them in 
benevolent terms.   He explained how the friars had “rescued some boys and girls from 
the empire of the devil and now have them as gentle, peaceable Christians, and wholly 
free.” It was because he did not allow the governor to sell them in Parral that “the 
governor so abominates the religious.” Clearly, if the friar and governor differed in 
rhetoric, both accepted the potential utility of Indian captivity more generally.111 
                                                            
110 AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, 3286; AGN Inquisicion, Vol. 502; For the broader context of this case see 
Gutierrez, When Jesus Came; Frances V. Scholes, Troubles Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670 (New York: 
AMS Press, 1977).  
111 “Case of the fiscal of the Holy Office against Bernardo López de Mendizábal,” in Hackett, Historical 
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Subsequent investigations revealed that Mendizabal had in fact sent seventy 
captives to sell in Parral, and recently sold another group of Natives for more than 1,000 
pesos in Sonora. If he had perhaps looked forward to his post in New Mexico—such 
assignments generated opportunity for financial gain—by November 1662 all had gone 
terribly wrong. A new governor, Diego de Peñalosa, had arrived in Santa Fe to begin a 
customary review or residencia of Mendizabal’s term in office. He found that 
Mendizabal had abused his power, forcing Christian Indians to labor for him against their 
will, initiating military campaigns against peaceful Native groups, and generally taking 
great care to make profit for himself rather than secure the peace and prosperity of New 
Mexico. Meanwhile, Fray Ramirez continued to build an impressive case against 
Mendizabal, amounting to more than thirty charges in all. Not only had Mendizabal 
captured “peaceful” Indians and sent them to New Spain to sell, but he had allegedly 
declared himself the “universal head” of New Mexico with authority over all religious 
affairs. He claimed that “only Jesus Christ could be a better governor than him” and last 
but not least, he and his wife Doña Theresa had attended religious services quite 
irregularly, and were often late when they did arrive. This was enough for the Mexican 
Inquisition to embargo the couple’s possessions, arrest them, and send them south to 
Mexico City to face trial.112  
The attention of the Inquisition shed light on Native captives in New Spain—
dozens sent by Mendizabal and his allies to sell, others “gifted” by Peñalosa or Ramirez 
to their acquaintances, and others accompanying Mendizabal and his wife. In fact, during 
1663, the Holy Inquisition distributed a number of Native captives that had arrived in 
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Mexico City amidst the turmoil in New Mexico. Taking advantage of the situation in 
Santa Fe, for example, Peñalosa had seized a large number of Mendizabal’s Indian 
domestics and had begun “gifting” these to acquaintances in Mexico City. Whether 
Peñalosa’s practice was innovative or echoed a longer tradition is unclear, but in March 
1663, residents of Mexico City began to petition that Peñalosa’s “gifts,” which the 
Inquisition had embargoed, be released to them. Carlos de Siguenz noted that Peñalosa 
had sent him a gift of “a little Chichimec girl” for him to teach how to work and instruct 
in the doctrines of the Catholic faith, as well as a chest with a dozen drawers and some 
pine nuts. Don Francisco Alfonso de Valdes noted that Peñalosa had sent him a gift of a 
“little Chichimec boy and two little Chichimec girls” as well as a carpet “of the type of 
that land” and some pine nuts.  A letter enclosed for his wife noted that the little Indian 
girls should serve Doña Juanica. Peñalosa’s letter and gift to Doña Francisca de Alzate 
was perhaps most descriptive. Not only was he sending pine nuts, the letter explained, but 
a ten-year old Apache Indian girl named Ana. This present “of angelical beauty in the 
form of an Apache” was intended to show “his best wishes” to the "deserving" Doña.  He 
noted that Ana even had some early grasp of “our language.”113  
Meanwhile, in April 1663, Indians that had been in the service of Mendizabal and 
his wife began to arrive as well. These captives soon gained the attention of the Viceroy 
of New Spain and other local elites. Traveling out to the Pueblo de Guadalupe where the 
Inquisition was housing the Indian women and men, the viceroy ordered that they be 
shown to him, and that since they were “free” and “because they could not be sold” he 
suggested that they be donated to the royal palace. The inquisitors granted this request, 
                                                            
113 AGN Tierras 3283: For gifting language, “si a medida de mi desear y su merezer de vmd ubiera de 
Proporsionar la yndiesuela q. remito solisitara una angelical hermosura en forma de apachi de cuia nasion 
es ana de 10 años cristiana y con algunas prinsipios de nuestro ydioma…” 
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and Michaela, Isabela, and Ines—all fourteen or fifteen years old—traveled with the 
viceroy into Mexico City.114  
The language used to discuss Native captives echoed recent royal decrees 
generated at least in part in response to the practices brought to light in the trial of 
Mendizabal. Elites involved in the circulation of Natives increasingly spoke of them as 
“gifts” and testified to their “complete liberty.”  Even Mendizabal, for instance, explained 
to the Inquisition that he had only sold Native captives “when it had been permitted” and 
that those in his service were entirely free and “without any charge of slavery.”115   
Attention to the fate of captives “gifted” or distributed by the Holy Inquisition in 
Mexico City qualifies the significance of “free” status for Native captives sent hundreds 
of miles from their homelands, however. As in Parral, assimilation into society was most 
possible for the youngest of captives. As noted above, both Native and Hispanic groups 
desired young captives in part because they viewed them as the most able to adapt—and 
the most likely to provide useful long-term labor. Thus Captain Toribio, for example, 
petitioned the Inquisition to be returned Juanchillo Toribio, “a heathen of seven or eight 
years-old,” noting that he had rescued the boy from “the civil wars that the Natives of 
New Mexico had with each other.” Having “raised him,” the Captain feared that the boy 
was sick, naked, and heartbroken in his absence.116 
 Other Mexico City residents petitioned to receive adults, providing the formulaic 
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promise “to instruct them and indoctrinate them,” but clearly also hoping that they might 
fulfill immediate labor needs. Doña Ana Muñez de Rojas, for instance, petitioned in June 
1663 to receive “a Chichimeca to teach and indoctrinate.”  While she promised to pay the 
Indian girl one peso per month, she returned a month later and explained that since Maria 
was naked, it was necessary to buy her clothing, and she also had to pay for a blanket for 
her to sleep on. Moreover, until she was further “instructed” her service was not worth 
anything, and she thus hoped that the inquisitors would see fit to relieve her of having to 
pay Maria for the next six months. They granted this request, and a year later Doña Ana 
returned again with the same request—to not have to pay Maria because of the cost of 
clothing her.  This time she noted that “she had baptized her, and set to work on 
instructing her in Christian doctrines.”117  
For an Apache Indian like Maria, the line Spaniards drew between “free” status 
and “slavery” must have been ambiguous.  Sleeping on a blanket, unpaid, and compelled 
to perform domestic service, perhaps she found some meaning in baptism and Christian 
instruction; unfortunately, her understandings are not recorded in the historical record. In 
the end, religiosity did shape the course of her life in Mexico City, as Doña Ana entered 
into the service of the Viceroy, took Maria with her to the royal palace, and left her 
behind. What happened to Maria is revealed in the Doña’s later petition to be relieved of 
any obligation to pay her one peso per month salary, which she seems to have succeeded 
in avoiding from the beginning. The Inquisition’s investigation revealed that Maria 
“Apache” had spent years in the service of the viceroy, but he had later sent her to a 
nunnery.  In 1672, almost ten years after arriving in Mexico City, Maria had died there of 
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This Apache woman’s experience in multiple households was characteristic of 
that of other Native captives in Mexico City. Recall that the Viceroy had received three 
other Indian women in 1663: “fourteen to fifteen year old” Michaela, Maria, and Ines. By 
1665, however, the Inquisition had returned these captives to Doña Theresa de Aguilera, 
Mendizabal’s widow. This had not prevented the viceroy’s wife from wrangling to get 
them back, however.  In fact, in January 1666, Doña Theresa presented serious 
allegations to the office of the Inquisition regarding the (now former) viceroy. She 
explained that he had scaled the walls of her estate, entered through the back corral, and 
stolen her three Indian servants: “Maria Quivira, Michaela Quivira, and Ines Apache.” 
She demanded that they be returned to her, and that the perpetrators of this “grave” 
plot—the Count and his wife, Doña Maria de Cordova—be given punishment fitting the 
severity of their crime. In the days to follow, the Inquisition heard testimony that Doña 
Maria had tried to lure the Indian women into her service by relaying promises of better 
treatment through her African slaves, who spoke with Maria, Michaela, and Ines while 
collecting water from the neighborhood well. When the women vanished one evening, 
Doña Theresa had initially entertained the possibility that they had committed suicide, 
but rumors of Doña Maria's wrangling for their labor had convinced her that kidnapping 
was more likely. It was at this point that Doña Theresa decided to turn to the Inquisition 
for redress, since it was that office that had returned her servants to her in the first 
place.119  
The ultimate fate of Maria, Michaela, and Ines is unclear, as the outcome of the 
                                                            
118 AGN Tierras 3283.  
119 AGN Tierras 3268: “haviendo hablado los criados de dho s.or conde con ellas antecedentemente segun 
he tenido not.a con q. con evidencia se convence el haver cometido el dho delicto grave…” 
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petition is not extant in the records of the Inquisition. Whether they were “kidnapped,” 
had chosen to flee to a new household, or had sought to escape Mexico altogether, their 
life stories reflect surprisingly common experiences of captivity and slavery in the 
Greater Rio Grande. As “Quiviras”—likely Wichita Indians—Maria and Michaela had 
probably been captured by Plains Apaches who often raided Wichita villages near 
present-day Kansas. Apache men carried the spoils of these raids, including buffalo hides 
and captives, hundreds of miles west to trading fairs in New Mexico. For Ines "Apache," 
captivity had perhaps begun at the hands of a Pueblo warrior or Spanish soldier who 
captured her in the retributive warfare that characterized Apache relations with some 
Pueblo and Spanish communities by the mid-seventeenth century. Whatever these 
women’s precise places of origin, by the late-1650s they had ended up in the possession 
of the governor of New Mexico, Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal, only to become 
unwitting captives to his troubles with the Holy Inquisition that sent them hundreds of 
miles south to Mexico City. It was years later, long after Mendizabal had died in prison 
and the Inquisition had exonerated him of his alleged heresies posthumously, that these 
Native women became objects of a new dispute between Mendizabal’s widow and a 
former viceroy over their labor. Whether captives, slaves, or possessions of the Holy 
Inquisition, they had traveled through multiple social worlds since entering into captivity, 
from their home villages or mountain encampments, through the Borderlands trade, and 
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 The Borderland Between Slavery and Liberty 
 
By the 1670s, royal decrees had narrowed possibilities for Indian enslavement, 
and Spanish elites from New Mexico to Parral to Mexico City spoke of “gifting” free 
Indians to their acquaintances “without any charge of slavery.” Such language reflected 
the ongoing dialectic between local power relations, customary practice, and royal 
decrees. If labels other than “slavery” came to dominate discussions of Indian captivity 
after the 1670s, it is clear that legal prohibitions did more than just produce changes in 
the way individuals talked about the captive trade. In fact, Parral residents freed 202 
Indian slaves during 1671, and evidence also suggests that new prohibitions affected the 
potential financial rewards of trading in Indian captives. Questions about legality posed 
risks to the security of one’s investment, and while an Indian girl with legal title had been 
worth as much as 100 pesos in the mid-1600s, by 1718, a man could explain in his will 
that he was paying a debt of “a few pesos” with a little Indian girl. Subsequent references 
to the sale of Indians in kind or via barter suggest the collapse of a lucrative market in 
Native slaves in Nueva Vizcaya.121  
 What did “liberty” mean for Indian slaves living through these legal and cultural 
changes? In April 1673, Governor Joseph de Garcia de Salzedo noted that he had 
received word that merchants had conducted a number of Apache captives south from 
New Mexico and sold them. Salzedo ordered that residents manifest all of these to local 
officials, and that they tell them that they were not slaves. Public criers read this order in 
San Bartolomé, San Francisco de Oro, San Diego, and in Parral, and local residents 
brought forward a number of Apache Indians, most of them quite young children. 
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Captain Cristobal Ponce, for example, presented Francisca, a six-year old girl, while 
Domingo de la Puente brought forward Thomas, a six-year old boy. Juan de Oropessa 
manifested Joseph Antonio, a five-year old Apache child. While officials explained to 
them in Spanish that they were not slaves, they did not return them to their kin in New 
Mexico, but rather allowed them to remain in the possession of their previous masters, 
facing no apparent alternative to a life in domestic service.122   
Some captives did come to understand the law and seek to use this knowledge to 
their advantage. Maria of the Conception, a native of New Mexico, appeared before the 
Mexican Inquisition in 1673 to petition for her freedom. She explained that as a child, she 
had entered into the possession of Diego de Peñalosa during the time he was governor of 
New Mexico. After the Inquisition had apprehended him, they had placed her in the care 
of Don Francisco Baldes, a citizen of Mexico City. Life in his house had “not been to her 
convenience,” however, and she had recently escaped. Now Baldes “was after her,” and 
she feared that he intended to “force her to serve him against her will.” Describing her 
own understanding of the law, she noted that she should not be subject to bondage for 
any longer than “ten years.” She had served this and much more, however, and pleaded 
that the inquisitors “grant her the freedom she should enjoy.” A month later, the 
Inquisition decided that Maria should not be freed, given that their case against Peñalosa, 
her former master, was still pending.123  
The image of a Native woman from New Mexico on the run from a Spanish elite 
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in Mexico City hints at practices of captivity and slavery that accompanied Spanish 
colonization throughout the Americas. Well into the seventeenth century, royal sanction 
for the enslavement of captives taken in a “just war,” purchased from non-Christian 
Indians, or sentenced to criminal acts buttressed long-distance trades in Native captives. 
Contrasted with hereditary chattel slavery, the “temporal” nature of Indian slavery in 
Spanish America by the seventeenth century suggests a greater possibility to, in the very 
least, eventually choose to labor in a household that was, as Maria put it, “to one’s 
convenience.” In practice, however, for Indian captives—as for free and enslaved 
Africans, women, and non-elites more generally—life choices in the early modern world 
remained constrained by unequal power relations that often made the boundaries between 
slavery and liberty hazy indeed.124  
The proliferation of statuses for Indian captives—“esclavo,” “naboria,” 
“criado”—casts light on religious motivations that for some Spaniards justified their 
exploitation of “heathen” Indian captives in distinction to slaves of African descent. If in 
some contexts, such terminology may have emerged as a means to subvert legal 
restrictions, the tension between law and social practice often cited in literature on Indian 
slavery has been overdrawn. If concern about the enslavability of Indians was evident 
from early colonization, so too were clear cases under which Natives could be legally 
enslaved: just war, rescate, and rebellion or criminality. The idea that hard labor and 
Christianization could go hand in hand had long been present in European societies’ 
interactions with “non-believers,” and transcended changes in legal categories over 
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time.125   
Debate over whether such legal messiness indicates that Native American 
captivity and slavery in New World societies was “less harsh” or “more benevolent” than 
chattel slavery in the end rings hollow. Scholars of African American slavery have 
revealed a diversity of labor regimes and slave experiences that varied based on climate, 
crop, and the peculiar individuality of masters and overseers. This diversity was also true 
for Native captives, who often labored alongside free and enslaved Africans in varied 
settings. At the same time, however, the distinct legal history of Native captivity as a 
practice within Euroamerican societies should not be disregarded as empty rhetoric. The 
actions of Native captives themselves are revealing in this regard. However constrained 
her power, however difficult her labor, Maria clearly saw some benefit to the promise of 
“liberty” that she believed she should legally enjoy. Her story is one of many, as in the 
coming century hundreds of Native captives would face similar challenges negotiating 
the borderlands of slavery far from homelands in the Greater Rio Grande.126 
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Chapter 2 
“The Infamous Traffic”: Markets in Apachean Captives in the Eighteenth 
Century 
 
In the 1680s and 1690s, Indian rebellions in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya 
highlighted the precariousness of the Spanish presence in the Greater Rio Grande.  As a 
severe drought strained the region during the 1670s, Spanish tribute and labor demands 
intertwined with a resurgence of Nativist spirituality to spur Puebloans to rise up against 
Spaniards in 1680. From Taos Pueblo, the medicine man Popé sent messengers to 
Puebloans across New Mexico, instructing them to return to past spiritual practices and 
cast out the Spanish invaders. Within months, the rebels had killed nearly 400 of the 
2,500 Hispanic residents of New Mexico and sent survivors fleeing south to El Paso 
where they would remain for the next twelve years. In Nueva Vizcaya, similar concerns, 
and perhaps awareness of the Puebloan success, sparked several thousand Tarahumaras to 
join together to cast friars out of their mountain villages as well in 1690 and again in 
1697. Such violence fueled some Spaniards to fear that all their kingdoms on the 
Northern frontier might be at risk of loss. Though armed Natives did not eliminate 
Spaniards from Nueva Vizcaya as they had in New Mexico, soldiers spent years 
“pacifying” the Tarahumara pueblos at great cost in life for both sides.127  
In these late-17th century conflicts, migratory indigenous groups, including 
Apaches, Sumas, and Tobosos, played an important role. They had their own grievances, 
related especially to the regional captive trades in which enemy Native groups and 
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Spaniards bought and sold their kin. In fact, the violence of the 1680s and 1690s proved a 
significant turning point in the history of slavery in the Greater Rio Grande. By 
disrupting the access of Nueva Vizcayan residents to captives from New Mexico, and 
leading some Hispanic residents to reevaluate long-standing practices of “temporal” 
Indian enslavement, the rebellions of the late-1600s helped bring a close to the lucrative 
market in Native slaves in Parral and its surroundings. Chapter 3 will examines this turn 
away from Indian enslavement south of the Rio Grande. First, however, another distinct 
market in Indian slaves warrants further analysis, as the Pueblo Revolt did not bring an 
end to slavery in the New Mexico borderlands, but helped set in motion geopolitical 
shifts that ultimately sparked new long-distance trades in Apachean captives at the hand 
of Comanche slave traders.128 
Even as the Spanish crown issued new restrictions on Indian enslavement, 
Comanche Indian traders began arriving in newly resettled New Mexico with captives for 
sale. It was no coincidence that the Comanche emergence followed relatively soon after 
the end of Puebloan rebellions; Native groups had circulated the horses that Spaniards 
had abandoned during the Pueblo Revolts widely, and the “kumantsi”—as the Utes 
referred to people “who were considered related yet different”—had found distinct 
advantages in equestrianism. Because a horse could carry four times as much as a large 
dog and cover twice the distance in a day’s travel, the Comanche were able to transport 
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more trade items and hunt for prey over a much wider range than before. As Pekka 
Hämäläinen has explained, “their reach of trade was multiplied, as was their ability to 
wage war, plunder, and defend themselves.”129  For some, including the Utes, Comanches 
would initially be useful military allies; for others, especially Apachean agriculturalists in 
the Arkansas Valley, they would be a formidable, and ultimately insurmountable, enemy. 
It was during visits to these groups in present-day Colorado in 1706 that Spaniards 
received some of the first reports of the broader geopolitical changes underway on the 
South Plains.130 
As Comanches overran Apache villages, they carried captives of war to trading 
fairs in New Mexico and the Louisiana borderlands. The value of Apachean captives 
acquired during the early 1700s fueled further Comanche expansion by providing access 
to horses and guns that helped them establish a vast trading complex in the South Plains 
by midcentury, displacing many of the region’s former inhabitants—and especially 
Apachean groups—in the process. Spaniards’ continued willingness to participate in 
Apache captive-trades reflected the limits of Spanish jurisdiction and sovereignty in an 
increasingly Comanche-dominated world north and east of the Rio Grande, more than a 
voracious demand for slave labor within colonial New Mexican society, however. The 
slave trade and Comanche power went hand in hand, as Comanches offered up Apache 
captives to Spanish and French buyers, demanding and receiving the horses and guns that 
gave them the decisive advantage over competitors as they gained control over much of 
the plains between New Mexico and Louisiana. Euroamericans, in other words, were not 
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alone in forging far-reaching trades in war captives in the North American West.131 
 
Slavery in the “Asylum of Barbarity” 
 
Violence and forced labor were not foreign to the Jicarilla Apache groups that 
Comanche encountered as they migrated south and east. Like other groups in the region, 
the Jicarillas raided enemy groups, obtaining booty and human captives in the process, 
especially from the Pawnee. Modern Athapaskan dialects do not distinguish between 
“captives” and “slaves,” and historical evidence corroborates a certain fluidity in 
captives’ experiences as outsiders within Jicarilla camps.132 Following the final Pueblo 
revolt of 1696, for example, members of the Picuris pueblo had fled north to Apache 
villages in present-day Colorado rather than submitting again to Spanish rule. Though the 
original nature of this arrangement and the precise nature of interactions between the 
Picuris and the Apaches escape the historical record, by the early-1700s, the Picuris were 
reportedly requesting aid from Spaniards in New Mexico in order to rectify a situation 
gone awry. The fact that they were unable to escape on their own suggests a degree of 
coercion on the part of Apaches that illustrates that if the Picuris had originally joined 
with the Apache as allies, they now considered themselves to be captives.133  
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In 1706, a Spanish expedition travelled north from New Mexico to Apache lands 
in present-day Southern Colorado to answer the Picuris’ requests for aid. The governor of 
New Mexico, Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez later explained his understanding of the 
situation to the king: the Picuris had foolishly chosen apostasy over Christian labor. By 
seeking refuge from Spanish labor demands “in the asylum of barbarity,” the Picuris had 
found “labor twice as great as that which they had endured [in New Mexico].” Once they 
had arrived in Apache villages, the Apaches had made them captives and held them “as 
slaves.” They had thenceforth been “obliged to do all kinds of work,” or at least this is 
how the governor explained the story in his after-the-fact, dramatized account.134  
In juxtaposing Spaniards and Apaches, it is unsurprising that a New Mexican 
governor would favor the former, and conclude without needing to see for himself that 
the Picuris were slaves and must be suffering harsh labor “twice as great” as they had in 
New Mexico. But if the 1706 expedition was influenced by a redemptive mission—to 
save Indian apostates that had strayed “into the asylum of barbarity”—it had other aims 
as well. In addition to redeeming the Picuris from captivity, its commander Juan de 
Ulibarri was to explore the “unknown land” of the Native peoples of the plains and to 
“take possession” of it in the name of the Spanish monarch. His entrée north from New 
Mexico signaled the expansionary spirit of the Spanish in the Greater Rio Grande in the 
early 1700s after the Pueblo and Tarahumara rebellions, even as it revealed Apache 
cultural practices and places of residence.  By uncovering evidence of long-distance 
captive trades and the looming attacks of new migrants to the region, the Comanche, it 
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also provided early signs of shifting geopolitics on the Plains.135 
 Ulibarri set off in July 1706 with twenty-eight soldiers, twelve militiamen, and a 
group of about 100 Puebloan Indians. As they travelled north, the members of the 
expedition encountered a number of Apache groups Ulibarri called by the names of 
“Penxayes, Flecha de Palo, Lemitas, Nementina, Xicarilla, Carlanas.” Such designations 
appear to have referred to the headmen or location of Apaches’ matrilocal villages. The 
descendants of these groups would call themselves “Tinde”—the people.  In the first 
Tinde villages Ulibarri encountered, he found men and women busy sowing corn, 
frijoles, and pumpkins. Echoing Spaniards general association of agriculture with civility, 
he declared them to be “very good people,” and presented them with tobacco, knives, and 
biscuits while asking them to keep some worn-out horses for him to pick up upon his 
return.136 In the following days they reached other Tinde camps, noting that on the banks 
of the Santa Ana River, “the heathen Apaches of the tribe called Penxayes have much 
land planted to corn, frijoles, and pumpkins.” This group, though wary of the Spanish 
soldiers, eventually came down off the mesa and into the canyon to speak with Ulibarri. 
They were pleased that Ulibarri “permitted no injury to be done to their fields.”137  
 In fact, Tinde agricultural villages may have reflected a broader shift among 
Apachean groups in the Arkansas River Valley towards farming over the course of the 
seventeenth century. As the Tinde had shifted towards semi-sedentary agricultural 
economy, they had come to rely on access to well watered fields along rivers like the 
Arkansas. The Comanche, in allying with the Utes and migrating onto the Plains were 
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making a shift in another direction: they were becoming nomadic bison hunters and long-
distance traders. They too needed river valleys, however, to water and feed their horse 
herds. This was a conflict over natural resources that gave the Comanche a decided 
advantage. While the Apache could seek safety in numbers, their agricultural villages 
made easy targets for attacks by swift-moving Comanches on horseback. Moreover, as 
Comanche forged trading ties with Wichita and Caddoan peoples to the east and gained 
access to guns, powder, and shot from French traders, Apaches faced a new era in which 
they were outmatched technologically and strategically disadvantaged.138  
Though he was unaware of this larger context, Ulibarri described the drawbacks 
of Apaches’ relatively newfound attachment to the land. After breaking camp on July 
28th, a Tinde man, two women, and three little boys had caught up to Ulibarri and his 
men. The man informed them that he was traveling to join the rest of his nation “in order 
to defend themselves together from the Utes and Comanches, who were coming to attack 
them according to the information of the rest of his tribe.” The next day, they came across 
an Indian woman with a little girl gathering cherries who repeated the same news.  While 
the relative proximity of Tinde villages allowed them to gather together to defend 
themselves, in doing so, they became even easier targets for their new enemies: the Utes 
and Comanches.139 
 After reaching the Arkansas River near present-day Pueblo, Colorado, the Spanish 
expedition learned that the Utes and Comanches represented only one of the new threats 
the Tinde were facing in 1706. After the party had lost their way, wandering off trails that 
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Apaches marked with hummocks of grass, Ulibarri had sent some men to try to relocate 
the path. These men had wandered into another Tinde village and brought its Native 
headman back to speak with Ulibarri. He explained that four days prior, the Apache had 
killed a white man and his wife, scalping the woman and taking from them “a large gun, 
a kettle, a red-lined cap, and the powder which he carried.” Though the Tinde man did 
not identify them as “French,” further Spanish interrogation suggested to them that this 
couple were in fact French travelers from the East.140  
In the ensuing days, Ulibarri sought to learn more about this French presence 
while continuing to track down the Picuris captives. Led by the Apache man who had 
first told them the story of the white man and his wife, the group journeyed together to 
the village of Tachichichi. As they approached, residents came out to meet them with 
“much bison meat…roasting ears of Indian corn, rejoicing, showing pleasure upon seeing 
us in their country.” Much to the relief of the Spaniards, some Apaches also arrived with 
Picuris captives. Soon, the talk of diplomacy began, as “the whole day was spent in 
talking of peace and of the good relations which we were desirous of entering into with 
the Apaches.”141  
From the Tinde perspective, the Spanish presence may have seemed fortuitous, as 
they faced a rumored Comanche attack, other strange invaders—the French couple from 
the east—and more conventional worries, “the enmity which they have with the 
barbarous tribes of the Pawnees and Jumanos,” as Ulibarri recorded their concerns. This 
situation likely shaped their generally friendly reception to this Spanish military 
expedition. If the Apache perhaps hoped for a temporal alliance among equals, however, 
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Ulibarri demonstrated his commitment to “take possession” of the Tinde lands. In one 
early ceremony of possession, for example, he renamed their village, calling it “Nuestra 
Señora de los Angeles Porsiuncula.”142  
 As Ulibarri continued his journey through Tinde Country, he reached the largest 
settlements yet at El Cuartelejo, where men and women came “without arms, very happy 
and kindly disposed” to greet him. They brought buffalo meat, Indian corn, tamales, 
plums, and shared plentiful food for all to eat. Suggesting just how well the Tinde 
understood how to show hospitality to Spaniards, they had also set up a cross on a hill at 
the outskirts of their village. Together, the Spaniards and the Puebloans in the expedition 
went forward to kiss, adore, and worship the cross. Ensign Don Francisco de Valdes then 
carried it in procession through the village at the foot of the hill.  It was just as these 
ceremonies concluded, Ulibarri noted, that the Picuris Indians emerged out of the huts “or 
little houses” within the village. He remembered that “after they understood everything, 
they cried for joy” aware that their redemption from captivity might be near.143  
 For Ulibarri, this was the culmination of his visit: enacting power through 
ceremony. The priest on the journey took the cross in his hand, beginning to recite the Te 
Deum Laudemus. Ensign Valdes then began to speak: “Knights, companions and friends: 
Let the broad new province of San Luis and the great settlement of the Santo Domingo of 
El Cuartelejo be pacified by the arms of us who are the vassals of our monarch, king, and 
natural lord, Don Philip V—may he live forever.” Asking if there was anyone to 
contradict this action—there was not—he finished with chants of “Long live the King! 
Long live the King! Long live the King!” Valdes cut the air north, south, east, and west 
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with his sword and signaled for guns to be fired. Everyone through their hats in the air, 
“made other signs of rejoicing, and the ceremony came to an end.”144  
 The Tinde leaders and Spaniards now began negotiations for the ransom of the 
Picuris, but only after Ulibarri had renamed the rest of the villages at El Cuartelejo: 
“Nanahe” became “the Rancheria de San Agustin,” “Adidasde” became “St. Joseph,” and 
“Sanasesli” became “Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe.” If the Tinde went through the 
motions of such ceremonies, they continued to push Ulibarri and his men to address their 
more practical concerns. They wanted the Spanish to go with them to attack the Pawnees 
and they wanted to be left a gun. After debating the matter, Ulibarri explained to them 
that they could not go to attack the Pawnees because they had made this visit only to 
retrieve the Picuris and their horses were too tired to go out for a battle. If the Apaches 
accepted this explanation, they nonetheless proved to be in no rush to satisfy Spanish 
demands.145  
While Ulibarri waited for the Tinde to bring forward their Picuris captives, he 
observed the Tinde and their villages further. He was particularly struck by the fact that 
many Apaches wore crosses, medals, and rosaries around their neck that he could tell 
were very old. They explained that they wore them because “for many years they traded 
and had commerce with the Spaniards and they knew that because they wore crosses and 
rosaries and images of saints, they were very valiant.” If Apaches viewed these items as 
possessing supernatural power, this hardly indicated, as Ulibarri later claimed that “they 
are a people more inclined toward our Catholic faith than any of all those that are thus 
reduced.” At the same time, however, it did signal the deep roots of Apache trade with 
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Puebloan peoples and New Mexico. In fact, they not only possessed crosses and medals, 
but also hatches, sword blades, harquebuses, and “copper things” they had acquired from 
their trading relations with New Mexico.146  Ulibarri also noticed that “they have other 
firearms [besides the French gun] and among them three carbines which they said they 
had taken from the Pawnees.”  Describing the trade implications of their enmity with the 
Pawnees, they also explained how the Pawnees sold to the French the Apache women 
and children whom they took prisoners, and that the Apaches sold to the Spanish the 
Pawnees they captured.147 
 After camping at El Cuartelejo for several days, the expedition was finally able to 
complete the second half of their mission: the redemption of the Picuris. One Tinde 
headman had tried to keep his captives, and these had to be ransomed for thirteen horses. 
Ulibarri and his party then set out to return to New Mexico to trumpet their perceived 
success. They had ransomed sixty-two Picuris, including the most prominent Picuris men, 
and had left the Tinde “very pleased and contented.” Ulibarri believed them to now be 
“subject to the obedience of his majesty.” In this vein, he had personally approved the 
leadership of one man—Yndatiyuhe—to be the “Captain-Major of all Apacheria” and 
given him the “staff of command” to signal his position.148  
Traveling through the Apache Rancherias on the path back to New Mexico, the 
party received the news on August 27th that the feared Comanche and Ute attack had 
occurred. Ulibarri seems to have given little thought to this news, however, anxious as he 
was to advise the governor of New Mexico “of the happy outcome of our expedition.” By 
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September 1st, he was back in Santa Fe.149  
 
“They No Longer Know Where to Go to Live in Safety” 
 
In the immediate context of Ulibarri’s expedition, it is understandable that 
Spanish officials might believe that through ceremony, reciprocal gift giving, and the 
assignment of titles—“Captain major of Apacheria”—they had begun the process of 
bringing the Tinde under Spanish sovereignty. The Tinde had of course read Spanish 
actions and symbols quite differently. If they had failed to gain Spanish support for a 
campaign against the Pawnees, they perhaps hoped that their return of the Picuris and 
their hospitality to Spanish travelers would be reciprocated through military aid in the 
future.150  
It is only with the benefit of hindsight that both groups’ hopes seem tragically 
misplaced. In 1706, Ulibarri could imagine that prayer and ceremony had brought a new 
province of Catholic Indians under Spanish vassalage—“the fertile agricultural plains of 
San Luis”—and Apache men could hope for Spanish aid for an attack on their traditional 
enemies the Pawnees, while drawing upon the supernatural power of crosses and rosaries. 
Within little more than ten years, however, another expansionary people—the 
Comanche—were overrunning the villages Ulibarri had renamed and “brought under 
Spanish vassalage.” When Governor Don Antonio Valverde travelled back into Tinde 
Country in the fall of 1719, he was—like Ulibarri—greeted kindly. This time, however, 
the first Apaches he encountered en route immediately explained that “their enemies, the 
Comanches, were persecuting and killing their kinsmen and others of their nation.” At the 
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village of La Jicarilla, a Tinde headman also raised the issue of the Comanche first, 
explaining that his people “were very sad and discouraged” because of the Ute and 
Comanche attacks.  In fact, they had killed so many of the Tinde and “carried off their 
women and children captives” that they “now no longer knew where to go to live in 
safety.”151  
 While Governor Valverde still noted fields of maize, frijoles, and squash—and 
described the ditches and canals that the Tinde used to irrigate their fields—he 
encountered suffering and fear everywhere in lieu of the bucolic agricultural scenes 
described by Ulibarri. On the 22nd of September, Apache chief Carlana met up with the 
Spanish expedition and explained that he had come fleeing from his country in the 
mountains. He described how he had led his people into “a land of Apaches whom Chief 
Flaco governed, because of the continual war that the Ute and Comanche enemy made 
upon them.” At La Jicarilla, a Tinde headman noted similarly that the Comanche, with 
their Ute allies, had recently attacked one of the their rancherias, killing sixty and taking 
sixty-four women and children as captives. “Since that had happened they were sad and 
filled with misgiving and fear that the enemy might return and finish them entirely,” he 
explained. Governor Valverde tried to console them by promising a campaign against the 
Comanche to “punish this nation which had caused such great damage to all of them,” 
news they received “with much exalting.”152  
  Carlana and other Apache men joined with the Spanish in this effort to “punish” 
the Comanches, but they were in the end unable to track them down. The Apache 
situation was truly desperate, as they not only faced Comanche assault, but also attacks 
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from their traditional enemies—the Pawnees, who benefitted from alliances with both the 
Wichita and the French. In fact, for Apaches beyond El Cuartelejo, it was the Pawnees 
and Wichita who had “seized their lands, and taken possession of them and held them 
from that time on.” Central to these efforts was trade with the French, who supplied 
Apaches’ enemies with guns, powder, and shot. Illustrating the importance of captives to 
this trade network, the Apaches explained that they had gained some awareness of the 
gun trade because “they were told by some women of their tribe who were made captives 
among the French on the occasions when they had war, but who had fled and 
returned.”153  
Ulibarri and Valverde’s visits to Tinde country provided Spaniards with early 
awareness of the powerful new alliance that would ultimately transform the geopolitical 
and social landscape of the plains, as Comanches joined with Wichita and Caddoan allies 
to tap into trade with French Louisiana and forge trading posts of their own. It signaled 
too the central role that violence and captivity played in this process— sixty men killed 
and sixty-four women “carried off,” for example; Apaches’ awareness of the gun trade 
because of Apache women who had escaped from captivity among the French. Just as the 
Spanish had sent Apache captives in the seventeenth century to distant locales—from 
north of the Rio Grande to Parral, Sonora, and even Mexico City—Comanche mobility 
and alliances were built on trading Apache captives from the Plains to New Mexico and 
Louisiana. Attention to this trade provides an important context to understand Apache 
migrations closer to Spanish settlements in the eighteenth century, and illustrates how the 
long-distance displacement of war captives was far from an exclusively Spanish or 
                                                            
153 Valverde Diary, 131-133.  
 92 
Euroamerican practice.154  
 
The Comanche Trade in Apache Captives in the Greater Rio Grande 
 
The Comanche and Ute war parties that swept across the Tinde lands north and 
east of New Mexico kept no written records of their actions. Unlike Spanish military 
campaign diaries that sometimes described in vivid detail the successes, failures, and 
violence of battle, Comanche expansion is revealed in the archives only in fragments: 
through the reports of survivors that their camps had been scattered and destroyed, 
through Spanish expeditions chance encounters with smoldering Apache rancherias with 
the bodies of the dead piled in heaps. And yet, despite the destruction the Comanches 
wrought upon the Tinde who had lived and farmed on the plains, there were survivors. In 
fact, the captives taken in battle further fueled the Comanche ascendance, as they 
exchanged them in New Mexico for ironware and horses and in Louisiana for guns, 
powder, and shot. Tracing the journeys of these Apache captives maps the increasingly 
far-flung reach of the Comanche and their allies. By the mid-eighteenth century, they 
controlled virtually the entire Southern Plains region north of the Rio Grande. 155 
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Captive exchange was woven into the fabric of life in the Borderlands. Almost 
every group had “enemies” they took captives from, adopted some captives they deemed 
useful, and sold others to trading partners. Apaches themselves described this 
nonchalantly to Spanish visitors: “The Pawnees sell our people to the French, just as we 
sell Pawnees to you.”156 But as an increasingly imperial power, the Comanche, as had the 
Spanish, transgressed the conventional mutuality of captive exchange in the numbers of 
Apaches and other Native captives they traded to Euroamerican buyers.  In fact, 785 
Apache baptisms took place in New Mexico between 1700 and 1760—the key decades of 
Comanche expansion through Apache territories—providing some measure of the 
volume of the captives Comanches carried to New Mexico.157 The Comanche took these 
captives not primarily because they needed their labor, or because they needed to 
replenish their numbers, but as part of displacing Apaches from key river valleys and 
obtaining a useful human commodity that was valuable in obtaining what they did need: 
livestock, tools, and firearms.  Trading in Apache captives, in other words, was not about 
forging mutual exchange relations between equals, but about establishing the dominant 
position in the Borderlands geopolitical landscape.158  
The Comanche expansionary wars and trading delegations ranged far and wide, as 
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baptismal records in New Mexico reveal that they conducted Apaches, Utes, Paiutes, 
Crows, Pawnees, Kiowas, Taovayas and at least one Osage, Cheyenne, and Arapaho to 
sell in New Mexico. That Comanches were the primary sellers is supported by the fact 
that many of the ethnonyms mentioned in Catholic Church records are Comanche loan 
words. The term “Aa,” for example, is clearly borrowed from Comanche “A?aa,” their 
term for Crow Indians, but meaning literally “horn.” The term for Kiowa “Caigua” seems 
likely to have been borrowed from Comanche “Kaaiwa,” meaning “Coyote” or 
“Cheater”; the term “Guazaza” from Comanche “Wasaasi,” for Osage Indians.159 
Comanche captivity practices varied over time based on the needs of the group. 
By the nineteenth century, for instance, they appear to have captured mainly Hispanic 
boys who could more easily be incorporated as Comanches and help manage their large 
horse herds. Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez has compiled a sample of more than 1,000 
Comanche captives, focusing especially on the late-18th and nineteenth centuries. He has 
found that more than half of captives taken by the Comanche (62.5%) were children 
between five and twelve years old, and that nearly three-fourths of captives (74.2%) were 
boys.160 In the early-to-mid 1700s, however, women seemed to have been traded much 
more frequently. By trading captives, rather than primarily adopting them as they would 
in later years, the Comanche built their horse herds and acquired and maintained weapons 
supplies as they established a new life on the plains.161  
Spanish chroniclers described these trading scenes in moralistic detail. Echoing 
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the back and forth denunciations between church and civil officials in the 1600s, 
missionaries in New Mexico decried the abuses of New Mexico governors’ by drawing 
upon horrific scenes of the “wrongs” committed at trading fairs in places like Pecos and 
Taos. Fray Andres Varo staged the scene perhaps the most vividly for his readers: “Oh 
how I wish that my grief might describe, in mere outline, what the most excellent viceroy 
might see [if he were to come to New Mexico]!” Amidst all the rhetorical flair, Varo 
described quite systematically how this trade worked, however. When the Comanche 
trading embassy arrived, they could not be missed. At least fifty and sometimes two 
hundred tents of Comanches “as well as other nations” came together, a multitude so 
great “it is impossible to enumerate them.” The civil officials of New Mexico, the 
governor, alcaldes, and lieutenants prepared to join the trading fair or rescate by 
gathering as many horses as they could and as much ironware as possible: “axes, hoes, 
wedges, picks, bridles, machetes, daggers, and knives.” In exchange, the Comanches 
offered deer and buffalo hides and Indian slaves “men and women, small and large, a 
great multitude of both sexes.”162  
 Father Varo described the scene as a neo-Babylon where “cannibal barbarians” 
and Spaniards blinded by greed came together in debauchery highlighted by the purchase 
of captives from the Comanches. Such captives, he explained, were the “gold and silver 
and the richest treasure for the governors, who gorge themselves first with the largest 
mouthfuls from this table, while the rest eat the crumbs.” It was a miracle that could only 
be attributed to God, he argued, that the “barbarians, cannibals, armed, and mixed with 
numerous apostates…do not ally themselves and unite in secret treason with the Christian 
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Indians.”163  
Varo’s condemnation of New Mexico’s civil officials through a description of the 
Taos trading fairs culminated in his account of the moments leading up to the purchase of 
Apache captives. Varo described the ritualistic rape of Indian women before Comanches 
delivered captives to buyers. “If they are ten years old or over,” he explained, “they 
deflower and corrupt them in the sight of innumerable assemblies of barbarians and 
Catholics.” The Catholic men—greedy but powerless—watched helplessly until the 
Comanches handed the captives over saying, “Now you can take her—now she is 
good.”164  
The broader context of Varo’s account raises questions about his descriptions of 
gang rapes of Apache women. For Father Varo, the greed, barbarism, and debauchery of 
these trading fairs were only one charge among many against the moral character of New 
Mexico’s civil officials. He went on to describe how they “terrorized, subjugated, and 
oppressed” the “white people, soldiers, and those who are not soldiers.” Accounts of 
sexual violence served to highlight the questionable moral character of Spanish governors 
as they saved women from the “barbarians” but had been unable to truly save them from 
harm. Governors’ claimed to be motivated not by greed or sinfulness, but over a concern 
to try to assuage the inherent dangers of interethnic exchange. They explained that they 
had no choice but to purchase the captives, to “rescue” or “ransom” them from the devil, 
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from the heathenish Comanche.165  
If the accounts of civil and religious officials vary from lauding rescate to 
condemning it, both suggested a central theme—Comanche domination—as Spaniards 
were forced to trade on Comanche terms, not on their own terms.166 Between 1710 and 
1750 the Comanche sold hundreds of these captives at New Mexican trading fairs. Recall 
that in 1714, Governor Mogollon had explained his concerns regarding the trade in 
Apache captives in New Mexico.  He had received news that Apaches were being bought 
in rescates “large and small” by New Mexicans, as well as visitors from other 
jurisdictions, and that they took them away to “distinct places” to sell “without baptizing 
them.” As he saw it, baptism was the “only reason the King tolerated this practice.” He 
was worried about the possibility that Apache children would fall off the mules carrying 
them and be killed, as had happened already, without the benefit of that holy 
sacrament.167  
It appears that New Mexicans followed his order, as ninety-seven Apachean 
captives were baptized in New Mexico in the 1720s, 136 in the 1730s, and 313 in the 
1740s.  Illustrating the broader significance of this trade, by 1732 Governor Cruzat y 
Governor had issued an order banning sale of “Apachuelos”— Apache youths—to 
“Natives of New Mexico.” Again citing spiritual concerns, he explained that this trade 
was being carried out “with little consideration of the spiritual detriment it caused the 
                                                            
165 I am critiquing here historians’ tendency to reproduce this account without placing in the context of 
Father Varo’s wider critique of civil officials, see for example Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 45. In this 
critique I draw from Saidiya Hartman’s work on the rhetorical ends achieved through scenes of violence, 
see Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, especially 17-48.  
166 Varo Report, 487-488. For Governors on trading fairs see Thomas, ed., The Plains Indians and New 
Mexico, esp. 180-181.  
167 Order of Don Juan Ignacio Flores, 26 September 1714, in SANM II, Reel 4; See also Brugge, Navajos in 
the Catholic Church Records, xix-xx.  
 98 
little Apache children.” Apparently, he was unconvinced that Pueblo masters would 
properly instruct these captives in Catholicism. Backing this up with some force, he 
instituted a fine of 100 pesos to any Hispanic resident who sold an Apache to another 
Indian, and a punishment of 200 lashes to any Puebloan who bought an Apache. They 
would also lose any captives involved, and the proceeds would go to pay the judicial 
costs and to the royal treasury.168  
The ban on sale of Apaches to Puebloans illustrates that while it was common for 
New Mexican households to possess Indian criados or servants, not all of the Apache 
captives imported by Comanches stayed in Spanish households. Apache captives were 
what Spaniards had to buy if they wanted to trade with the Comanche, but captives’ fates 
suggest that the sale and baptism of Apache and other Native captives in New Mexico 
responded more to Comanche trading demands than New Mexicans’ demands for slave 
labor.169 The development of a distinct group descended from captives sold at New 
Mexico’s trading fairs illustrates this point perhaps most strikingly. By 1740, for 
example, “Genizaro” Indians, many of whom were captives sold by the Comanche, lived 
in a new settlement of their own. Fray Miguel de Menchero explained the roots of this 
settlement four years later. In his eyes, the new settlement of the “Genisaros Indians” was 
a marvel, given his experience that the Native nations of New Mexico “cannot endure the 
sight of one another.” Divisions between Native groups were, in Menchero’s analysis, a 
providence of God that allowed the relatively small population of New Mexico to 
survive, preventing the Natives from “uniting to annihilate the missionary ministers and 
the Spaniards.” But this new settlement was an exception because its residents 
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represented the “various nations that [had] been taken captive by the Comanche.”170 
 Menchero traced the fate of these Genizaros from captivity through sale by the 
Comanche into Spanish society. Describing the remarkable extent of Comanche 
expansion by the mid-1700s, he explained that the Comanche were “a nation so bellicose 
and so brave that it dominates all those of the interior country, penetrating into it more 
than a thousand leagues.” The captive trade extended far and wide, as he had experienced 
when he went to at trading fair in 1731 had asked an Indian about an especially “white 
and beautiful” captive Indian girl. Those present at the fair had told him that she was of a 
nation that lived 110 suns, or more than one thousand leagues from New Mexico.171  
He then detailed what happened after Comanches sold them to the Spaniards of 
New Mexico. “Held in servitude,” adults received Catholic instruction and the children 
were baptized, (as had been mandated by Governor Mogollon). And yet, the Native 
captives, he noted, “were not always well-treated in this servitude, no thought given to 
the hardships of their captivity.” In his mind, harsh labor turned these neophytes into 
apostates, as many decided to desert their masters. As a result, missionaries had 
petitioned the governor that something be done. Ordering that all Indian men and women 
who received ill-treatment report it, many had in fact applied to him for redress of their 
grievances. As a result, the governor had named a place for a settlement thirty leagues 
south of Santa Fe. Now, Menchero explained, “the people engage in agriculture and are 
under obligation to go out and explore the country in pursuit of the enemy, which they 
are doing with great bravery and zeal in their obedience, and under the direction of said 
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father they are erecting their church without any cost to the royal crown.”172  
Within several decades there was more than one Genizaro settlement, as a later 
account described another Genizaro settlement 10 leagues from El Paso. Its residents had 
been “bought from the Indians of New Mexico, and by them from the Comanches, who 
are at war with the Apaches. Similarly surprised by the lack of Native solidarity, this 
account noted that while the Genizaros are “in reality Apaches, there never as been 
observed in them any special inclination toward their nation, which is supposed to be 
because they left their country at a tender age and became strangers to its language.” 
They have “remained quiet, marrying women of their own kind, and afterwards among 
themselves.”173  
The longevity of the Comanche trade in Native captives to New Mexico 
combined with Spanish receptiveness to conversion and military service as just causes for 
emancipation, fueling ethnogenesis among former captives or slaves. Drawing on diverse 
cultural traditions, the Genizaros built new communities attached to but not subsumed by 
the nearby Spanish presence. Spaniards would later describe how they “imitated” the 
heathen Indians, though imitation seems hardly the right word. Instead, memories of past 
lifeways and continued interaction with both Spaniards and Native communities allowed 
them to forge a new identity out of past slavery, an identity based on claims to loyal 
service that facilitated an exit from the servitude they had experienced within Spanish 
homes, or on the part of their Native captors.174  
                                                            
172 Ibid., 402.  
173 “Description of the most notable characteristics of the settlement of El Paso del Río del Norte,” in 
Hackett, Historical Documents, Vol. 3, 506-509.  
174 For further description of Genizaros, and idea that they “imitated” non-Christian Indians see AGN PI, 
Vol. 204, fr. 460-487. See also Gutierrez, When Jesus Came, esp. 149-156; Brooks, Captives & Cousins, 
esp. 121-142; “Genizaros,” in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., The Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 10 
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While “Genizaros” have attracted the most scholarly attention, this process 
appears to have extended beyond New Mexico as well, to captives that—as Mogollon 
had indicated—continued to be circulated on occasion to the south in Nueva Vizcaya. 
The case of Juan Camacho, an “Apache criado” charged with stealing the pearls from the 
image of Our Lady of the Rosary in a Parral church in 1714, provides only one vivid hint 
at this practice. Apaches within Spanish society in eighteenth century Nueva Vizcaya 
appear in archival records through baptism, as witnesses to Spanish elites’ adultery, as 
the perpetrators and victims of sexual violence and suicide, and as newly weds.175  
The ethnogenesis scholars have noted in the New Mexican context may have also 
characterized the experience of Apache captives in Nueva Vizcaya. Like “genizaros” or 
“janissaries” in New Mexico, Apaches within Nueva Vizcayan society were called by a 
term that correlated to their status and labor: “criados.” On the one hand, “criado” was a 
generic term that applied to any domestic servant, but over the course of the eighteenth 
century it also came to refer to a distinct group within Nueva Vizcayan society, the 
“Apache criado,” as distinguished from the Gila, Mescalero, or Lipan Apache that lived 
beyond the Spanish sphere.176  
The degree to which “Apaches criados” understood themselves to be a distinct 
ethnic group warrants further research, but by the mid-1700s, some individuals self-
identified as “Apache criados” in legal testimony, and Spaniards also referred to them as 
a distinct group. When local officials investigated livestock rustling gangs in the early 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(Washington, D.C., 1988), 198-200.   
175 For criminal case against Juan Camacho, “Indio Apache criado” for theft of pearls from image of 
Nuestra Senora del Rosario in Parral church see AHP 1714, fr. 691-712. For other references to Apache 
criados in Nueva Vizcaya see for example AHP 1711B, fr. 860-876; Janos Collection, F1, S1; Cd. Juarez 
Municipal Archives, MF 513, pt. 2, r. 5, paging sequence 3, fr. 69-75; Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 
513, pt. 2 r. 5, fr. 364-376; Janos Collection F3, S1. 
176 Ibid.   
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1770s, for example, they explained that these gangs were made up of “Apaches, 
Cholomes, Norteños, with a mix of those called criados, as well as Tarahumaras.” 
Another official explained that for the last five years, haciendas had been raided by 
“Yndios Apache criados.”177  
If the origins of “Apaches criados” is rarely clarified, in criminal testimony they 
often testified in Spanish, suggesting that they may have been among the “apachuelos”—
young Apaches—that Governor Mogollon described being sent out of the province in his 
1714 baptism order. When an Apache woman escaped from her master at the Hacienda of 
Tabalopa near Chihuahua in 1758, for example, she made it as far as El Paso before 
officials there apprehended her. They noted that Maria was “mui bozal”—not very 
Hispanicized—but in her rudimentary Spanish she explained she was from “the nations in 
the interior New Mexico that are traded there.” While the captain of the El Paso presidio 
tried to track down her master, he placed her “in the care of” Domingo Apodaca.  The 
suicide of this Apache criada two months later is likely the only reason we have any 
record of her life.178  
How should the status of these Indian criados be understood? In recent years, 
scholars have generally understood these captives to be “slaves.” As Marc Simmons 
argues, New Mexicans skirted the laws against slavery and “avoided calling the captives 
slaves, and instead used the euphemism of criado.” In this analysis, the religious lens 
through which Spaniards discuss Indian captivity is read as “an artifice,” a means of 
justifying what was really going on: slaving. By reading too far against the grain of 
                                                            
177 For “los que llaman criados” see AGN-PI 132; AGN-PI 42 contains testimony from self-identified 
“Apache criados” in a case involving raiding gangs charged with associating with Apache Indians.  
178 Ibid., “Diligencias practicadas en razon de haberse ahorcado en casa de Domingo de Apodaca, una india 
Apache que alli estaba depositada…Año de 1758,” Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513 pt. 2, r. 7, 
paging 2, fr. 212-220. 
 103 
historical testimony, however, we may in fact lose some of the historical specificity of 
interethnic and household relations in the eighteenth century Rio Grande. Could the 
Governor of New Mexico have meant what he said when he explained that the king 
tolerated Indian captivity as a means of Christianization? Was the inspector of war in 
Mexico City disingenuous and masking his true understandings of Indian captivity when 
he lauded the Spanish purchase of Native captives as a means through which they “can be 
educated and brought into the fold of this church”? In the end, distinguishing between 
“material” and “religious” motives represents something of a false choice: masters could 
understand their possession of criados through a religious lens even as they coerced labor 
from them and, in some cases, committed brutal acts that fueled escapes or even 
suicide.179  
 
“The Infamous Traffic” to Louisiana 
 
The sale of Apache captives in New Mexico (and their dispersal elsewhere) 
represents only the most documented venue for Comanche slaving. As early as 1706, an 
Apache headman had described to Juan de Ulibarri how some of his women had escaped 
from captivity among the French. By 1726, a Louisiana census revealed the presence of 
at least 159 Indian slaves, at least some of whom were likely Apachean. As Pekka 
Hämäläinen has explained, it was restrictions on trade in New Mexico—in particular 
New Mexicans unwillingness to provide Comanches with guns—that first led them to 
seek other trading partners to the east.180  
The development of this market in Indian captives altered older ways of dealing 
                                                            
179 Marc Simmons quoted in Gutierrez, When Jesus Came, 155. James Brooks similarly implies that rescate 
might be understood as an “artifice” see Captives & Cousins, 125. 
180 Ulibarri Expedition, 74; Barr, “From Captives to Slaves,” 29; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 41.  
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with war captives. The Wichita, for example, had traditionally killed enemy captives in 
ritual fashion. But by the 1710s, French demand for Apache captives—evident in 
Ulibarri’s report in 1706 that Tinde captives had escaped from the French and returned to 
the Arkansas valley—had led to a mix of old and new ways of treating captives. When 
French trader Bénard de la Harpe visited a Wichita village on the South Canadian River, 
for example, he was given an eight-year-old Apache boy as part of conventional 
ceremonial speeches and gift-giving. A Wichita chief had explained that had he arrived a 
month earlier, he “could have given (or sold) him seventeen more Apaches, but alas, they 
had been killed in a public festival.”181  
The French attempted to trade with the Apaches as well in the 1720s, but in doing 
so they revealed what the Tinde had already suggested to Spanish visitors: the 
Comanche-Wichita-French trade network was fueled in part by a trade in Apache 
captives. In 1724, for example, Etienne de Bourgmont sent a young woman and teenage 
boy he had purchased from Kansas Indians back to a Tinde village. His goal was to forge 
new trade relations with Apache leaders, hoping the gesture of returning their kinsmen 
would be met my reciprocal goodwill. He traveled to the Apaches three months later, 
laying out for them an array of trade goods that they might receive from the French: 
rifles, sabers, pickaxes, gunpowder, bullets, red cloth, blue cloth, mirrors, knives, beads, 
brass wire, and much more. Before more than two hundred warriors and a large group of 
women and children as an audience, the Apache leader highlighted what had been an 
impediment to such trade in the past. While he was open to peaceful trade, he explained 
that they would have to “return to us our women and children whom they have taken 
                                                            
181 Barr, “From Captives to Slaves,” 24.  
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from us and who are slaves in their country.” French efforts to trade with the relatives of 
people they also purchased proved in vain. As Comanches displaced the Tinde from the 
Arkansas Valley, opportunity for closer relations with the French, even if they had 
desired it, came to a close.182  
By midcentury, such trading networks built in part around an Apache captive 
trade were well established.  In 1748, for example, Spanish officials learned that thirty-
three Frenchmen had traveled to Comanche camps northeast of Taos, purchasing mules 
with “plenty of muskets.” The French traded not only guns but also “gunpowder, bullets, 
pistols, sabers, and coarse cloth of all colors.” This visit of Frenchmen to Taos was 
perhaps unusual, as the Comanche supplied livestock and slaves to Taovaya and French 
allies at a new trading center they had established in the upper Arkansas valley.  From 
this post, the French returned to Louisiana with “skins of deer and other animals, horses, 
mules, burros and a few Indian captives whom the Comanches have taken.” While no 
written records indicate the precise numbers of slaves circulated, by the early 1750s, the 
governor of Louisiana would wonder whether Louisiana held too many Apaches slaves to 
establish trade or alliance with the Apaches.183   
After the Spanish takeover of Louisiana in 1763 at the close of the Seven Years 
War, Spanish attention to French captivity practices provides greater insight into the 
Comanche circulation of Apaches to the Louisiana Borderlands. After all, discussions of 
captivity and slavery have long served as means for groups to distinguish insiders from 
                                                            
182 Ibid., 24-25.  
183 Quotes from Tomás Vélez de Cachupín, Brief Description of the Province and Territory of New Mexico 
in the Kingdom of New Spain, in “New Mexico in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: A Report Based on 
Governor Vélez Cachupín’s Inspection,” trans. And ed. Robert Ryal Miller, Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly (Oct. 1975): 173; See also Antonio Duran de Armijo to Joachín Codallows y Rabál, Feb. 27, 
1748, in Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 2 vols. (New York: Arno, 1976), 
1:149; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 42-44; Barr, “From Captives to Slaves,” 28. 
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outsiders and condemn enemies for their allegedly more severe, inhumane, or 
transgressive practices. Discussing (and decrying) Indian enslavement was a way for new 
Spanish administrators of Louisiana, for example, to critique and distance themselves 
from the French, even as, in reality, many Spaniards also bought and held Indian 
captives.184  
Correspondence flooded into the viceroy in the 1770s regarding an “infamous 
traffic of the flesh” that characterized trade on the Louisiana frontier, and allegedly 
revealed Spanish superiority to the French. Fray Miguel de Silva described to the viceroy 
in Mexico City, for example, how in the village of Cadodachos he had met Monsiue 
Alexi, a French carpenter. He was “so unchristian” that he had a son who was fifteen that 
he had not yet baptized. “Even worse than this,” Silva noted, Alexi had five captive 
Indian women, “of various nations” in his house.  On his way back to the Texas missions, 
Silva noted that a Frenchman who had put him up for the night had “retired in [his] sight 
with an Apachi Indian woman.” Silva explained that she was pregnant and so near to 
term that he “prayed to God our Lord that she might be delivered that night in order that I 
might save the child.”185  
 Reflecting the ways in which critique of the French shaped Silva’s narrative, he 
explained how when he showed an image of the virgin to an Indian chief “our 
Indian…his countenance grief-stricken, and making signs of great pain in his breast, 
broke forth in his own language with these words: ‘If the French do not tell us these 
                                                            
184 This is evident not merely in Spanish reports from the region, but in royal decrees like a 1756 order from 
the King liberating Indian slaves found aboard a French ship exiting the Mississippi: see AGN Reales 
Cedulas Vol. 76, exp. 13; Spanish correspondence from Louisiana is collected in Athanase de Mezieres and 
the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780, trans. and ed. Herbert Eugene Bolton, 2 vols. (Cleveland, 1914) 
[Hereafter cited as Mezieres, Vol. #, p. #.] 
185 “Fray Miguel Santa Maria y Silva to the Viceroy, July 21, 1774,” in Mezieres, Vol. 2, 74-76.  
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things, we poor creatures will know nothing. Frenchman only Cambalachi, Cambalachy.’ 
This word ‘cambalachy,’ most excellent Sir, means commerce or trade.”186 Silva’s 
subtext was hardly subtle: if Spanish missionaries were to be brought to Louisiana, they 
could save not only Apache women’s unborn children but also teenagers who Frenchmen 
had failed to baptize because they were too busy seeking material gain through 
“cambalachi.” The Spanish governor of Natchitoches, Antonio de Mezieres, saw matters 
similarly, explaining how on the Arkansas River, one could buy women, children, horses, 
cattle, and mules. The men who dealt in these good lived “scandalous lives in public 
concubinage with the captive Indian women whom for this purpose they purchase among 
the heathen, loaning those of whom they tire to others of less power.” In fact, both Silva 
and Mezieres saw the Arkansas River as something of a heart of darkness. Mezieres 
argued that it was “the asylum of the most wicked persons, without doubt, in all the 
Indies.”187  
 When officials in Natchitoches forbade the trade in horses, mules, and slaves from 
Indian nations, men’s legal actions in relation to their female captives provided further 
evidence of the Apachean presence in the region by the late-1700s. Francois Morvant, for 
example, had declared his ownership of a twenty-five-year-old Apache woman named 
Marie Anne as well as their twelve-year old son in 1770. Several years later,  Marie Anne 
had been enumerated in census record as Morvant’s wife, “Ana Maria, of Apache 
nationality,” suggesting that he may have married her to ensure that her presence in his 
household would be secure from Spanish meddling.  Pierre Raimond acted similarly in 
marrying Francoise, another Apache woman, following her manumission. The fact that 
                                                            
186 Ibid., 78.   
187 Mezieres Vol. 1, 166.  
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other men simply emancipated their slave women in response to Spanish policy changes 
suggests that Raimon and Morvant’s actions may have reflected more than just practical 
concerns of ownership. Jacque Ridde, for example, freed his eighteen-year-old Apache 
slave girl, Angélique, after “she pledged to remain in his service.”188 
  If the archival record provides little insight into how these Apache women 
understood their circumstances, the long-term significance of their presence in the region 
is signaled by the fact that, by 1803, nearly one-quarter of the Euroamerican population 
born in Northwest Louisiana counted Indian slaves in their ancestry.”189  An 1806 Anglo-
American report after the United States takeover of Louisiana is perhaps the most 
descriptive. It discussed the “still-prevalent Apache women who had been brought to 
Natchitoches, and sold amongst the French inhabitants, at forty or fifty dollars a head.” 
They had become “servants in good families, and taught spinning, sewing…as well as 
managing household affairs.” By marrying Frenchmen, they had “became respectable, 
and well behaved women; and have now grown up, decent families of children, have a 
language peculiar to themselves, and are understood by signs by all others.”190  
 As in the case of “genizaros” in New Mexico and “Apaches criados” in Nueva 
Vizcaya, the descendants of Apache captives transported to Louisiana continued to be 
recognized as a distinct group over time. Though the perspective of these women is even 
less accessible than that of “genizaros” and “criados” of the Greater Rio Grande, 
observers’ descriptions of their unique language provide a tantalizing hint at the 
                                                            
188 Barr, “Captives to Slaves,” 39-40.  
189 Ibid., 40.  
190 John Sibley, “Historical Sketches of the several Indian trabes in Louisiana, south of the Arkansas river, 
and between the Mississippi and river Grande,” 1806, in American State Papers, vol. 1 (Washington, 
1832), 723.  
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From Santa Fe to Natchitoches, the far-flung destinations of Apachean captives in 
the eighteenth century traced the outlines of two vast networks of trade, commerce, and 
communication. In their efforts to escape violence and captivity in-between the 
Comanche and the Spanish, Apachean groups adapted through mobility, diplomacy, and 
armed struggle of their own. Some clung to Spanish settlements near Taos and Pecos, 
receiving missionaries. Others, like the Lipans, alternated between raiding and trading 
near San Antonio de Bexar in Texas.  Others found new trading opportunities by forging 
relations with mission Indian communities along the Rio Grande and south of the Rio 
Grande in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila. It is this trade, fueled in part by the poaching of 
Spanish livestock, which would become one of the gravest concerns of Spanish officials 
as they increasingly accepted after 1750 that given the power of the Comanche, the Rio 
Grande would be a dividing line between civilization and “barbarism,” or more precisely, 
between the Spanish and Comanche empires.192  
Before returning to consider how Apachean groups adapted and survived in the 
Comanche-era through migration, however, another thread of the history of captivity and 
slavery in the Greater Rio Grande after the Native rebellions of the late-1600s warrants 
                                                            
191 As Juliana Barr notes, “Most enslaved women…appear in records only as the subjects of baptism at their 
French owners’ behest or as mothers of natural children whose fathers usually, but not always, went 
unnamed in sacramental registers. Thus the lives of most enslaved Indian women rested on the whims of 
their owners…The experiences of women began in war, when they were torn from their communities by 
brutal force, and culminated in their sale into sexual and labor relations defined by coercion (From 
Captives to Slaves, 41). While I agree that John Sibley’s rosy portrait of Apache women’s lives in “good 
families” should not be taken at face value, I wonder if Barr overdetermines “slavery” as a category to 
understand these women’s life experiences. We can recognize that their presence in Louisiana was rooted 
in captivity and shaped by coercion—like most women’s lives in early America—while also attending to 
evidence that their social status may have been characterized by some degree of fluidity. 
192 This history is the subject of Chapter 4 of this dissertation.   
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further examination.  If Indian captive trades flourished in the context of Comanche 
expansionary wars and limited Spanish power north of the Rio Grande, to the south, new 
restrictions on the legal enslavement of Native peoples were not merely disregarded. In 
particular contexts, individuals and groups chose alternative fates for captives that 
presaged shifting understandings of captivity and forced labor in the Greater Rio Grande. 
As we will see, the decision not to enslave Indian rebels often had as much to do with 











Illustration 1: La Cabaña Fortress in Havana, Cuba, Site where Native captives were imprisoned in 





                                                            
193 Photo from <http://www.desdelahabana.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Fortaleza_de_San_Carlos_de_la_Cabaña_Havana-650x420.jpg> (Accessed by 
author, 28 April 2011).  
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Chapter 3 
“To Islands Overseas”: From Slavery to Forced Removal in the Greater Rio 
Grande, 1680-1730 
 
During the long eighteenth century, Spaniards and their Indian allies captured 
hundreds of Native men, women, and children, and transported them south to Mexico 
City, Veracruz, and Havana. Some captives labored in textile workshops, tobacco 
plantations, shipyards, or Spanish households. Many spent months or even years 
imprisoned in military forts, jails, and poor houses. Others escaped and made the long 
journey back to the mountains and river valleys of the Rio Grande River Basin.194    
Relatively few historians have traced these displaced people, and analyses of the 
banishment or “deportation” of Native groups have cast the practice as unusual and 
unrepresentative of broader relations between Spaniards and Indians in colonial North 
America. In a 1975 article, for example, Max Moorhead rooted “the deportation of hostile 
Apaches” in frontier military regulations issued in 1729. He suggested that local officials 
were reluctant to send Indians away until the 1780s, however, and argued that the “brutal 
disposition of a few hundred [Apache] prisoners of war was hardly indicative of Spanish 
policy.” Christon Archer came to similar conclusions in a contemporaneous article. He 
also explained banishment through imperial policy and focused on the exile of Indians in 
the final decades of the Spanish colonial period. “Deportation,” he argued, provided “a 
means of removing primitive people who refused to conform or surrender to the ways of 
the so-called civilized majority.” By referencing the later forced removal of Yaqui and 
Maya groups in the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Archer suggested that 
                                                            
194 See charts in appendix for demographic significance of these displacements of Native groups, which 
included Coahuiltecan groups from the Lower Rio Grande; Lipan, Mescalero, Chiricahua, and Western 
Apaches from the central region, and Seris from Sonora and the west coast.  
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Apache displacement was an isolated “evil” that presaged the forced migration practices 
of modern nation-states.195  
In the years since Archer and Moorhead’s articles, scholars have continued to be 
drawn to the image of Apache warriors in Havana, even if just as a fascinating footnote 
of Spanish-Indian relations in the final decades of colonial rule. As recently as 2005, for 
example, David Weber noted that Apache Indians “suffered banishment to distant islands 
more than any other group of unyielding Indians.” Reflecting broader trends in the 
Borderlands literature, other scholars have reinterpreted Archer and Moorhead’s findings 
to suggest that exiled captives were “sold into slavery in distance lands” or that “for adult 
men, this probably meant slavery.” If Moorhead and Archer looked ahead to the 
deportation practices of modern nation-states, scholars like Pekka Hämäläinen and 
Juliana Barr have looked back to long-standing practices of Indian enslavement to 
explain the fates of displaced Native captives in the eighteenth century.196  
This chapter develops an alternate explanation for the emergence of banishment 
or “forced removal” campaigns in the North American West, challenging the idea that 
they were “hardly indicative” of Spanish-Indian relations, only affected Apaches, or were 
                                                            
195 Max L. Moorhead, “Spanish Deportation of Hostile Apaches: The Policy and the Practice,” Arizona and 
the West 17 (Autumn 1975), 205-220 [quote on p. 220]; Christon I. Archer, “The Deportation of Barbarian 
Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain, 1789-1810,” Americas 29 (January 1973), 376-385 
[quote on 385]. Moorhead did not cite or seem to be familiar with Archer’s earlier work. The link between 
forced migration and modernity has been a key theme in literature on forced migration more broadly. See 
for example Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake, eds., Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the 
Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and 
Markus Rediker, eds., Many Middle Passages: Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).  
196 See Weber Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 150; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 78; Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of 
a Woman, 189; Ana Maria Alonso, Threads of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico’s 
Northern Frontier (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 37-39.  
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significant only at the end of the colonial period.197 It interrogates the relationship 
between Indian enslavement and forced removal by pursuing a case study of one little-
known context in which a Native group that Spaniards had enslaved in the past—a 
coalition of migratory bands they called the “Tobosos”—experienced alternative fates to 
enslavement in the late-1600s and early-1700s, including transport to the Caribbean. 
Given the common assumption evident in existing scholarship that exiled Natives were 
“sold into slavery,” it may come as a surprise that neither displaced Tobosos nor the 
hundreds of Apachean and other Native captives that would be exiled later in the 
eighteenth century were sold in slave markets.198  
The capture and exile of Toboso groups emerged not to fulfill market demand for 
slave labor, but rather as an attempt to achieve security and sovereignty in a region that 
remained highly contested in the late-1600s and early-1700s. As Tobosos combined talk 
of “peace” and “obedience to his majesty” with raids of Spanish settlements and 
participation in Nativist rebellions that swept across the region in the 1680s and 1690s, 
Spanish residents and their governors explained that mobile Indians impeded the progress 
of Nueva Vizcaya and threatened its “ruin” and “depopulation.” A siege mentality fueled 
arguments that removing Natives “to islands overseas” represented the only means to 
                                                            
197 I favor the term “forced removal” over “deportation” or “banishment” in this chapter because the latter 
terms assume that Indians were being sent away from territory under Spanish jurisdiction. Many of those 
Natives displaced, however, likely viewed themselves as being removed from their homelands. It should be 
noted too that Spaniards referred to their actions using a variety of verbs—“extraer,” “sacar,” “exterminar,” 
“extinguir” fittingly evoked by the English term “removal.” Drawing upon Alf Ludtke’s essay, “Explaining 
Forced Migration” in Bessel and Haake, eds., Removing Peoples, I distinguish between “forced migration” 
and “forced removal.”  While I see “forced removal” as related to intra-regional “forced migration” 
practices such as labor drafts, mission settlements, and captive exchange, both Indians and Spaniards 
understood the long-distance transport of Indian groups away from familiar landscapes and homelands to 
be something different. I recognize this distinction by using “forced migration” to refer to intra-regional 
movements, and “forced removal” to reference extra-regional displacement. At times I also use the term 
“exile” as a synonym for “removal” to avoid repetition. 
198 On past enslavement of Tobosos see AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 29; AHP 1652B, fr. 301-620; AHP 
1655A, fr. 102-107.  
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bring lasting peace, quiet, and prosperity to their contested kingdom.199  
Attention to contexts in which Indians were not enslaved reveals new insights into 
the relationship between captivity, violence, and power relations in the North American 
West. Even as Comanche slave traders found willing buyers for Native captives in New 
Mexico and Louisiana, for example, Spaniards in Nueva Vizcaya had become convinced 
that some Native groups posed too great a threat to their security and sovereignty to be 
allowed to remain within the region, and sought to exile them as captives under terms 
other than “slavery.” If new legal restrictions on Indian enslavement may have played a 
role in this decision, the central impetus was not imperial but local, as persistent 
interethnic violence had convinced some Nueva Vizcayans that traditional means of 
interacting with Natives, including temporal enslavement, would be fruitless. 
Importantly, these residents were willing to back up schemes to “send away” Tobosos 
Indians with their “bodies and their funds,” an offer that proved key for royal officials in 
Mexico and Spain to endorse the practice.200 
 
  
                                                            
199 This approach draws upon Brian Delay’s argument that Indian nomads are rarely taken seriously as 
political actors, see Delay, "Independent Indians and the U.S. -Mexican War," American Historical Review 
112, 1 (2007): 35-68; Brian Delay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For the quotes from local residents of Nueva Vizcaya see 
“Diligencias practicadas con motivo de la paz que piden los indios de las Naciones acoclames y cocoyomes 
[Inquiries conducted as a result of the peace requested by the Acoclame and Cocoyome Indian nations]” in 
El Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral, Microfilm on file at the Benson Latin American, Austin, Texas, reel 
1704A, fr. 217-236. Hereafter cited as “AHP, reel #, and fr. # or p. #.” 
200 Ibid., for “temporal” slavery see Chapter 1; on imprisonment and forced removal as characteristic of 
Spanish interactions with migratory Native groups see Chapter 5. For a recent study of captivity and 
slavery elsewhere in North America that similarly interrogates change over time see Snyder, Slavery in 
Indian Country.  
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“Until they are permitted to be enslaved…” 
 
 Even before the Pueblo Revolt sent Spaniards fleeing from New Mexico in 1680, 
Indian raids and rebellions had sparked them to imagine the imminent loss of their 
kingdom at the hands of Native aggressors.  On the one hand, migratory Indians served 
an important rhetorical purpose in correspondence between governors and military 
officers in Nueva Vizcaya and royal officials in Mexico City and Spain. They helped to 
explain Nueva Vizcaya’s low Spanish population and declining mining revenue while 
rationalizing the discontent of those Native groups who often lived in towns and missions 
but occasionally fled from them. On the other hand, the lived experience of violence and 
the disconnect between Spaniards’ imagined enslavement or extermination of Indians and 
their ability to carry out such actions suggested that the rhetoric of “imminent loss” was 
not an empty strategy for gleaning royal investment. Nueva Vizcaya—far from being 
“lost”— had yet to be won.201  
In January 1677, Don Lope de Sierra Ossorio departed from Mexico City on an 
800-mile journey to his new post at Parral, Nueva Vizcaya, where he was to serve as 
governor and captain general of this kingdom with few Spanish but many Native 
inhabitants. When he arrived in April after more than two-months of difficult travel, he 
discovered that the kingdom was “in danger of being lost.” From Parral north to the 
Conchos River, which ran through fertile valleys until it reached the Rio Grande, Indians 
“wandered about,” and committed “murders and robberies without resistance.” Only days 
                                                            
201 For studies of Nueva Vizcaya during this period see especially Susan Deeds, Defiance and Deference; 
Cramaussel Poblar la frontera; William B. Grifffen, Indian Assimilation in the Franciscan Area of Nueva 
Vizcaya (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979); Peter Gerhard, La Frontera Norte de la Nueva 
España (México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996); and Edward H. Spicer’s magisterial 
overview, Cycles of Conquest: the Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the 
Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962). In contrast to my approach below, 
these works focus much more attention on sedentary Native groups and tend to assume rather than 
interrogate Spanish hegemony.  
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after he arrived, these Indians had raided a farm, killed twenty Native laborers who were 
sowing wheat and carried off the farm’s horses and mules. Ossorio immediately sent 
soldiers and “friendly Indians” in pursuit, explaining that though his forces had been “few 
in number,” they had caught up to the hostiles and killed thirty-three of them.202  
Ossorio’s assault on thirty-three unnamed Indians was only the beginning of his 
efforts to secure the kingdom against the “total ruin and depopulation” threatened by 
Indian “boldness.” In his first four months at Parral, during the summer of 1677, he 
claimed to have killed or taken captive “more than three or four hundred persons.” He 
only lamented that he did not have the military resources to accomplish more in order to 
fully “pacify” what he viewed as “the best kingdom that your Majesty has in its entire 
crown.”203   
Ossorio dwelled at length on why Nueva Vizcaya mattered. Its level, well-
watered lands, he explained, were productive for a variety of crops and livestock. The 
Sierra Madre that ran from Acapulco north through New Spain, into New Mexico and 
“without known end,” traversed the heart of the kingdom. These “infinite” ranges, 
Ossorio explained, were “all full of rich ores of silver and gold.” Even though Nueva 
Vizcaya had “no more than 300 citizens,” 150,000 marks of silver were drawn from its 
mines annually, from which the crown received 200,000 pesos in taxes and tithes each 
year. He even included a certified receipt with his report to testify to the fact that the 
                                                            
202 See “Don Lope De Sierra Ossorio…informs your Majesty of the state of affairs of Nueva Vizcaya, 
September 26, 1678,” in Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches 
Thereto, to 1773, Volume II, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1926), 210. Hereafter cited as “Ossorio Narrative, page #” and “Hackett, Historical 
Documents II.” Original quotes: “estava mas a riesgo de perderse porque en todos sus contornos, andaban 
los yndios enemigos, executando muertes y rovos, sin resistencia”; “yndios amigos”; “siendo mui pocos en 
numero”  
203 Ossorio Narrative, 210: “total ruina y despueble”; “la avilantez, con que los Yndios enemigos andaban 
executando en todos sus poblaciones, muertes y rovos…”; “les matamos y quitamos, pasadas de trescientas 
a quatrozientas personas”; “dejar en paz el Reino mejor que tiene Vuestra Magestad en toda su corona.” 
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mines of Parral had produced 120,000 marks of silver in the last year and a half alone.204  
In emphasizing Nueva Vizcaya’s bounty, Ossorio perhaps hoped to connect his 
warnings that it was “in danger of being lost” to broader imperial concerns. Since the 
1630s, the flow of mining revenue from the Americas to Spain had been on the decline. 
The recession in Mexico had been particularly severe, as royal officials in Spain had 
diverted a larger share of quicksilver exports necessary for silver production to Peru. 
Even as Ossorio weighed in on the crown’s monopoly on quicksilver, how much they 
charged for it, how it was transported, and who should receive it, he continued to stress 
that controlling nomadic Indians was what mattered most. They had “destroyed and 
entirely annihilated” many mining camps, and in the process had threatened the “loss of 
Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico.” All the quicksilver in the world, he seemed 
to suggest, could not make deserted mines operate.205  
Considering the mining process makes it clear why Ossorio took the Indian threat 
so seriously, even if he imbued it with hyperbolic flourish. Success in mining was built 
on three pillars: ore, labor, and quicksilver (mercury). Miners in Parral used the patio 
process to extract metal from ore. First, they laid out silver-bearing ore on the floor of a 
circular pit. The grinding process was driven by mules, which turned a central rotating 
post that forced blocks of stone down upon the ore and reduced it to a fine mud.  Next 
they spread the muddy ore over a paved patio, sprinkled it with quicksilver, salt, and 
                                                            
204 Ossorio Narrative, 210: “Por el medio de este Reino atraviessa la Sierra madre que tiene su principio 
cerca de el Puerto de Acapulco y se entra por el Nuevo Mexico sin que se sepa su fin”; “son infinitas las 
sierra, y montañas en que se divide y todas ellas estan llenas de ricos minerals de plata y oro”; Ossorio 
Narrative, 214: “en medio de no tener todo este Reino mas que trescientos vecinos se sacan el pasados de 
ciento y cinquenta mil marcos de plata.” 
205 Ossorio Narrative, 210: “en los Reales de minas que en ellas se empezaron a poblar y han destruido y 
aniquilado en el todo los yndios enemigos.” Ossorio Narrative, 212: “está a riesgo conozido de perderse 
todo el Reino de la Vizcaia y el de el Nuevo Mexico y la Galicia.” On 17th century mining concerns see 
D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, “Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 52, 4 (1972), 545-579.  
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copper sulfate, and drove the mules across it to mix it together. By dissolving impurities, 
quicksilver then divided elemental silver from the mixture.206 
Migratory Indians disrupted this process both directly and indirectly. By rustling 
mules critical to the patio process, they could bring work in a given camp to a halt. At 
times they raided the road between Parral and Salinas, disrupting transportation of salt 
from the mines there. While Indians also attacked mining camps directly, they more often 
disrupted mining by impeding access to the ingredients essential to refining rock into 
precious metal.207   
The degree to which Indian raids impacted mining revenue is difficult to measure, 
but since mining camps further south in Guanajuato and Zacatecas were not disrupted, 
Native campaigns clearly do not offer an alternate explanation for declining mining 
revenues in colonial Mexico at large.  If the discussions of governors like Ossorio raise 
questions about the relationship between rhetoric and reality, however, they also raise 
questions about “Nueva Vizcaya.” Who were the “hostile Indians” that Ossorio so 
feared? How did local inhabitants understand their surroundings?208  
 Ossorio’s description of unnamed “hostile” Indians reflected his own sense of a 
fluid landscape with boundaries that were difficult to pin down. The way he mapped 
Nueva Vizcaya’s large Native population is revealing. First, he sought to distinguish the 
                                                            
206 On the patio process see Thomas Egleston, “The Patio and Cazo Process of Amalgamating Silver Ores,” 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 3, 1 (1883), 1-66; and for a less technical description, “Patio 
Process: Pre-Columbian Contribution to Modern Silver Mining,” 
<http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2059585/patio_process_precolumbian_contribution.html>  
(Accessed by author March 15, 2010).  
207 For Indians blocking the road between Parral and Salinas see “Extract of a paper which Don Lope de 
Sierra wrote in regards to matters touching upon the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya,” in Hackett, Historical 
Documents II, 222;  for an account of direct attacks on mining camps see “Letter from the residents of 
Sonora, written to the viceroy, giving an account of conditions existing among them,” [San Juan Bautista, 
February 6, 1693] in  Hackett, Historical Documents II II, 290-297.  
208 D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, “Colonial Silver Mining.”  
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migratory Tobosos and their allies who threatened the kingdom, from the “more than 
300,000” Tepeguanes, Tarahumaras, and Conchos who were “all peaceful.” He turned to 
the Tobosos first, taking his readers on a rhetorical journey up the royal road. He 
explained that it was on the right side of the road where eleven nations of hostile Indians 
lived in the mountains, noting that it was “because the bravest of them are the Tobosos,“ 
that they were all called by this name. Contrasting Indian homelands with Christian 
settlements, Ossorio described Toboso lands as containing “no river, arroyo, or spring 
that is perennial,” no towns or cultivation, or even “birds or animals.”209  
Ossorio’s condemnation of the Tobosos emerged as much from their strategies of 
warfare as from his perception of their ways of life. It was not simply that they waged 
war against Spaniards, but that they did not hesitate to kill or enslave “women, children, 
old men…and priests.” In his eyes, they committed these murders “without motive,” and, 
even more importantly, they had “never gone out to fight in the open.” Thus they were 
not simply fierce, but “treacherous.”210 
Fears of Toboso “treachery” led Ossorio into his discussions of the broader Indian 
population of the Rio Grande. Importantly, Ossorio articulated a clear divide between 
Spanish and Native territory. Though he described the imaginary boundaries that 
mapmakers drew on elegantly crafted maps, he also recognized the lines of effective 
authority on the ground: lands “contiguous to” but not under the possession of Spaniards, 
                                                            
209 Ossorio Narrative, 214: “Dentro de la jurisdision del Reino de la Nueva Viscaia, hai muchas diversas 
naziones y algunas de ellas mui numerossas, y solo las de los Tepeguanes, Taraumares y Conchos, en lo 
descubierto llegaran a trescientos mill familias, y todo estos están de paz”; “por ser entre ellas la de más 
valor la de los Tovossos comunmente todas se llaman con este nombre”; “en toda su tierra no hai rio, arroio 
o fuente, que sea perenne, ni ellos tienen poblaciones o siembras algunas, y por lo que yo he visto en dos 
vezes que he pasado por parte de ella, ni paxaros ni animales hai…” 
210 Ossorio Narrative, 210: “no rreservando su bárvaro crueldad, mugeres niños viejos, Religiossos y 
sacerdotes”; “además de ser sin caussa todas las [muertes] que exejutan, son con alevosia por que jamas 
han salido a pelear a campaña rasa mientras no se les hisiere la Guerra mui de propósito…”  
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the lands of the Conchos, Tarahumaras, and Tepeguanes, who each “occupied 150 
leagues of mountain range.”211 
 In lieu of a Spanish kingdom, Ossorio had found a contested landscape still not 
entirely charted by Europeans when he arrived in Parral in the late-1670s. Through his 
own travel, and missionary and military informants, he learned it was filled with “many 
distinct nations, some of which are very large.” Indians had explained to friars travelling 
to the north that “the multitude is innumerable in every direction” and on the Rio Grande 
alone, “there are so many nations that with all their efforts the friars who are in that 
vicinity have not been able to understand and learn their names.”212  
 
Map 4: Native Groups of the Greater Rio Grande c. 1700213 
                                                            
211 Ossorio Narrative, 214: “todas estas tierras, estan contiguas a las que Vuestra Magestad possee…”; 
“cada una [nación] ocupa ciento y cinquenta leguas de cordillera” 
212 Ossorio Narrative, 214: “Dentro de la jurisdision del Reino de la Nueva Viscaia, hai muchas diversas 
naziones y algunas de ellas mui numerossas”; “y preguntados los yndios ultimos a donde han llegado los 
padres, si en lo de adelante y a los lados hai mas indios, responden, que es innumerable la multitud, hazia 
todas partes y solo en el rio del norte…son tantos las naciones que hai, que toda la diligencia de los padres 
que hai por aquellos contornos, no ha podido comprehender y saver sus nombres…” 
213 From Oakah L. Jones, Nueva Vizcaya: Heartland of the Spanish Frontier (Albuquerque: University of 
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Even as Ossorio declared that the Indians along the Rio Grande had “no idolatry 
among them,” and described them as a part of the bounty of the landscape, he revealed 
how being surrounded could provoke both promise and fear. On the one hand, he 
emphasized the potential utility of converting the inhabitants of this landscape, and noted 
that the expenses would be repaid, “since there is so much in this region which is 
contiguous to that which your Majesty possesses.” On the other hand, he warned that 
these “docile and gentle” Indian masses could just as easily swing in the direction of the 
Tobosos. He explained that they had already invited these Indians to come to their aid in 
raiding wagon trains on the way from Parral to New Mexico with clothing. This 
development should not be taken lightly, he cautioned, noting that Indians’ desire for 
clothing, “which they crave so much since they all go naked,” might lead them to 
“inundate these kingdoms and provinces,” and risk “all New Spain being lost.”214  
In his proposals to prevent such loss, Ossorio first drew upon the “just war” 
doctrine to call for “real and determined war” and Indian enslavement. He asserted that 
Spaniards had never encroached on Indian lands. Rather, it was the hostile Indians who 
had “come to the lands that are in possession of the Spaniards and Christian Indians,” had 
“robbed them of their farms with barbarous cruelty,” and “taken their lives without 
distinction of sex.” In a telling comparison, he argued that there was “more justification 
in making war upon them than upon the Turks,” who were the “declared enemies of all 
Christendom,” but at least gave quarter to the defenseless. Underscoring this line of 
reasoning, he stated that until it was “permitted for them to be enslaved,” Nueva Vizcaya 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
New Mexico Press, 1988), xix.  
214 Ossorio Narrative, 214: “en todas ellas no hai ydolatria alguna”; “siendo tanto lo que hai en estas partes 
contiguo a lo que Vuestra Magestad posehe”; “las mas mansas y dosiles”; “estava a riesgo de perderse toda 
la Nueva España, por que con el zelo de la ropa, que tanto apetesen por andar todos desnudos fueran 
innumerables las naziones del norte que salieran a innundar estos Reinos y provincias.”  
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would always remain at risk of being lost.215   
 Before Ossorio retired as governor of Nueva Vizcaya, travelled to Guatemala, and 
then returned to Mexico City as an advisor to the viceroy, however, he chose a solution 
that was neither determined war nor slavery. “All those of [the Toboso] nation,” he noted, 
“were reduced to peace. I settled them at San Francisco de Conchos.” Emphasizing his 
work in making peace and bringing the Tobosos into a fixed settlement—“I settled 
them”—reflected his paternalistic role in the legally sanctioned approach to Spanish-
Indian relations. As an agent of “our Lord” and “his majesty,” he was to watch over and 
protect these Indian vassals, who reciprocated for his generosity and guidance by offering 
their martial labor as “the principal defense” of Nueva Vizcaya. “Our Lord has 
permitted,” Ossorio asserted, “that they should become such enemies to the rebellious 
nations that the hostile Indians fear them most.”216  
At first glance, Ossorio’s narrative is vexing in its bipolarity. The kingdom is at 
risk of being lost, migratory Indians must be enslaved or vanquished, and then suddenly, 
these same Indians are its greatest strength. In one breath the “innumerable nations” of 
the Rio Grande are “docile” and in the next they are cravers of clothing who threaten the 
loss of all of New Spain. The fact that bounty and loss coexist in his narrative provides 
                                                            
215 Ossorio Narrative, 212: “mientras no se les hisiere la Guerra mui de propósito”; “si los españoles 
hubiesesses pretendido en algun tiempo quitarles su tierra, o entrar en ella o hazerles Guerra, no hubiera 
razón alguna que les disculpara ni justificara el hazerles esclavos, pero siendo los yndios enemigos, los que 
vienen a las tierras que estan poseiendo los españoles, y los Yndios cristianos, y que estan de paz y con 
bárvara crueldad les rovan sus haziendas, quitan la vida sin distincion de xesso, sin que para su fin principal 
que es rovar, conduzga, en mi sentir con mas justificazion se les puede hazer la Guerra, y hazerles esclavos, 
que a los Turcos, que siendo los enemigos declarados de toda la cristianidad dan quartel a todos los que se 
rinden sin llegar a ensangrentarse en las vidas de los que por su sexo, edad o profession estan indefensos.”  
216 On Spanish Indian law see Brian P. Owensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ossorio, Narrative, 212: “todos los de esta nazion se han 
reducido de paz, y los poblé en San Francisco de Conchos y ha permitido Nuestro Señor que estos se 
enemistasen de manera con las naziones alzados que hoi son la principal defensa de la Vizcaia, y a quien 
mas temen los yndios enemigos.”  
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useful insights into how Spaniards viewed the Greater Rio Grande, however. Uncertainty 
and ambiguity reflected constraints on Spanish knowledge and power. Moreover, in his 
response to these constraints, Ossorio raised questions that other governors and Spanish 
residents wrestled with in the years to come. How could highly mobile Indians be 
controlled, if not through traditional legal means? Was Indian behavior innate or 
changeable?   
 Ossorio vacillated. Even as he critiqued past efforts at peace, baptism, and 
Christianization, he attempted the same. Perhaps pride led him to imagine that he would 
be the one to really subdue the Indians, and that the Toboso would stay settled this time 
and continue to be the “principal defense” of the entire kingdom. Or maybe he was 
merely obedient to new legal restrictions, choosing peace “until they are [again] 
permitted to be enslaved.” Or perhaps making peace with the Indians simply reflected 
Ossorio’s sense of Spanish weakness—“three hundred citizens” in the face of thousands 
of Indians.  
What is clear is that his warnings of imminent loss were not entirely hyperbolic.  
Two years after he wrote about his arrival in Parral, the killing and capture of hundreds of 
Indians and the potential but stifled wealth of the kingdom, allied Natives in nearby New 
Mexico rose up against Spanish settlers. At the height of their siege, nearly 2,000 Pueblo 
Indians surrounded Santa Fe. By late-September 1680, Natives had eliminated Spaniards 
from New Mexico, killed over 400 of its 2,500 Hispanic residents and destroyed nearly 
every Spanish building. Fleeing New Mexicans marveled at how Pueblos had broken up 
and burned images of Christ, the Virgin Mary and “everything pertaining to 
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Christianity.”217   
Such actions, and the presence of dozens of refugee families among them, lent 
new purchase to the links neighboring Spaniards made between future prosperity and the 
enslavement, extermination, or forced removal of migratory Indians like the Tobosos. 
Subsequent governors and residents also recognized Indians as a cause of the kingdom’s 
impeded progress. Like Ossorio, they struggled with and debated efforts to make “Nueva 
Vizcaya” a reality.  
 
“Compelling them by force, to crave peace”  
 
Juan Isidro de Pardiñas had been governor of Nueva Vizcaya for fifteen months 
when he weighed in on the matter in 1688.  Adhering to common tropes in governors’ 
missives to the viceroy and Council of the Indies, he first detailed the kingdom’s bounty.  
“It is a very fertile kingdom,” he explained, noting that not only were “all kinds of grain” 
grown there, but that it was “extremely rich in gold and silver ores.”218 Military officers 
who had surveyed the region agreed.  Joseph Francisco Marin and his subordinates had 
explored the Greater Rio Grande at length in the early 1690s pursuing both Indian raiders 
and rumors of French incursions. As he described it to the viceroy, “heaven favored this 
most extensive kingdom with a benign climate, as much so as can be desired, and with 
great fertility of the land, for the plantings produce most abundant crops.” Then there was 
the “principal nerve” of the kingdom: “All experienced persons in New Spain,” he argued 
                                                            
217 On the Pueblo Revolt see David Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 133-141. 
218 “Don Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, to his Majesty, Parral, November 21, 1688,”  
in Hackett Historical Documents II, 228: “que es un Reyno muy fertil pues en el se cojen todos generos 
Semillas que hay en otra qualquiera parte de la America…es opulentissimo de minerales de platta y oro por 
que no hay parte en todo el que no manifieste betas.” Hereafter cited as “Pardiñas Narrative, page #.”  
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in 1693, “assert that the said kingdom has more silver than all the rest of it.”219  
 Two interrelated concerns prevented this bounty from being fully exploited. First, 
as Ossorio had noted, nomadic Indians disrupted mining and ranching. When Tobosos 
rustled horse and mule herds, they slowed work in the silver mines, “for without the 
horses and mules this work cannot be done.”220 If Spaniards saw Indian raids as 
motivated by Native subsistence strategies, noting that livestock, and especially horses, 
provided food—“their maintenance”—they also suggested that Indians saw raids as a 
geo-political tool. Since war had been continuous, much of the kingdom “had no Spanish 
population.”221 Indian raids helped explained this “depopulation” because “as a result of 
the inhabitants being forced to go on foot,  [the Indians] are able to obtain possession of 
the province.”222 For Pardiñas and Marin, controlling the Indians would allow for the 
working of the mines and for the growth of the population; a growing population and 
working mines would in turn prevent new Indian attacks.223  
They tied Spanish possession of Nueva Vizcaya to control of the wider Indian 
population as well. Marin reported in detail on the dozens of Indian nations that Captain 
                                                            
219 “Letter, report, and reply of the maestre de campo Don Joséph Francisco Marin to his Excellency the 
Count of Galve. Parral, September 30, 1693,” in Hackett Historical Documents II, 388: “Este dilatadissimo 
Reyno le favorecio el cielo con benigno temperamiento, quanto puede dessearse, con gran fertilidad de sus 
campos; pues producen los fructose colmadissimas cosechas”; “asegurando todos los mas practicos de la 
nueva españa, tiene dicho reyno mas plata que lo restante de todo ella.” Hereafter cited as “Marin 
Narrative, page #.”  
220 Pardiñas Narrative, 228: “caussando tanto Perjuiciio que quando menos consiguen, se lleban las 
Cavalladas y muladas que pastan los campos frustrando el Veneficio de Sacar platta por que sin ellas no se 
puede hacer.”  
221 Pardiñas Narrative, 229: “Lo mas deste Reyno es despoblado de Españoles por que como ha ssido 
continua la guerra en el no se atreben a poblar.”  
222 For a vivid description of Tobosos that echoes that of other Spanish writers see, “Extract of a paper 
which Don Lope de Sierra wrote in regard to matters touching upon the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya,” in 
Hackett Historical Documents II, 221: “Siendo al mismo paso voraces quando Roban algunos Ganados, o 
caballadas (que es a lo mas que anhela su codicia por conseguir con este medio dos fines, el primero es el 
de su mantenimiento pues Su mayor Regalo es este Genero de comida y el segundo por que consiguiento el 
dejar a pie los Avitados logran sin resistencia el apoderarse de la Provincia.”  
223 For Marin’s discussion of mining and “depopulation” see Marin Narrative, 391.  
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Juan Hernandez de Retana had discovered on his recent expedition north across the Rio 
Grande. Contrasting the “five hundred” Spanish families with “the many nations that 
surround [them],” he explained that along the banks of the Rio Grande alone there were 
fifty-four Indian nations. Like Ossorio, Marin saw these Indians as a potential threat 
because “it [was] impossible to prevent [their] robberies and invasions,” and also as a 
potential resource, because “all these nations are more peaceful than warlike, for which 
reason it should be possible to penetrate with ease to their interior.”224  
Pardiñas focused his attention closer to home, noting the particular importance of 
the Tarahumara Indians, whose territory included important mineral deposits. He 
revealed how Christianization, forced migration, and colonialism went hand in hand. “As 
a result of the Indians of the Tarahumara nation having been converted to our holy 
Catholic faith,” he explained in 1688, “riches have been sought in their lands.” He noted 
that it was because he had maintained “good relations” with Tarahumara headmen that 
during his governorship “there was discovered in the region one of the richest mineral 
deposits that has been encountered in these parts.”  Even as he asserted that the discovery 
of new mineral deposits and the resulting Spanish settlements did not “alienate” the 
Tarahumara because of his personal persuasion, he hinted at another story.  He explained 
that settling Tarahumaras had allowed new mines to be opened on the road to Sonora. 
“These settlements,” he noted, “will be of great profit to the royal income of your 
Majesty.”225   
                                                            
224 Marin Narrative, 388, 390, 392: “y ser tanta la copia de las naciones barbaras que los havitan…que no es 
dable, que aun maior numero impidiessen semejantes latrocinios”; “Las familias de españoles que havitan 
en el Reino seran como quinientas con poca diferencia, corto numero a el crecido de las muchas naciones 
que le circumbalan”; “Todos estas naciones son mas pacificas que velicossas, por cuia razon se pudiera 
penetrar con facilidad hasta lo interior de ellas.”  
225 Pardiñas Narrative, 228: “por haverse combertido a nuestra Santa fee Catolica los de la nacion 
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Other sources suggest that converting and settling the Tarahumara had required 
more force and produced more “alienation” than Pardiñas disclosed. Captain Joseph de 
Berroterán, for example, later recalled yearly missions to Tarahumara country to 
“extract” Indians from the mountains. He noted that in 1690 and 1691 it had become 
necessary for missionaries to “correct the Indians’ idol worshiping” through “the thorn of 
the sweet vine of the Gospel message.” In response to this “correction”—and I would 
add, increased pressures on their land base by Spanish settlement—Tarahumaras rose up 
against their neighbors.  In Tarahumara Alta, Indians had “murdered priests, burned the 
churches, and retreated to the cliffs and canyons.” In a two-year campaign that followed, 
150 soldiers and 500 Indian scouts “pacified” them.226   
“Pacification” campaigns call into question the “gentle means” by which Pardiñas 
claimed to maintain good relations with the Tarahumara. In his description of later 
campaigns against this group, for example, Captain Berroterán clarified what 
“pacification” involved. He explained that “besieging and battering the mountains with 
four to six small cannons of mobile artillery” could overcome the inaccessibility of the 
gorges, rivers, and buttes to which Indians had fled. He noted how capturing Indians, 
destroying their cultivated fields, and removing them for resettlement “to another region” 
would facilitate the growth of a Spanish population and prevent the return of Natives to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Tarahumara se han buscado en sus Tierras”; “mediante la buena correspondencia que he procurado se tenga 
con los naturales, se hallan muy bien sin estrañar el que pueblen en su provincia los Españoles”; “despues 
que entre en este govierno se descubrio en aquella partte un mineral de los mas ricos que se han 
experimentado en estas partes”; “segun demuestran seran de mucha Utilidad al Real haver de Vuestra 
Magestad.”   
226 See “Captain Berroterán’s Report on the Condition of Nueva Vizcaya (1748),” in The Presidio and 
Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain: Volume II, Part II, The Central Coridor and the Texas 
Corridor, 1700-1765, Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor, and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, eds. (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1997), 206-207. Hereafter cited as “Berroterán Narrative, page #.” Original 
quotes,  “era preciso corregir por sus padres misioneros los abusos de la idolatría, atribyuendo a ‘espinas de 
dulce parral,’ de la parte evangélica”; “dando muerte a algunos padres, quemando los templos, se retiraron 
a los peñoles y barrancas”; “pacificada la Tarahumara.”  
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their former homelands. He had personally taken 120 families from the canyons and 
resettled them at his presidio.227  
Such interactions with Tarahumara Indians also shed light on Spanish approaches 
to migratory Indians like the Toboso. The link between colonialism, violence, and forced 
migration is evident in Pardiñas’s call to compel them “by force to crave peace,” and in 
Marin’s suggestion to the viceroy that they be “compelled to build their houses correctly, 
raise chickens, and plant their cornfields.” As he saw it, forced resettlement of Tobosos 
would cause them to “lose and abandon their inherent instinct to wander in the mountain 
ranges.”228   
The relationship between the discourse of “imminent loss” and forced migration 
practices helps explain Spanish expansion during the 1680s and 1690s, as military 
campaigns intertwined with missionization to help fuel new possibilities for mining, 
ranching, and Euroamerican settlement. Pardiñas, Marin, and others described how 
reciprocal violence was effecting social change in the Rio Grande, even as they continued 
to recognize Indians as a grave threat. They suggested that Tobosos were now “small in 
number,” but also that more than ever before they were leading other Indians to hostile 
action. As Captain Escorza explained to the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya in 1693, 
“formerly [the Tobosos] were so numerous that they had had no need to make use of 
other Indians further in the interior, and could prevent them from coming in.” Now, 
Escorza feared, the Tobosos’ desperate situation, the result of “time and war” had led 
                                                            
227 Berroteran Narrative, 221: “sitiando y batiendo con cuatro o seis cañoncitos de artillería manejables en 
dicha sierra.”  
228 Pardiñas Narrative, 230: “con deseo de obligarles con las Armas a apetecer la Paz”; Marin Narrative, 
400: “obligandoles a que hagan cassas en forma, y cria de gallinas: y que siembren sus milpas de calidad.”  
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them to solicit  “strange” Indians to migrate south of the Rio Grande.229  
Even as the Spanish population slowly grew, from Ossorio’s estimate of “not 
more than 300 citizens” in 1678, to Marin’s estimate of “five hundred families” in 1693, 
Indian raids continued and settled Indians continued to rise up.  Even as Spaniards built 
new towns and mines in Nueva Vizcaya, and they resettled New Mexico in 1694, Spanish 
writers continued to assert that “depopulation was worse than ever,” “the potential loss of 
the kingdom” was at hand, and Indian nomads were to blame. As Escorza summarized,  
“the truth is that affairs are in a worse state in these parts and the consequences are worse 
than they have ever been.”230  
Like Ossorio, governors and military officers in the 1690s drew upon macabre 
fantasies to imagine a final end to the Indian siege. Marin explained, for example, that 
though the Tobosos are few in number, they incited other nations to atrocities, and as a 
result “it is extremely necessary to extirpate and destroy them entirely…for it is certain 
that as long as such very bad Indians live trouble will not be lacking.”231 Governor 
Gabriel de Castillo, echoing Marin’s sentiments, suggested that it was “contrary to reason 
not to put Indian men to the sword.” In addition to putting a bounty of 100 pesos on the 
heads of five Toboso leaders in 1693, he requested that the viceroy allow him to send to 
                                                            
229 On Tobosos influencing other nations see Marin narrative, 390; “Copy of a letter from the sargento 
mayor Juan Bautista de Escorza to be sent to his lordship Don Gabriel de Castillo. Cerro Gordo, July 13, 
1693,” in Hackett Historical Documents II, 324: “siendo ellos como eran en numero crecido no solo no 
tenian nezesidad de balerse de otros Yndios de mas adentro Sino que antes les Ympedian la entrada pero oy 
que los a consumido el tiempo y la Guerra y Se ben pocos no solo no ympiden a los Yndios estraños sino 
que antes los Solicitan y combidan Subordinandose a ellos…” Hereafter cited as “Escorza Narrative, page 
#.” 
230 Escorza Narrative, 324: “por estas partes estan las cossas de peor calidad y consequencias que han 
estado nunca”; for other descriptions of depopulation see Marin Narrative, 390; Pardiñas Narrative, 228.  
231 Marin Narrative, 400: “que se les haga la guerra mui viva, y sangrienta sin darles quartel…consumirles y 
acabarles del todo, y reducir las chusmas, que es cierto, mientras subsistan tan pessimos Yndios, no faltaran 
travajos al Reino…” 
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Mexico City the women and little children of those who he killed.232   
These schemes met with resistance. A crown attorney in Mexico City counseled 
the viceroy to reject both plans. He condemned the extermination of Indian men and 
stated that they should be put on trial, “conducting these cases according to law and 
proving them fully.”  With regard to Indian removal, he noted that it would not only 
involve “considerable expense” but that “the demoralization of these people would be 
such that, having nothing for them to do…they would be maintained at the expense of the 
royal coffers.”233 It is worth noting, however, that such condemnation did not prevent a 
war council in Durango in 1696 from envisioning a plan to capture Indians when they 
came to offer peace and then “take them in carts to Mexico, Veracruz, and transport them 
over water to Campeche.”234  
 If the opposition of royal advisors in Mexico City helps explain why visions of 
extermination or forced removal largely remained fantasies of Spanish residents in the 
late-1600s, it is important to note that Nueva Vizcayans had not entirely abandoned the 
traditional legal framework of “peaceful” persuasion either. Recall that Ossorio declared 
that he had made peace with the Tobosos and through his efforts he had transformed 
                                                            
232 “Another letter from the said Governor Gabriel del Castillo. Parral, November 20, 1693,” in Hackett 
Historical Documents II, 350: “aseguro a Vuestra Excelencia es contra razon no pasarlos a todos a 
cuchillo.” For scheme to send Indians away see “Response of the fiscal (crown attorney), Mexico, 
December 16, 1693,” in Hackett Historical Documents II, 355-361. Hereafter cited as “Fiscal’s 
Recommendations, p #.” On bounty on the heads of chiefs see “Order which Don Gabriel del Castillo gives 
to Captain Juan de Retana, Parral, November 10, 1693,”  in Hackett Historical Documents II, 344-349.  
233 Fiscal’s Recommendations, 358: “que devera dicho Governador y los demas Capitanes y Cavos ajustarse 
a lo mandado fulminando las causas conforme a derecho y substanciandolas con los mas breves terminos 
que la calidad de los delictos permitieren”; “por ninguna manera haga semejante remission pues fuera del 
considerable costo que causaran en la conduccion el embarazo de esta gente sera de calidad que no haya en 
que ocuparla ni parte donde ponerla y havran de manenterse por quanta de la Real hazienda.” Note that the 
fiscal did not ruleout forced migration altogether but suggested they could be remitted to near or distant 
missions.  
234 The plans to send Indians away in carts is discussed in “Reply of the fiscal to the letter of the royal 
officials. Acknoweldged by the señor fiscal, Madrid, April 2, 1698,” in Hackett Historical Documents II, 
458: “dizen se pudiera dar providencia de apricionarlos en dandose de Paz y conduzirlos en caros a mexico 
y a el Puerto de la vera cruz trasportandoles a la provincia de Campeche para poner los en encomiendas…” 
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them into the “principal defense of the kingdom.” Pardiñas argued that Tarahumaras were 
not alienated because he maintained good relations with them. In fact, virtually every 
governor, putting pen to paper, wrote that Indians “always break the peace,” described 
Indian diplomacy as “false,” and then described their own entrees into peacemaking with 
Tobosos. When Indians actually arrived offering peace, after months of violence, 
speaking back to Spaniards in deferent language—“we pledge obedience to his majesty,” 
“we want you to be our godfather”—governors almost always granted them their 
requests.235     
The paternalistic tradition reflected in settling Indians in missions in order to 
Christianize and civilize them suggested lingering hope that Indian behavior was not 
innate but changeable. In the late-1600s, governors of Nueva Vizcaya usually engaged 
this question implicitly rather than explicitly, but it ran through their correspondence and 
emerged in a question they asked Indians repeatedly during diplomatic and legal 
inquiries: “Why do you pledge peace and then break it?” Calls for Indians to be “put to 
the sword” or sent away in carts suggest that through the weight of experience, residents 
of Nueva Vizcaya were becoming more convinced that Tobosos were never going to lay 
down their arms and take the Christian path.236  
Obedience to traditional legal frameworks only goes so far in explaining Spanish 
                                                            
235 Ossorio, 212; Pardiñas, 228. Ossorio, characteristic of other discussions of “false” peace, described 
Indian peace entrees as follows: “Under a feigned peace which on various occasions they have made, they 
have succeeded in securing a knowledge of all the towns and farms of the Spaniards and friendly Indians, 
which they have no utterly annihilated and depopulated.”; “Also, under the pretext of peace, most of them 
were baptized, yet today they are apostates.” For multiple discussions of Indian peace entrees and the long 
history of “false peace” see Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral Microfilm (AHP) Reel 1704A, fr. 171-217; AHP 
1711A, fr. 33-44, AHP 1711b, fr. 1030-1040, AHP 1715A, fr. 57-337; AHP 1718A, especially fr. 117-151; 
AHP 1722A, fr. 175-354.  
236 On questioning during trials in the 1680s and 1690s see especially Archivo General de la Nacion, 
Mexico City, Mexico, Provincias Internas, Volume 30, expediente (file) 9, hereafter AGN, PI, vol. #, file #; 
AHP 1688c, fr. 1432-1461. AHP 1686b, fr. 854-918, AHP 1684A, fr. 66-176.  
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approaches to migratory Indians, however. Questions about Indian “character” were 
never divorced from power relations; violence fueled in part by fears of “imminent loss” 
had helped Spaniards realize new prosperity through increased royal investment, even if 
they continued to suggest their situation was “worse than it has ever been.”237 If anything, 
the Spanish visions of the Greater Rio Grande examined above reveal that their calls for 
enslavement or extermination are necessary but not sufficient to explaining the 
emergence of forced removal campaigns. Why were Indians requesting peace and then 
returning to the mountains? Why, if they held the province in constant threat of loss, did 
they not mobilize to cast the Spanish presence out of Nueva Vizcaya, as neighboring 
Indians had in New Mexico? How did Indian actions relate to visions of extermination or 
removal, and the possibility of turning them into reality? 
 
“All Spaniards do is eat bread and drink Chocolate…” 
 
In the 1680s and 1690s the constraints on Spanish power in the Greater Rio 
Grande were multiple. As governors’ accounts made clear, Indians surrounded them. 
Even if many groups had interacted with missions, received baptism, and self-identified 
as “Christians,” vast swaths of territory were controlled by migratory Indians like the 
Toboso and their allies. Furthermore, recurrent rebellions and uprisings among “friendly” 
Natives like the Tarahumara made even the heartland of Spanish settlement seem 
vulnerable.238   
Power was rooted in landscape. In Spanish towns, missions, and haciendas, 
                                                            
237 I am drawing here from David J. Weber’s insights on the relationship between power and Spanish 
approaches to Indians; see Bárbaros especially 277-278. Quotes from Escorza Narrative as cited above.  
238 For broader Indian rebellions in Nueva Vizcaya see Deeds, Defiance and Deference, especially Chapter 
4, “Crises of the 1690s.”  
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soldiers and friars watched over laboring bodies with rifles and whips; framed in 
benevolent aims, coercion was effected through the specter of violence. If Spaniards 
feared that Tobosos might “pervert” the “domestic” Indians, they also drew upon the 
capture and punishment of enemy Indians to warn Native subjects about the 
consequences of disobedience.239 Just a few leagues from Spanish towns, however, their 
cavalry were virtually useless in the rugged mountain ranges. Horses required water in 
abundance and the aridity of the terrain and Spaniards’ lack of knowledge about those 
springs and creeks that did exist challenged their ability to move through the Greater Rio 
Grande.240 
Outside islands of Spanish hegemony, Tobosos and their allies built social worlds 
that were tied to but not determined by the Spanish presence. At times they fell upon 
Spanish haciendas and ranches in small groups, opening a corral and driving off the 
mules and horses before local residents knew what had happened. Other times, they 
organized coalitions of 400 or 500 Indian raiders, attacking convoys along the royal road, 
taking captives, clothing and livestock and returning to their mountain camps. Spanish 
explorers described what happened to these spoils when they journeyed north to the Rio 
                                                            
239 For “pervertir los reducidos” [pervert the settled ones] see AHP 1718, p. #726b. Note too that the 
emphasis here is on the danger of Natives’ “continual movement”—“continuo movimiento.” I chose this 
quote for its particular vivid language, but discussions of enemy Indians bringing settled Indians to their 
cause are evident in the late-1600s as well; see the governors narratives as cited above, and trials 
manuscripts like AHP 1684a, fr. 393-421, AHP 1684d fr. 2222-2229, and AHP 1688c, 1432-1461, for 
example.  
240 Drawing upon Cynthia Radding I view landscapes as socially constructed spaces that emerge historically 
out of the interaction between humans and nature. See Radding, Landscapes of Power and Identity: 
Comparative Histories in the Sonoran Desert and the Forests of Amazonia from Colony to Republic 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), especially Chapter One, “Ecological and Cultural Frontiers.” On 
the relationship between labor coercion and violence I draw from Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of subjection!: 
terror, slavery, and self-making in nineteenth-century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997). On punishment see AHP 1684A, f. 66-176 and Ramón Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn 
Mothers Went Away: Marriage Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), especially 191. For difficulty of horse travel, see Berroteran Narrative, especially 
p. 194, and AHP 1710A, f. 12-19.  
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Grande and observed the Native trading fairs at La Junta in the 1680s and 1690s, or when 
Captain Domingo Ramón came upon a “great meeting of Indians” near present day 
Austin, Texas in 1716. He observed piles of cloth, clothing, buffalo skins, rifles, and 
“many fine horses”—with Nueva Vizcayan brands—before Indians noticed his presence 
and sent him fleeing.241  
The evidence of how Tobosos organized and understood this world is surprisingly 
rich. Escaped captives described their experiences among the Indians, military officers 
wrote campaign diaries that described their movement through Indian homelands, and 
perhaps most importantly, Spaniards recorded Toboso testimony during diplomatic and 
criminal proceedings. Taken together, this material can be used to suggest a range of 
motivations for Indian actions that help shed further light on the Greater Rio Grande and 
the relationship between Indian raids and diplomacy and Spanish visions of Indian 
removal.242 
The category of “Toboso” encompassed distinct Native groups who shared broad 
similarities in political economy. If Ossorio described “eleven” Tobosos nations, 
                                                            
241 On Estrada’s descriptions of a “gran Junta de Indios” near Austin with “pedazos de paño fino” and 
“muchos cavallos Buenos” see AHP 1716A, p. 258; On La Junta trading fairs see Anderson, Indian 
Southwest, especially Chapter Two, “Ethnogenesis and Cultural Continuity within the Jumano Exchange 
Network, 1682-1720,” see also “Autos from Pardiñas, 1688-1692” and “Autos from Parral, 1691-1694,” in 
Hackett Historical Documents II, 228-363. For an alternative to Anderson’s emphasis on Native dominance 
see Maria F. Wade The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2003).  
242 A note on methodology:  I use material from the 1680s to the 1720s in this section to construct a 
composite portrait of Toboso groups. Cultures change over time through social relations, but I have 
nonetheless gone forward with this approach cautiously, cross-referencing sources and carefully 
considering the context of their production.  This approach made sense to me for two reasons: first, the 
evidence suggests that the basic political economy of Toboso groups continued even as they faced new 
disruptions with the emergence of forced removal campaigns in 1711, and second, while extant evidence is 
rich, it is scattered enough that breaking from a thematic approach to emphasize change over time would 
limit my ability to imbue a larger sense of the Tobosos and their world to my readers. Most studies that 
address Tobosos have opted for strict chronology. See William B. Griffen, Culture Change and Shifting 
Populations in Central Northern Mexico (Tucson: Univerrsity of Arizona Press, 1969).  Griffen’s work has 
been immensely useful in facilitating my archival inquiries and helping me contextualize my findings, even 
as I hope to build upon his work through a more analytical approach. 
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Spaniards usually used the term with less specificity, to refer generically to migratory 
Indians or as a synonym for “enemy Indians.” I use the term here to describe several 
interrelated Native groups that appeared consistently in archival records: the Cocoiomes, 
Acoclames, and Chisos. These groups allied with a variety of others like the Cabezas, 
Gavilanes, and Coahuileños who also shared similar patterns of subsistence and social 
organization. Individuals never self-identified as “Toboso” but described themselves as 
belonging to a specific “nation,” like the “Acoclame” or the “Cacuitatome.”  In 
describing the raiding and trading political economy these groups shared, the terms 
“Toboso” or “Toboso and their allies” are nonetheless useful in the interest of coherence 
even as it is important to recall the complexity and multiplicity of identities these terms 
encompass.243 
It is impossible to reconstruct Toboso culture before epidemic disease and the 
incorporation of Spanish livestock began to affect Native groups in the region, but the 
archival record can provide an entry into the post-contact world in motion. By the late-
1600s, significant changes in social organization and subsistence practices among all the 
“innumerable” nations of the Rio Grande were underway. Over the course of the 
seventeenth century, epidemics had thinned the Native population both south and north of 
the river, as long-distance trade networks and the increased mobility offered by horse 
travel carried disease from missions, towns, and mining camps north to Native trading 
fairs and seasonal encampments. Smallpox epidemics and plagues in nearly every decade 
help explain the decline in the Native population from an estimated 300,000 to 80,000 by 
                                                            
243 On Spanish ethnic ascriptions see Ossorio Narrative, 213; Marin Narrative, 393-395  
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1700, though it still dwarfed the Spanish population of 5,000 or so by that year.244   
The degree to which disease and slave raids may have affected the population of 
Toboso groups in particular is difficult to pin down precisely. On the one hand, Spaniards 
explained that Tobosos were “now small,” and that their power centered on “inviting in 
other groups.” But Indian testimony suggested that between 1680 and 1710, Tobosos and 
their allies demonstrated remarkable stability in numbers. Spaniards most frequently cited 
three groups in concert when discussing the broader category of “Toboso”: the 
Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos. Chiso bands were distinct from the Cocoiomes and 
Acoclames in homeland, dwelling further north towards the well-watered Conchos 
Valley, but they shared similarities in political economy and often served as 
intermediaries between the Toboso and “settled” Indian spheres. Some Chiso bands 
regularly labored in haciendas and resided in mission towns for extensive periods even as 
they maintained alliances with Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Indian groups north of the 
Rio Grande. Indian testimony suggests that there were approximately 1,000 Cocoiomes 
and Acoclames through much of this period, and it was sometimes noted that Chisos 
were an even larger group.245  
Toboso subsistence centered on mastery of harsh landscapes that Spaniards 
asserted were virtually uninhabitable. In their homelands in mountain ranges like the 
                                                            
244Daniel T. Reff, Disease, Depopulation, and Culture Change in Northwestern New Spain, 1518-1764 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), especially chapter three’s wider anlaysis of the impact of 
disease on Native organization; See also Gerhard, La Frontera Norte de la Nueva España, 214-15; 
Anderson, The Indian Southwest. Smallpox was a constant threat for Spaniards and Indians alike, though 
observers noted that “the laboring population”—Native subjects of the Spanish—and “enemy Indians”—
the Tobosos—were particular affected. For the late-1600s see Marin Narrative, 391: “To this the epidemic 
which prevailed last year, and part of this [1693], contributed not a little, for it destroyed more than a third 
of the kingdom, the working people suffering more generally from this misfortune.”  
245 For population estimates see “Testimonio de los autos fhos Sobre las Providencia dadas en tiempo de 
D.n Gabriel deel Castillo,” in Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Guadalajara 67-4-1 (1693); AHP 
1704A, fr. 222; AHP 1715A, p. 166-169; AHP 1715A, fr. 279, AHP 1716, fr. 155. For an alternate 
discussion of population see Griffen 94-95.  
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Sierra Mojada and Sierra del Diablo, they gathered the fruit of cacti (tunas), roasted 
agave roots (mescal), and drew upon rich botanical knowledge to make use of a variety of 
other plants and animals.  What to Spaniards was hazy, hostile terrain was to Tobosos a 
named landscape full of watering holes, enemies and allies, and secure shelters.  They 
drew upon generations of life in a semi-arid region prone to prolonged drought in 
demonstrating a clear attachment to place and returning repeatedly to particular camps.246 
Illustration 2: Sierra Mojada, Site of Toboso camps in the late-1600s and early-1700s247 
 
 
Tobosos had adapted to violence and disease by drawing upon Spanish horses and 
fragmenting into small, extended family groups that were highly mobile. They sought to 
                                                            
246 On harvesting tuna and mescal from nopal cacti see AHP 1684A, fr. 115; AHP 1704A; AHP 1716 fr. 
156 (p. #307); AHP 1722A fr. 422-425; AHP 1724A, fr. 257-260; Griffen, Culture Change and Shifting 
Populations, 110.  
247Image courtesy of, fittingly enough, a mining investment website: 
<http://www.goldstockbull.com/articles/gold-silver-takeover-targets/>  (Accessed by author on 31 March 
2010).  
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counteract disease with movement, and sometimes cited it as both a reason to seek peace 
with Spaniards and a reason to break alliances and return to the mountains. Descriptions 
from military campaign diaries shed light on both Indian responses to disease and Toboso 
political economy. In 1715, for example, Diego de Estrada noted that his soldiers and 
Indian scouts had witnessed Cocoiome and Acoclame Indians “fleeing from an 
epidemic.” As they followed their tracks and moved through their abandoned camps, they 
described discarded gourds, shattered pots, rifle cases, leather bags, linens and other types 
of cloth “from Mexico and Cholula.” They came across piles of capes, overcoats, 
undervests, and other discarded clothing. Particularly indicative of the “severity of the 
sickness,” they noted, was the shorn hair that littered the trail, suggesting a mourning 
practice that was common among other groups in the region as well.248  
The camps, or “rancherias,” that these soldiers came across during epidemics 
served both for rapid movement and as bases for raiding and trading expeditions, as 
descriptions of pots, rifles, and piles of cloth and clothing suggest. Accounts from 
escaped captives who had lived among Tobosos and their allies reveal that rancherias 
were chosen both for access to water and for security.  Cocoiomes, they reported, lived in 
huts that they covered with skins that could easily be set up and taken down. By locating 
camps high in the mountains, they were both nearer to perennial springs or rainwater 
pools and less vulnerable to attack.  When water ran out, the group could move easily to a 
                                                            
248 On reorganization as a result of disease see Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 12-13; Reff, especially Chapter 
Two, “Aboriginal Culture in Northwestern Mexico”; on motivations related to settlement see AHP 1715, p. 
85-99; For Indians “huyendo de la enfermedad” see AHP 1716, p. 269. Apaches also had the mourning 
practice of shearing one’s hair, see Michael Steck’s description in Microfilm Reel 1 (1858), Steck Papers at 
UNM Center for Southwest Research and Morris Opler, Apache Lifeway: The Economic, Social, and 
Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua [Apache] Indians (New York: Cooper Square Publisher, Inc., 
1965), 475.  
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new camp.249  
Even as escaped captives provide a window onto Toboso ways of life, they 
suggest how captivity and captive exchange shaped social relations in the Greater Rio 
Grande. In the short term, interrogating captives could provide information about the 
location of enemy settlements and military forces and help groups make strategic 
decisions. Captives also served as translators or were used to deliver messages to their 
former captors. At times it was explicitly noted that a given individual had lived among 
the Spaniards or lived among the Indians and was especially useful as a result. Some 
captives remained among outsiders long-term and were adopted as kin. An “Acoclame” 
man explained this practice to Spanish officials in 1705 when he noted that he was not 
actually the son of an Acoclame headman but “like a son.” He reminded Spaniards that 
they had the same practice of raising outsiders among them “as if they were their 
children.”250  
Captive exchange or the exchange of women served to forge relations between 
Toboso groups and their allies as well. Offering captives as gifts signaled goodwill to be 
met with reciprocity, while the offering of female relatives forged affine kinship relations 
that bound Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos together as “relatives.” In 1703, for 
example, twelve Chisos arrived at an Acoclame encampment with four girls that they 
wanted the Acoclames “to marry.” In the ensuing months, the two groups lived together 
                                                            
249 AHP 1715A: “los cueros que tapaban sus jacales”; for a particularly vivid account see AHP 1724A, fr. 
256-260. See also AHP 1716A and AHP 1686C. 
250 References to captives litter the archival record, see for example: AHP 1684A, p 27; AGN-PI vol. 30, 
exp. 9 (1688); Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Guadalajara Leg. 152 (1693); AHP 1704A, exp. 
103, 104, 105, 136; AHP 1710A, fr. 12-19; AHP 1715A, p. 85-99; AHP 1716A, fr. 467; AHP 1724A, fr. 
257-260. Quote from AHP 1704A, fr. 200: “el no es hijo de raton [the Acoclame headman] que lo tenia y 
estava con el como si fuera su padre como tienen los xptianos y espanoles otros q. crian y enseñan consigo 
q. los quieren como hijos…”  
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and aided one another in the Sierra Mojada. Suggesting that this was not an uncommon 
practice, one Indian explained in 1688 how Contotora Indians had brought news that the 
Spanish governor had died to a Cabeza headman because “his wife was their relative.”251  
Out of this world enlaced with kinship, Tobosos built alliances that helped them 
obtain subsistence goods and status items like cloth, captives, and horses through raids 
and diplomacy. In the process of forging the large coalitions Spaniards described raiding 
the royal road, Tobosos and their allies contrasted their ideas about political economy to 
those of Spanish elites. They drew upon gendered language to make their case. One 
Chiso leader, Natura de Cacalote, recruited hacienda laborers in the 1680s by stating that, 
“I am a man. I kill Spaniards and have mules and horses and clothing.” Or as Seis Dedos, 
another Chiso leader explained, “I am a man, but not the Governor of Parral, all he does 
is eat inside; he does not know how to go out and find it outside.” Other Tobosos 
reportedly made their case in the form of a question: “What do Spanish men know how to 
do but eat bread and drink Chocolate?”252  
                                                            
251AHP 1704A, fr. 200: “Binieron un años dose chizos con sus familias y quatro muchachas que se havian 
de casar con acoclames y q. estos los han ayudado en el tiempo que han estado con ellos”; In AGN-PI vol 
30, exp. 9, p. 391-397 the “confessions” of Francisco and El Tuerto are particularly useful (1688): 
Francisco explained that “él es diferente nacion y que se junto con ellos por aver casado con una mujer de 
dhos cavesas “; The Contotora Indians brought news about the death of the governor because they were 
“parientes de la mujer de D.n S.ntiago Cap.n de los cavesas”; El Tuerto noted that he had been raised 
among Spaniards (perhaps as a captive) and that “Por que como se crio en este puesto con los españoles 
nunca queria salir a hazer mal, y que c.do los cavezas y tovosos vinieron a Caopas q. mataron algunos y se 
llevaron cav.da, q. el no vino y que aun cueles preguntó q era lo que havian echo noselo quisieron dezir por 
estar enojados en el por no aver querido venir con ellos.”   If the exchange and adoption of captives helped 
Tobosos forge alliances and may have helped them maintain their population in the face of violence and 
disease, it also could fuel conflict. On one occasion, for example, Cociomes sought to “turn in” their 
Coahuileño allies to the Spanish, explaining that they wanted to keep some of their women since “they had 
married them.”  (AHP 1722A) In this case, Spaniards sought to manipulate the rift to their advantage, by 
drawing upon Coahuileño scouts in their campaigns against Cociomes and other Toboso groups. Though 
the roots of conflict between these Native groups are more often left unexplained, Indian emissaries at 
times cited “fights” between the Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos as a motive to seek peace with the 
Spaniards.  
252 AHP 1684A, fr. 111-113, 127: “Yo sí que soy hombre que mato españoles y tengo mulas y cavallos y 
ropa que me dieron en los Carros”;  “el sí era hombre y no el Gov.or del Parral que no hazia mas que comer 
alli dentro, que no savia salir a buscarlo fuera”; “que saven hazer los Españoles que solo comer pan y 
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Such testimony suggests ways in which Spanish elites and Toboso headman 
constructed gendered visions of political economy in relation to each other.  Recall that 
for Spanish elites, prosperity centered on taking possession of Indian homelands to build 
farms, ranches, and mines. They contrasted these activities with the “wandering” and 
“inconstancy” of Indian men. For Tobosos and their allies, wealth encompassed 
possession of captives, horses, and clothing, accessed through both raids and diplomatic 
entrees. They contrasted “going out” to make a living, the practice of a real man, with 
Spanish civility—“all they do in Parral is talk.”253   
Such distinctions between Spanish practices and their own were also reflected in 
ceremonies of adoption for Hispanic captives. Though Tobosos occasionally took adult 
captives, they explained that they more often killed them because “they were the enemy.” 
They incorporated young captives, especially boys, “to raise them up as their own.” At 
the moment of capture, Indians stripped Hispanic boys of their clothing, explained that 
“trousers made them look ugly” and put them in loincloths. Upon reaching Native camps, 
women greeted them, dancing and tapping them with clubs. Boys were assigned a 
“master” and helped take care of the horses, gather firewood, and transport water. 
Suggesting the kind of kinship slavery that James Brooks has described for New Mexico, 
escaped captives noted that there were Hispanic captives who had chosen to continue to 
live among the Tobosos because they had become accustomed to their ways of life and 
had learned the language. After a period of harsh labor, they had been allowed to go out 
on raids and had married Toboso women. The ability to go out on the raid was a key rite 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
semitas, y vever chocolate.”  [Note that emphasis is in original as the phrasing “el sí era hombre” stresses 
his claim to manhood. See also AHP 1686C, AGN PI-30, 9 (1688).  
253 See Marin Narrative as cited above for language of “penetration”; AHP 1684A, especially fr. 111-127, 
for Indian visions of making a living like a real man.  
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of passage into manhood, as both captives and Tobosos revealed in their testimony, and 
suggested a transition from “slave” to “kin” status.254   
While raids were key to Toboso ideas about wealth and gender, Tobosos also 
drew upon the language of “peace” and “obedience to his majesty” as a political 
economic strategy.  Emissaries often came bearing news that their leaders “wanted to 
make peace” or that they were “ready to live in peace and never return to mountains.” 
These visits began a process by which Spaniards put military campaigns on hold while 
they waited for Indians to fulfill their end of the bargain and bring in their families to 
“ratify the contract of peace.”255  
On most occasions, neither Indian headmen nor their families ever arrived, even 
as messengers returned time and time again to explain the delay. During such visits they 
received tobacco, corn, and some cloth and clothing before returning to the mountains 
“quite content with having been gifted and received in name of his majesty.” One 
Acoclame Indian testified, for example, that his people talked about making peace by 
saying, “let’s go, let’s get food and clothing and something to eat, and cheat the 
Spaniards.”  They “cheated the Spaniards” through offers of peace framed in terms of 
fictive kinship, telling one Spanish official in Parral, for example, that they wanted him to 
                                                            
254 AHP 1715A, p. 85-99 (a number of captive Cocoiome women testified along these lines): “para criarlos 
y para que los ayuden”; AHP 1724A, fr. 257-260, “les hizieron quitar los calzones disiendo que con ellos 
estavan feos y les dieron tapa ravos.” See note 225 above for other references to captives.  
255 “Pledging peace” took many forms, but after Indians were gifted and rationed (in 1677, 1682, 1684, 
1688, 1693, 1695, 1699, 1703-1704, 1708, 1715-1716, 1718, and on other occasions) Spaniards usually 
accused them of being faithless or treacherous.  See Ossorio Narrative, AHP 1682, AHP 1684A, AHP 
1688C, Marin Narrative, AHP 1703, AHP 1704A, AHP 1710A, AHP 1715A, AHP 1716A, AHP 1718A, 
AHP 1722A, and Griffen Culture Change. Weighing intent in such situations is admittedly difficult. But 
the evidence for such actions is not only from a Spanish perspective, as Indian testimony was also 
frequently recorded. This recorded testimony has its own challenges—shaped as it was by the frequent use 
of one or even two interpreters, and the threat of violence or even torture in the immediate context of 
proceedings. I have been careful to consider the “scripting” of recorded testimony, and its invocation, or 
mirroring of Spanish tropes of Indian behavior, but I am unwilling to cast it aside as simpling mirroring 
Spanish fears and the Spanish mind. 
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“be their godfather.” This language was met with so many gifts of tobacco, food, and 
clothing that the governor lamented that there was “not even a cape left in this town.” He 
was outraged when the Indians promptly returned to their mountain homelands.256  
Toboso actions suggest multivalent motivations for entering and leaving peace 
settlements. Spanish reports of Indian raids in the midst of peace proceedings suggest, for 
example, that Natives may have used “peace” as a diversionary tactic. Since settlements 
were garrisoned with military regiments, newly settled Indians diverted soldiers away 
from their kin and allies in the mountains. Settling among the Spaniards could thus 
provide immediate benefits to some Toboso groups, while their relatives and allies raided 
Spanish livestock with newfound security.257   
Even as Tobosos at times manipulated peace entrees to their advantage, it must be 
stressed that the decision to settle among Spaniards was often shaped by the context of 
violence. In the hours after a devastating attack, for example, Indians knew that “pledging 
obedience” would lead soldiers to put down their arms, and prevent further casualties. It 
was often on such occasions that Tobosos and their allies brought in their people to stay 
among Spaniards for longer periods, though usually no more than six or seven months. 
They aided with farming and Tarahumaras “helped them sew corn.” They ran errands for 
priests, and served as scouts in military campaigns against other Native groups.  Many 
                                                            
256 AHP 1704A, fr. 182: “los acoclames y cocoiomes siempre que pedian Paz dezian bamos a que nos den 
rropa, que comer, y lo que nosotros quisieremos, y a engañar a los españoles como aora al presente lo 
hazian los cocoiomes en Parras…”; AHP 1716A, fr. 380: “y que io los abia de apadrinar y defenderlos”; 
“ni a quedado capote ni justacor de soldado que no este en su poder este es el modo mas conbeniente para 
traerlos a nuestra pas.” 
257 If Toboso likely had diverse motivations for entering into such peace settlements and receiving baptism, 
they revealed little useful information on this matter in their testimony to Spanish officials. In explaining 
why they had come to request peace, they spoke in the language of Spanish Indian law, saying they had 
come to live in peace, under the obedience of his majesty, and never return to their hostilities. When they 
were asked why they broke the peace and returned to their homelands, they claimed to “not know why” or 
said that “it was their custom,” or noted that “they left because the missionaries flogged their children.” See 
note 255 above.  
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Tobosos were thus baptized and received Christian names, even if Spaniards often 
clarified that they had not been “instructed” in Catholicism.258 
It is also clear that more than just rational calculation or violent coercion shaped 
Native decision-making. One particularly vivid illustration of the cultural lens that shaped 
Toboso actions is evident in a 1704 raid into Coahuila, when headman Contreras’s son 
was mortally injured. Retreating with the spoils, the raiding party came across three 
priests and an Indian servant on a hillside. Declaring that “it was not right that his son 
was dying while the Fathers lived,” Contreras ordered his men to kill the priests. 
Stripping them of their habits, as they did to most victims, the raiding party ultimately 
abandoned this valuable clothing in a cave on the way back to their mountain 
encampments. One man later described why, explaining how a few of his relatives had 
put on priests’ clothing once and staged a dramatic performance, blessing and kissing 
everyone in the camp in imitation of the friars. These Tobosos “priests” had soon died, 
however, and this incident had convinced the raiding party that priests’ clothing was 
simply too dangerous to keep in their possession.259  
The degree to which Toboso and Spanish worlds intertwined reflects the ways in 
which Natives met their rapidly changing world through adaptation. Tobosos 
demonstrated a clear awareness of the Spanish political system, developed a sophisticated 
understanding of how this system worked and benefitted from a network of kin and allies 
that transmitted information about Spanish military campaigns and the arrival and 
                                                            
258 By meeting expectations of reciprocity through military service, Tobosos may have strained relations 
among other Native groups in the Rio Grande. Spaniards hoped as much, drawing upon Indian scouts both 
because they were essential to military campaigns’ success, and in the interests of fragmenting Native 
alliances: I discuss this issues at length in subsequent chapters of my dissertation. For a history of these 
peace entrees see AHP 1722A, fr. 499-501.  
259 AHP 1704A, fr. 205-206: “no es bien que estando mi hijo muriendose esten los Padres bivos.” 
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departure of governors. They linked raiding and peace entrees in Spanish Nueva Vizcaya 
to position themselves as suppliers of horses, clothing, and captives to Native trading 
fairs north of the Rio Grande. They also, like Spaniards, saw the world as defined by 
supernatural forces, and sought balance by fleeing epidemics, breaking or discarding 
symbols of Spanish power like priests’ habits, and seeking vengeance for slain warriors, 
women, and children.260 
This glimpse at the Toboso world sheds light on the landscapes of power and 
identity that both cut across and interlinked the Greater Rio Grande. The Toboso and 
their allies, like Spaniards, may have at time imagined exterminating their neighbors. A 
Chiso man testified to Spanish officials in 1684, for example, that the Tobosos talked 
about how they would not be satisfied until they had killed “many Spaniards” and their 
Indian allies. Others explained that “what the Indians talk about is little by little killing all 
the Spaniards.” Several factors worked against the longevity of Nativist campaigns, 
however. Even as Tobosos contrasted their methods of making a living to Spanish ways 
of life, their political economy was deeply tied to Spanish haciendas, ranches, and 
merchant convoys. In carrying horses, cloth, and clothing to Native trading fairs, they 
drew upon the presence of Spaniards, not their elimination.261   
Taking Tobosos seriously as political actors suggests that Spanish fears of 
migratory Indians were not merely a rhetorical invention to spur royal investment. They 
were that in part, as warnings that Nueva Vizcaya was “at risk of being lost” helped spark 
the creation of a string of new military forts in the mid-1680s and helped glean more than 
                                                            
260 For an argument that Indian nomads did not grasp Spanish political organization see William H. Griffen, 
Apaches at War and Peace (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988). For a critique see Brian 
Delay, “Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War,” as cited in introduction.  
261 I draw here upon the insights (and borrow the terms) of Cynthia Radding; for discussions of “killing all 
the Spaniards” (“matar a todos los españoles”), see especially AHP 1684a and AHP 1704A. 
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120,000 pesos per year in military defense funds by the 1690s.  But reading Spanish 
discourse as merely a subterfuge to manipulate the royal treasury would elide the degree 
to which the Greater Rio Grande remained a contested landscape, and mask the violent 
context out of which Spanish and Indian visions of that world emerged. The complex 
relationship between fear, Indian raids, and violence warrants closer examination.262  
 
“They cut the shame parts…” 
 
Violence, diplomacy, and political economy were interlinked in the Greater Rio 
Grande for both Tobosos and Spaniards. For Tobosos, “pledging peace” was a means to 
access rations, tobacco, and clothing immediately. But it also could serve as a means to 
survey Spanish herds and settlements to later raid, or even to divert Spanish forces for the 
security of relatives who stayed behind. Such raids were often accomplished through acts 
of physical violence that terrorized targeted communities by employing fire and bodily 
dismemberment.  Importantly, these actions were not construed as morally problematic 
but valorized as “going out to make a living,” a moral concept constructed in opposition 
to Spaniards who “stay[ed] inside, and talk[ed].”263   
For Spaniards, the potential wealth of mines, ranches, and haciendas was 
extracted by linking violence to paternalistic persuasion. Tobosos themselves noted this 
by explaining that they had left their settlements in past years because of the whippings 
of missionaries in the farm fields. Spaniards valorized violence against Indians as 
necessary defensive action within the wider ideology of “imminent loss,” or as 
punishment for sins—“correction by the thorn of the gospel message.” Though in theory 
                                                            
262 On military funds and new presidios see “Reply of Fiscal, 1698” in Hackett, Historical Documents II, 
455; Weber The Spanish Frontier in North America, especially Chapter Eight, “Indian Raiders and the 
Reorganization of Frontier Defenses.”  
263 See notes 252 and 253 above. 
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they approached migratory Indians through “gentle means” by persuading them to come 
down from the mountains voluntarily, images of hundreds of armed men climbing 
mountain trails or blasting mountains with artillery raise questions about Indians’ ability 
to “consent” under the threat of violence.264  
 Violence was not merely a reflection of ideology, however, but had generative 
potential. When Ossorio or Berroterán discussed having “reduced” a Native group to the 
Catholic faith, their language masked the violence of that process and its impact for 
targeted Native groups, as noted in the case of the Tarahumara above. Similarly, the 
ubiquitous trope of Indian “murders and robberies” often stood in for a discussion of the 
specific acts that might help us better understand how an Indian raid could generate the 
type of reprisal that Ossorio carried out in the summer of 1677, when he “killed or 
captured 400 persons,” or when Escorza killed twenty-two men, eight women, and 
described “a very bloody trail where the hostiles had retreated” in 1693.265   
A close reading of the way Indian and Spanish violence played out in concrete 
encounters helps explain the push from discussions of extermination or forced removal to 
action. On a Sunday morning in March 1684, for example, residents of a small settlement 
in rural Nueva Vizcaya learned that two of their neighbors had gone missing. The day 
before, Juan Caburrado and Luis, an Indian servant, had gone down river to cut wood to 
replace a broken cartwheel. When they did not return home that night, a party of men 
went out to investigate. Pedro Albarez later recalled that they had first noticed an axe, 
                                                            
264 See Ossorio, Pardiñas, and Berroterán narratives as cited above. On the link between violence and 
consent I am influenced here by Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, especially Chapter Three, 
“Redressing the Pained Body.”  
265 Ossorio Narrative, 211; Escorza in Hacket Historical Documents II, 333. On violence and ideology see 
Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: the Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).  
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chisel, and a stocking—which he recognized as Juan’s—before coming upon his naked, 
wounded body. Covering him with a blanket, they continued their search for Luis. They 
found him on a nearby hillside: pierced with arrows; his skull split by an axe. They 
carried the bodies downriver to the valley of San Bartolomé, where authorities began an 
investigation into who had killed and robbed these men.266  
Inquiries immediately turned to the Chisos at a nearby hacienda, who had only 
recently settled “at peace” and officials worried had already returned to their old customs. 
Analysis of the arrows found at the attack site suggested that it was the Chisos and 
suspicious tracks led in the direction of the hacienda of Balsequillo where they labored.  
After further investigation, a Concho Indian was brought into testify to the matter. By 
explaining that he and three Chisos had committed the murders together on that day, he 
verified officials’ suspicions. Perhaps he hoped that by confessing right away, and 
identifying his companions, he would reduce his own punishment. Maybe he thought that 
the argument they coerced him into joining them would let him off the hook.  
As initial investigations turned into a full-fledged trial, Indian testimony shed 
further light on the relationship between newly settled Indians and longtime hacienda 
workers like Juan. In front of a Spanish tribunal, Juan described exactly the situation that 
local Spaniards feared, and provided an alternative perspective on the events of the raid.  
On March 4, he had left the hacienda of San Andres and travelled towards the ranch of 
Simon Cordero until he met with several Chiso Indians. Though Juan did not detail how 
they persuaded him to join them, together they headed off the road and up a canyon, until 
they heard the sounds of axes chopping where Juan Caburrado and Luis were working, 
                                                            
266 Narrative below is drawn from full trial proceedings extant in AHP 1684A, fr. 66-266. Quotations 
hereafter cited as Chiso Raid Trial, frame #.  
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cutting wood for their cartwheel. The Chisos turned to Juan and said, “let's kill them.” 
When he asked “why? Why should we kill them?” They responded, “let’s kill them, and 
if you don’t help, we are going to kill you.” And so they set to work, approaching them, 
giving the war cry, shooting arrows. Though Juan insisted that he shot into the air, “to not 
do harm,” he recalled how after “the work was done,” they cut “the lower parts,” the 
“shame” parts of both men, and stripped them of their clothing. They took away a white 
shirt and trousers, a purple cape, shoes, boots, a hat and work tools, and the men’s brown 
horse with a saddle. Juan de la Cruz received none of these spoils, however, “because he 
was not known to them.”267  
This testimony corroborated current Spanish suspicions. First, Chisos that were 
allegedly “at peace” laboring at the Hacienda of Balsequillo were in fact continuing to 
raid. Second, they were recruiting hacienda laborers like Juan to their cause. The 
magistrates’ line of questioning reflected these fears when after asking Juan to describe 
the events of March 4, they immediately asked what he knew about the Indian nations 
that were laboring in the haciendas of the valley and whether they wanted to or had tried 
to “rise up.” Juan said that he knew that the Chisos and Chichitames had risen up or tried 
to rise up many times before returning again recently. Moreover, they communicated 
with their Toboso allies, “declared enemies of the Spaniards.” He knew all this because 
he had heard the Chisos talking about it many times. After remitting Juan to Parral “given 
his flight risk,” local magistrates immediately issued orders that the Chiso men who Juan 
                                                            
267 Chiso Raid Trial, fr. 81-82: “por no aser daño”; “cortaron las partes bajas y bergonsosas a los dhos dos 
difuntos a Juan Caburrado se las cortó el Yndio Lasaro y los desnudaron la rropa que tenian…”; “por no ser 
conocido por ellos.” Spoils described as follows: “Una camisa calzon y blancos calzon y de Paño [illegible] 
morados capote de paño del mysmo color sapatos y botines y a luis calzones y sonbrero y de las 
erramientas conque estavan travajando una acha carpintera y el cavallo castaño ensillado de Juan 
Caburrado toda la qual ropa y lo demas se rrepartieron unos con otros.”  
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had accused be apprehended.268  
Spanish officials now hit a roadblock, as after arriving in Parral, Juan changed his 
story. Or at least, he changed the names of the Chiso Indians involved. While he had 
original accused Francisco, Bartolomé, and Francisco Manijera, he now accused Lazaro, 
Frasquillo, and Ignacio. He only explained that he had told the story wrong the first time 
because “he was afraid, having been captured.”269 Officials set the former group of 
Chisos free and apprehended the latter group, but then Juan changed his story again and 
returned to his first declaration. He now said that he had only changed his testimony 
because Chiso leaders had told him that if they “were discovered in what they had done 
they would kill him.” It was out of fear of Chiso revenge, he contended, that he had made 
his second statement.270 
The testimonies of the apprehended men suggest the multiple worlds of Chiso 
Indians recently settled at peace. They worked at the hacienda of Balsequillo “and also in 
their country, towards the Rio Grande.” They were part of, or party to discussions about 
livestock rustling, trades in cloth and clothing, and larger political aims to kill Spaniards, 
and even the governor of Parral. Such talk was, as I have noted above, tied to gendered 
visions of political economy. In this case, for example, Chiso leaders contrasted their 
ideas about wealth and manhood with Spaniards to declare that “they were men and that 
they carried away the horse herds, and since Spaniards could not take them back they 
were not men, nor did they have weapons.” Such language may have been refracted 
                                                            
268 Chiso Raid Trial, fr. 81-82: “de paz…admitida y prometida”; “alsados y declarados por enemigos de los 
españoles.” 
269 Ibid.: “por miedo por verse preso”; “y por que entendio que con esso le soltarian pero que la verdad es 
que ninguno de los que estan pressos ni el dho Fran.co manijosa tienen culpa en las dhas muertes por que 
no las ysieron.”  
270 Ibid.” “si los descrubria en lo que avian echo le avrian de matar y que por este temor y miedo dijo y 
declaró lo que contiene su segunda declarazion.”   
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through the setting of captivity in a Spanish tribunal, and through translation between 
Native languages and Spanish. But in light of specific acts committed in recent raids it is 
certainly suggestive. What sentiment, for example, would the accusation that 
“Spaniards…were not men nor did they have weapons” have generated for Spaniards 
present, amidst testimony about Indians cutting off the “shame parts” of their victims?271  
The trial of Juan and the Chiso men who led him on a raid also opens up the 
Spanish world of violence and forced migration. Imagine a man laboring in fields with 
his family, perhaps as one means of subsistence during times of seasonal scarcity, or 
perhaps because his leaders are biding time until political coalitions can take shape, until 
the time comes when Tobosos, Chisos, and others have solidified their plans to “kill all 
the Spaniards.” He is snatched by Spanish soldiers at gunpoint, carried to a tribunal, and 
asked to identify his name, nation, age, and occupation. 
Perhaps he participated in the actions he is accused of, or maybe—as in this 
case—a man from another group is accusing him of an action he may not have 
committed. When he denies it, magistrates insist: “but how can you say you don’t know 
about the murders, when there are those who say you shot the arrows?” When he asserts 
his innocence again, they put him before his accuser, who reiterates testimony that he was 
there. He denies it a second time and they strap him to the torture machine—“the 
pony”—tying cords around his extremities, and tightening them, pulling his body apart 
until he cries out “yes, yes, it was me.”272   
                                                            
271 Chisos Raid Trial, 110-115: “asisten en el Rio de S.n P.o y en su tierra mas alla del Rio del Norte”; 
“estos le avian dicho que ellos sí eran hombres q. se llevavan las cavalladas que como no yban los 
españoles aquitarselas que no eran hombres ni tenian armas”; another Indian noted that Spaniards’ rifles 
weren’t worth anything, they didn’t “reach” their targets: “que sus arcabuzes no valen nada que no alcanzan 
ni matan.” 
272 This narrative draws upon descriptions of torture contained in the trial documents: see Chisos Raid Trial, 
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Later he tries to take it back, and tells his accusers that “he said what he did only 
out of fear of the torture machine.” But they cling to his confession. He is hung from the 
gallows and shot. They place the pieces of his quartered body on posts along the royal 
road to warn other Indians about the danger of contesting Spanish authority. 
These events during the spring of 1684 illustrate how violence and bodily pain 
overlaid Indian decisions to interact with the Spanish sphere. On the one hand, they 
received rations and gifts, and through raids accessed clothing and livestock. On the other 
hand, they became vulnerable to Spanish inquisitions, and the demonstrations of power in 
the face of weakness represented by “el potro,” the machine of torture. Indian acts of 
violence in turn reveal ideologies that served to join Tobosos and their allies in alliance 
against Spaniards: how individuals contrasted Indian and Spanish visions of gender and 
wealth to argue that “Spaniards were not men,” and then kill and castrate them.273 
Spaniards also built their society and distinguished it from Indian ways of life 
through violence. They cloaked it in the fiction of the legal proceeding. Ironically, 
inquiries into Indian raids suggest ways in which Spaniards helped fulfill their own fears 
of uprisings and mass rebellions. They ordered that “all Chisos” be captured, and 
whipped any Indians who had heard about the raids, but not informed them. When they 
descended upon the hacienda in search of Chiso families, they found that they had 
already fled. Thus actions intended to determine if the Chisos “wanted to rise up,” in the 
end helped spark them to rise up. Through “justice” and inquiries into “truth,” Spaniards 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
106, 134-136.  
273 Ibid. I draw here upon insights into the “structure of torture” in Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The 
Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 27-59; Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3-72; Irene Silverblatt, 
Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 55-76. 
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helped produce their deepest fears and fuel Indian discontent and rebellion.274  
In sum, Indian-raid trials like those of 1684 reveal how attention to the mutuality 
of violence might help clarify the bewildering confusion of Indians pledging peace and 
then abandoning it, and the seeming mindlessness of unending cycles of violence and 
peace. It adds context to Spaniards’ discussions of “enslavement” and “removal” and 
helps explain the move from the hope of transformation embodied in contracting peace to 
the conviction that Indian behavior would never change. Importantly, the impetus to act 
to “remove” Tobosos and their allies from their homelands in the Greater Rio Grande 
emerged as much from residents of Nueva Vizcaya—miners, farmers, and ranchers—as 
from the Council of the Indies in Spain or the viceroy in Mexico City.  
 
“…to the islands of Californias…” 
 
On a January afternoon in 1704, two emissaries arrived in Parral, Nueva Vizcaya 
to request peace on behalf of the Acoclame nation. Through an interpreter, Nicolás and 
Curi performed the customary peace ritual. They said they came on behalf of “all of their 
people to see the new governor and ask him for peace in the name of God and King.” 
They pledged to deliver news of the governor’s decision to their headmen, who were 
prepared to “settle down, form a town, and live at peace for all their lives without 
breaking it.” Similar peace entrees were occurring in other towns and presidios in the 
Greater Rio Grande, where Chisos, Cocoiomes, and Apaches had also offered “to come 
in and pledge their obedience to his majesty.” While Governor Juan Fernandez de 
Cordova was inclined to accept these requests, the present state of the royal treasury 
                                                            
274 Ibid. For other contemporaneous references to torture in Spanish trials in Parral see AHP 1686B, p. 27; 
AHP 1704A, fr. 248-249. 
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complicated matters. With the funds for war and peace nearly exhausted by recent 
military campaigns—seventy soldiers and 240 Indian scouts were still in the field—
Cordova realized he might need outside support to provide the customary gifts and 
rations granted to newly settled Indians. For now, he sent the Acoclames on their way 
with a letter to present to Spanish soldiers if they happened to come upon the Indians’ 
camps. Cordova then set to work on raising the necessary funds to fulfill this promise. It 
was perhaps in hopes that local residents might help foot the bill that he called town hall 
meetings —“juntas de vecinos”—at settlements across the kingdom.275  
A bankrupt treasury provided an opportunity for Spanish residents to advise their 
governor on relations with migratory Indians. Though some residents of Parral suggested 
that the Chisos should be admitted to peace, “because they [had] not committed the same 
depredations as the others,” other towns in Nueva Vizcaya unanimously opposed granting 
peace to the Acoclames, Cocoiomes, or Chisos. They mobilized histories of failed peace 
to justify this decision. In San Bartolomé, San Diego, and San Blas, for example, miners, 
farmers, and cattle raisers present noted in collective statements that based on many years 
of experience they could assure the governor that “these nations are not people that keep 
the peace.” With the Apaches, they explained “they had no experience, and so could not 
give any advice,” but with the other groups, past peace experiments had “not served any 
useful purpose for the kingdom” because the Indians had “never maintained it.”  In fact, 
offering peace had only served “for the further ruin of the kingdom.”276  
Residents explained why peace led to ruin by highlighting Indians’ strategic 
                                                            
275 AHP 1704A, fr. 217-237. Hereafter cited as 1704 Juntas de Vecinos.  
276 Ibid.: “por que de ellos [los chisos] no an esperimentado las eniquidades que de estos otros”; “No es 
gente que persiste en la paz”; “las Veses que se la an dado [la paz] los Señores Governadores no aservido 
de Ninguna Utilidad deste Reyno y Antes ansido parra mayor Ruyna deel…”  
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politics. In San Bartolomé, they alleged that Tobosos manipulated the peace process in 
order to receive gifts and familiarize themselves with Spanish haciendas, ranches, and 
towns. By learning “our most hidden secrets,” they explained, they had returned to their 
lands better equipped to continue to “kill and rob, as is their custom.” The principal men 
of San Diego explained “peace” as a multilayered political strategy. They noted that some 
Tobosos requested peace to familiarize themselves with Spanish settlements and divert 
soldiers away from their kin and allies, who continued to raid. When the Tobosos who 
had offered peace returned to the mountains—which they always had—they did so more 
enlightened then ever before as to Spanish settlements, military resources, and the 
location of livestock herds.277   
If histories of “faithlessness” were key to residents’ decisions to reject peace, 
interpretations of violence shaped the alternative courses of action that they envisioned. 
The residents of San Blas were particularly descriptive. It was not simply that Indians had 
killed their neighbors but that they had “not been content to just take lives and frequently 
cut apart their bodies and danced with the pieces.” Out of fear of such acts miners and 
their helpers were not willing to work and neither were “the blacksmith and lumberjack, 
for the same reason.” Not only had the Indians stolen herds and taken the lives of their 
neighbors, but that they had set fire to the corrals, causing mass wildfires that had “even 
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been visible from the governor’s palace in Parral.”278  
In rejecting peace, citizens envisioned only one means to prevent the further 
“ruin” of their contested kingdom: to capture the Indians and transport them as far away 
as possible. In other words, residents were willing to step up to aid Cordova “with their 
bodies and their funds,” but only in order to lure the Indians, trap them, and move them 
out of Nueva Vizcaya.  In San Bartolomé, they signed a collective statement agreeing to 
support granting peace as long as the Indians were subsequently transported to  “some 
island like panzacola or the island of californias.” San Blas’s citizens imagined a 
different, if equally extreme, response to Indians’ recent peace requests. After they 
described how Indians had set their corrals on fire and danced with the body parts of their 
murdered neighbors—though not mentioning their own display of dismembered Indian 
bodies—they suggested that Indian men be “punished by fire and blood, carrying their 
families out of this kingdom to work in textile workshops in Mexico City.” Given that 
these Indians’ customs were “so innate,” they argue that if this “breed” was allowed to 
remain within Nueva Vizcaya, the kingdom would never prosper.279 
On the surface, the citizen councils appear to echo the narratives of Governors 
like Ossorio, who set north from Mexico City and discovered Nueva Vizcaya “at risk of 
being lost” in 1677. Like governors in past decades, residents of towns across the Greater 
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Rio Grande described their fears of destruction at the hands of Indians and plotted 
counter-insurgency strategy. Spanish governors and residents alike scripted their relations 
with migratory Indians as an unending cycle of failed peace and impeded prosperity. By 
displacing change to some future date, when Indians could finally be exterminated or 
removed from the kingdom, these narratives both masked Spanish acts of violence and 
their role in social change over time. One would hardly know that important changes 
were in fact occurring: the Spanish population was growing, excavating new mines, and 
sewing new farm fields.  
These meetings also shed light on how the move from sentiment to action worked, 
however. Particularly in the case of San Blas, residents mobilized discussions of violence 
and failed peace to argue that Indian behavior was not changeable, was “so innate” that 
the traditional framework of settlement and Christianization should not apply. Though 
such thinking had been evident earlier, in suggestions that Indians warranted 
extermination or enslavement “even more than the Turks,” many residents of Nueva 
Vizcaya went a step further in 1704 by rejecting any claim to Indian labor. This rejection 
was based on intimate knowledge rooted in social relations. Though Apaches had asked 
for peace, for example, citizens noted that they could not speak to the matter because 
“they had no experience with this group.” But with Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos, 
they believed that peace, and even enslavement, would be fruitless.280 
These town hall meetings in Nueva Vizcaya provide a startling contrast to the 
traditional emphasis on bureaucrats, soldiers, and missionaries in explaining Spanish 
relations with migratory Natives. In this context, law and policy were subordinate to local 
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concerns and to the experience of long-term Spanish residents. Fifty years earlier, when 
Spanish soldiers and Indian allies had waged war on the Tobosos, they killed nearly 300 
men and women, and auctioned off survivors as slaves. If any of the prominent citizens 
of Nueva Vizcaya hoped to profit off the capture and sale of captives now, they did not 
reveal it, as they instead offered to collect funds to help pay to send them away 
permanently. It is striking in this respect that they did not discuss what they envisioned 
would happen to the Tobosos in exile, or how they imagined that a group they argued 
was “a breed” of murderers and robbers would be changed into something else.281  
 
Forced Removal In Practice 
 
In the end, ongoing citizen meetings and offers to help pay for the forced removal 
of Tobosos proved key to the emergence of campaigns to send Indians away. Such 
campaigns did not begin immediately, however. Though it is unclear how he raised the 
funds—records corroborate his financial strain—Governor Cordoba chose to admit the 
Acoclames, Cocoiomes, and Chisos to peace in January and February of 1704. By March, 
however, they had returned to the mountains, and Cordoba renewed both military 
campaigns and diplomacy, perhaps to the frustration of local residents, who had seen this 
cycle unfold before. After new cycles of violence in 1708 and 1709, soldiers had 
transported a large number of Acoclame and Chiso captives to the public jail in Parral.282  
By the spring of 1710, Tobosos had begun to mobilize in large numbers to raid 
the haciendas and farms of military officers, perhaps to retaliate for the capture of their 
kin and seek their ransom. In March, 400 Indians attacked the hacienda of Captain 
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Maturana, taking two captives and warning observers that they would return in five days. 
In early April, they rustled 150 cattle from Captain Flores, killing sixty of the animals on 
the spot. In subsequent days they raided the hacienda of Alferez Ugarta, killing a 
shepherd and driving off more than 100 livestock. Mobilizing the usual contingents of 
soldiers and Indian scouts, officials complained that the horses could not pass to where 
the Indians were, a constant complaint for Spanish forces in the Greater Rio Grande.283  
In the midst of these mass raids, the fate of Native captives in the public jail 
gained new urgency. As he had in 1704, the governor convened town hall meetings. He 
explained that his budget was exhausted and that hostile Indians threatened the massive 
new mining strike at San Felipe. This time, however, both he and the viceroy had 
reconsidered residents’ earlier proposals. A new plan from the viceroy authorized the 
forced removal of Tobosos and their allies currently in captivity, as long as local 
residents paid for it.284 
The order followed the recommendations that some Spanish residents had made 
in town hall meetings in 1704 and 1710. All Cocoiome, Acoclame, and Chiso men and 
women over the age of seventeen would be removed from the kingdom and sent to 
Mexico City, where they would “earn a living with all security” in mills and textile 
workshops and thus never return to “cause turmoil.” Local residents would pay the costs 
of both the military escort and rations for the prisoners given that the royal coffers “were 
strained by the costs of war in Europe.” Fragments of donation lists suggest that citizens 
fulfilled their end of the bargain. The mining camps of Santa Rosa and San Diego had 
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together donated more than 200 pesos by September.285 
Precisely how many Indians were sent away in 1711 is unclear from extant 
documents, but mentions of the fact that “most of the Acoclames and Chisos” were in 
captivity suggest that the number was significant. If Spaniards hoped that forced removal 
would usher in a new era of peace and tranquility after 1711, they quickly observed 
unintended consequences, however. By 1715, a number of Indians sent to labor in 
Mexico City had escaped and returned north. They brought new wariness to their 
interactions with Spaniards and spread news of what had happened to them among their 
neighbors.  Some Native groups fled their settlements as rumors circulated that governors 
were targeting them for forced removal.286 
By the early 1720s, consensus had developed between local Spaniards, officials in 
Mexico City, and the King that a final solution was needed to bring an end to migratory 
Indians’ challenge to Spanish sovereignty in Nueva Vizcaya. After some of the Tobosos 
and their allies had again pledged peace and then abandoned their settlements after nine 
months, the crown issued a cedula approving the removal of all Cocoiomes, Acoclames, 
Chisos, and Coahuileños to Mexico City for the viceroy to decide their fate. In the fall of 
1722, military campaigns began to capture as many men, women, and children as 
possible. In November, for example, with the aid of more than 100 Indian allies and 50 
militiamen, soldiers encircled a Toboso camp near the Valley of San Bartolomé. Before 
dawn, Lieutenant Antonio Rodela entered the camp to demand three times—as required 
by law—that Indians surrender, telling them “in their language” that they were 
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surrounded by many men of arms. The Tobosos did not lay down their arms and sixteen 
died fighting before their leader, Juan de Lomas, surrendered. The Spanish forces took 
forty-four women, forty-six children, and thirty-one adult men as captives. Similar 
campaigns continued in the coming months.287  
In April 1723, a collera—or chain of captives—departed for Mexico City with 
311 Cocoiome, Acoclame, and Coahuileño men, women, and children. If Governor 
Martin de Alday argued that “this removal of Indians,” represented the only means to 
bring peace to his contested kingdom, officials in Mexico City saw matters somewhat 
differently. The Marques de Casafuerte, viceroy of New Spain, expressed skepticism that 
“so few” Indians could in fact cause such a threat to so large a kingdom as Nueva 
Vizcaya. The fact that Nueva Vizcayans had failed to subdue the Tobosos, despite 
thousands of pesos in military funding every year, suggested that they were merely 
wasting the King’s treasure. He saw his sanction of the plan as something of a test, as 
Nueva Vizcayans could hardly continue requesting funds for Indian wars after the 
viceroy had given into their demands to send the Tobosos out of Nueva Vizcaya. After 
all, both Casafuerte and the King explained, the Toboso groups and their allies 
represented the “last three” of the more than 80 Indian nations that had existed in Nueva 
Vizcaya when the King had founded the kingdom’s presidios as a result of the great 
rebellions of the 1680s and 1690s.288  
As the march of the Tobosos south to Mexico City proceeded, the viceroy and his 
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advisors planned their fates in an ad hoc fashion. When the convoy of captives began to 
be afflicted by smallpox, an initial decision to bring them to labor in the workshops of the 
capital was discarded, and Casafuerte ordered that they be temporarily diverted to Puebla. 
Giving the matter further consideration, he explained that if the Tobosos were allowed to 
remain in New Spain, it would be necessary to “construct them houses and assign them 
lands…at great cost to the royal treasury.” Moreover, he argued that their “vehement 
inclination” might lead them to return to Nueva Vizcaya and “commit the same atrocities 
as they had in the past.” In the process, the final “pacification” of that jurisdiction would 
not be realized and he would face continued complains from area residents. The “only 
solution” he envisioned echoed residents’ long-standing recommendation to send them to 
islands overseas. In the mind of the viceroy, this would both prevent their return to Nueva 
Vizcaya and alleviate any expenses to the royal treasury. He imagined that Toboso 
families would be divided equally between Havana, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico, 
where men, together with their wives and children, would be “entrusted” to residents of 
those islands who would give them food and clothing and Christian instruction in 
exchange for their labor.289  
There proved to be a wide divide between the ease with which Spaniards could 
imagine sending Indians to “islands overseas” and their ability to put such ideas into 
practice, however. Of 311 displaced captives, 227 survived the journey south to central 
New Spain. Because some young children remained in the city of Puebla, and more than 
seventy escaped en route to the coast, the Spanish armada embarked only ninety-two men 
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and women for Cuba in 1723.290 
If theoretical plans reveal broader conceptions of Spanish governance: 
incorporating Indians through Christianization and labor under the watchful eye of 
upstanding Spanish subjects—they tell us little about the Native experience of 
displacement. In this respect, the testimony of an escaped captive extant in archival 
records provides some access onto what the emergence of forced removal campaigns was 
like for migratory Indians living through these years.  It was on a September afternoon in 
1723 that a boy in Parras, Nueva Vizcaya noticed an Indian man on his family’s doorstep. 
Recognizing him as a Coahuileño Indian whom local officials had captured and sent 
south to Mexico City with Toboso captives months before, the boy called to his father to 
come to the door. The Indian fled, but a party of men was soon in pursuit. They hunted 
him down, apprehended him, and confined him to the town jail.291  
The Indian man—Diego de la Cruz Pacheco—remained in prison in the coming 
months after his recapture, testifying twice through an interpreter about his experiences in 
exile and the circumstances of his escape and return back to Nueva Vizcaya. In January 
1724, he explained that he had returned to Parras to try and find family members who had 
hid out there in order to avoid being sent away to Mexico themselves. He spoke of the 
initial shock of capture and claimed “he did not know why he had been apprehended.” 
Reflecting a common experience of Natives apprehended in warfare, Diego noted that 
after his capture near Parras he had first been imprisoned along with his compatriots at a 
military fort for seven months. Though some of his kin had died while incarcerated, the 
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survivors had then been cuffed and chained and marched south by an escort of soldiers, 
passing Mexico City and descending towards the coast.  It was midway between the city 
of Pueblo and the port of Veracruz that they had taken advantage of the fact that the locks 
on their chains had not been properly secured in order to escape. While seventy men, 
women, and children managed to flee to the hills, the escape met resistance, as Diego 
noted that a man named Nicolás had been shot in the mouth, shattering his jaw, and had 
fled injured and bleeding.292  
Traveling with his family members—including his brother and wife—Diego 
began the journey north, passing the slopes of the volcano of Orizava and rustling cattle 
to eat en route. Near Orizava they had also met a priest who invited them to come to the 
town of San Andres where he maintained an hacienda. In a striking scene that paralleled 
in diaspora Spanish efforts to incorporate Natives in the Greater Rio Grande, the priest 
offered to petition on their behalf for them to be able to stay on his hacienda and offered 
to give them lands to plant. Diego and his companions labored “for some days” there 
before continuing their journey. 
Weeks passed as they travelled through unknown terrain. As Diego noted, “he 
didn’t know the name of these places.” They skirmished several times with soldiers who 
were by this time hot in pursuit. They occasionally came upon ranch hands and mule 
drivers that they either asked for supplies or robbed. As they neared Parras, they began to 
be pursued by soldiers again, who killed one member of Diego’s group. One morning, 
Diego hid himself from his compatriots in order to separate from them.  He entered the 
town of Parras alone that night. He eluded capture and slept in the doorway of a house. It 
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was the next afternoon, he remembered, when the town magistrate caught him and put 
him in jail.293  
In the end, if Diego de La Cruz and his compatriots’ fates may have been 
particularly harrowing, they cannot simply be cast aside as “unrepresentative” of broader 
Spanish-Native relations. Attention to the experience of displaced captives provides a 
useful contrast to the correspondence of Spanish officials, which as we have seen, posited 
violence and forced migration as accomplished acts rather than lived experiences. In their 
analyses, Natives were repeatedly “reduced” to towns, “transferred” from one mission 
location to another, “pacified” or “sent away.” Diego’s testimony provides insights into 
how these actions were accomplished, and contested. Soldiers captured him in the 
countryside near Parras. With guns and swords they transported him to a jail. He was 
imprisoned for seven months, likely living through episodes of sickness and disease that 
took the lives of other captives. Finally, he was shackled and forced to march for weeks, 





 If the forced removal of the Tobosos in 1723 proved far more difficult than 
Spaniards had hoped, the unexpected challenges of these campaigns did not prevent 
officials from continuing to send convoys of Indian captives away in the future. In May 
1726, Spanish soldiers apprehended forty-two fugitives from the 1710 and 1723 
campaigns and conducted them south to Mexico City. Perhaps because the violence of 
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these campaigns succeeded in shattering Toboso resistance, Nueva Vizcayans forgot the 
mass escapes that had characterized these efforts, and remember them as decided 
successes. Royal officials who toured the region in the late-1720s reported that Toboso 
removal had ushered in a new era of peace and prosperity, just as they had hoped. 
Similarly, military men in the late-1700s did not mention the challenges of Toboso forced 
removal when they employed this history to argue for the exile of Apache captives to the 
Caribbean. As we will see, the fates of Native captives transported south into New Spain 
later in the eighteenth century would be shaped more than ever before by imperial 
interests in security and sovereignty, rather than by labor or market demands.295  
In the case of Toboso removal, the demands of Spanish residents and imperial 
interests coincided, as the willingness of ranchers and miners to pay for and participate in 
military campaigns they hoped would serve their interests in the “peace and prosperity” 
of their contested kingdom coincided with the interests of imperial officials in reducing 
costs to the royal treasury in the long term. If the forced removal of Tobosos was a local 
concern that eventually gained imperial purchase, in the chapter that follows we will see 
how migratory Indians and neighboring Native and Hispanic groups could also find 
common ground that sparked tension between local and imperial interests. The initially 
peaceful history of Apachean migrations into Northern New Spain as they fled Comanche 
slave raiders will highlight the difficulties of making generalizations about the trajectory 
of violence, captivity, and slavery in the North American West.
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Chapter 4 
Intimate Enemies: Apache Migrations and the Roots of War, 1730-1770 
 
  In October 1747, Joseph de Berroterán wrote one of the first histories of Apache 
migration across the Rio Grande into Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila.  Drawing upon 
decades of experience as a military officer and presidio captain, he explained in a report 
to the viceroy of New Spain how the forced removal of the Tobosos in the 1710s and 
1720s had left the rugged mountains and deserts they had once inhabited free for the 
taking, and more than 400 Apaches Indians had made these lands their own.  In referring 
to the recent past, Berroterán described his relations with these migrants as friendly: he 
traded with Apache headman Pasqual, whom he called his "compadre," and sent his 
soldiers on a joint military expedition with Pasqual's men to capture some of the last 
remaining Tobosos. When he looked to the future of the Apache presence, however, 
Berroterán turned apocalyptic. Native men surely would begin attacking Spanish 
haciendas and ranches, and by turning groups like the Tarahumara against the Spanish 
they might "easily destroy " Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila, he predicted. If in the years 
since the Toboso wars the Greater Rio Grande had seemed peaceful, Berroterán argued 
that this relative calm should be regarded "as a period of convalescence from a bad 
illness, and preparation for another more serious one threatened by the Apaches.”296  
 In discussing peaceful relations with Native groups while warning about looming 
violence, Berroterán's report is a quintessential example of official correspondence 
between the Greater Rio Grande, Mexico City, and Spain. Indians had long served dual 
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purposes for Spanish administrators in the region: as trading partners, military allies, and 
laborers, on the one hand; and as potential rebels, apostates, and enemies, on the other. 
Whether the Native presence represented an ominous threat or a welcomed opportunity 
depended upon one's perspective, and as Berroterán's report illustrates, upon on one's 
audience. Berroterán exploited the Apache presence in every way possible in the midst of 
a political controversy over his own failed explorations and allegations that he used his 
post as a presidio captain solely for personal gain. Through trade and military 
cooperation, he benefitted materially from their physical proximity, even as he drew upon 
imagined dangers to argue for the need for continued royal investment in frontier military 
regiments. It is fitting in this respect that he favored metaphors that naturalized the 
presence of "enemy Indians" onto the landscape: if the Tobosos had been a "bad illness," 
the Apaches were a "more serious one."  The question was not whether this violent 
"illness" would break out, but when.297  
 Berroterán's report introduces both the history and historiography of Apache 
migrations south of the Rio Grande in the eighteenth century, the subject of this chapter. 
In his prophecies of inevitable violence, he summarizes the dominant historical narrative 
of Apache-Spanish relations in Nueva Vizcaya and neighboring Coahuila. As this story is 
usually told, Comanche violence and expansion sent Apache groups fleeing south into 
Northern New Spain by 1748, when they initiated devastating raids that continued until 
Native headmen and Spanish administrators negotiated imperfect but lasting peace 
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Majesty, Parral, November 21, 1688,”  in Hackett Historical Documents II, 228; “Letter, report, and reply 
of the maestre de campo Don Joséph Francisco Marin to his Excellency the Count of Galvez. Parral, 
September 30, 1693,” in Hackett Historical Documents II, 388.  
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agreements in the 1780s and 1790s. If a previous generation of "Spanish Borderlands" 
historians regarded Berroterán as a prescient observer whose warnings against imminent 
Indian raids went unheeded, it is striking that the turn towards Native-centered histories 
in recent decades has done little to shift the basic narrative of Spanish-Apache relations. 
Instead, it is primarily historians' evaluation of Native violence that has shifted, as astute 
Native political actors have replaced "marauding invaders."298    
 Recent Latin American scholarship has suggested the need for a reexamination of 
this long-standing narrative, however. In a provocative new account of late-colonial 
Nueva Vizcayan society, Sara Ortelli has argued that the threat of Apaches was primarily 
a rhetorical tool drawn upon by local elites to resist imperial reforms, secure royal 
investment in the region, and provide cover to presidio captains and local residents who 
benefitted from cattle rustling and contraband trade. Ortelli's prodigious research also 
provides compelling evidence that neither Apaches nor livestock rustling were 
devastating the regional economy. In fact, by using the term “apache” in quotes 
throughout her text, Ortelli calls into question the influence of actual Apache Indians on 
the history of late-eighteenth century Nueva Vizcaya. War and "enemy Indians,” she 
argues, are better seen as discourses through which local elites sought to shape the 
                                                            
298 For Berroteran as prescient see Hadley, Naylor, and Schuetz-Miller, eds., The Presidio and Militia on 
the Northern Frontier of New Spain: Volume Two, Part Two;  Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Forgotten 
Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-
1787, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969); Oakah Jones, Nueva Vizcaya : Heartland of the 
Spanish frontier, 1st ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988). On Apache raids as 
looming presence in Nueva Vizcayan history see Susan Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s 
Colonial North: Indians Under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); 
David Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Ana 
Maria Alonso, Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution and Gender in Mexico’s Northern Frontier 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995). Recent studies of Comanche expansion include Pekka 
Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and Brian DeLay, War of a 
Thousand Deserts: Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). For 
quote on  "marauding" Apache invaders see Max Moorhead, The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and 
Spanish-Indian relations in Northern New Spain (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968, 26.  
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interventions of an increasingly assertive imperial state in the context of Bourbon-era 
reform measures.299  
 By examining the relationships that developed between Apache migrants, local 
Native communities, and Hispanic residents over the course of the eighteenth century, 
this chapter both builds upon and challenges Ortelli's innovative work. The fact that 
Spaniards manipulated the idea of war, or had an incomplete understanding of the 
diversity of groups that they labeled “Apache,” does not mean that Apachean groups 
mattered little to the history of the Greater Rio Grande. Even as Berroterán used the idea 
of "Apaches" for his own political ends in correspondence with royal officials, for 
example, he also had to make decisions with how to interact with men and women who 
arrived peacefully at his presidio that he understood to be “Apaches.”  
I develop three interlinked arguments in the ensuing pages that emphasize the 
material reality of Apache groups’ presence in the mid-to-late 1700s while reconsidering 
the ultimate emergence of war in the late-1760s and early-1770s. I first explain how the 
migrations of Apachean groups south of the Rio Grande in the early-1700s often centered 
on trade and diplomacy, and argue that there is in fact little evidence that interactions 
between these Apaches and other Native and Hispanic groups in these decades were 
primarily violent, as even recent histories have suggested.300 Secondly, I examine 
                                                            
299 Sara Ortelli, Trama de una guerra conveniente: Nueva Vizcaya y la sombra de los apaches, 1748-1790 
(México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007).  For other accounts that have 
de-emphasized the importance of Apache militancy see Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 
1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), Richard Perry, 
Apache Reservation: Indigenous peoples and the American state (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 
and Ian Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone: the Western Apaches, Aravaipa, and the Struggle for Place 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008). 
300 For accounts emphasizing Apache violence see Ana Maria Alonso, Thread of Blood, and Brian DeLay, 
War of a Thousand Deserts, especially chapter 1.  Clearly Spanish military campaigns and raids attributed 
to the Apaches occurred during this period, especially in New Mexico and Sonora, but I believe evidence of 
relative peace and trade relations has been neglected amidst the emphasis on Apache violence in the 
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livestock rustling and homicides in Nueva Vizcaya after mid-century, highlighting that 
investigation into Apaches' alleged raids rarely produced eyewitness accounts. While 
local officials most often attributed these actions to the vague category of "enemy 
Indians," they also noted that mission Indians might be to blame. This uncertainty of 
attribution, far from simply providing discursive fodder for local elites' to manipulate the 
imperial state, helped produce the outbreak of a devastating war which affected all 
residents of the region beginning in the late-1760s, as Hispanic residents responded to the 
perception that they were surrounded by "domestic" enemies and enemy "invaders" alike; 
local Native groups faced mass inquisitions into their alleged raiding activities and 
collusion with Apaches; and Apaches sought revenge for Spanish military offensives. 
The Borderlands warfare of the 1760s and 1770 reveals the fine line between 
manipulating the threat of violence, and being caught up in its ravages. It is only by 
considering both the material reality of the Apache presence and the rhetorical ends to 
which it was put that we can understand the ultimate escalation of violence in the 1760s 
and the mass capture and displacement of Apaches and neighboring Native groups alike 
beginning in the 1770s.301 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
historiography. For examples of raiding and violence in the mid-1700s see for example see Spanish 
Archives of New Mexico (SANM), reel 8, f. 748-763; f. 773-779; AGN-PI, Vol. 14, f. 208-216; AGN-
Historia, Vol. 393, f. 155-156.  
301 I am influenced in this approach by scholarship examining the relationship between discourses of Indian 
"menace" and colonial violence elsewhere in North America, especially Ian Steele, “Shawnee Origins of 
Their Seven Years' War,” Ethnohistory 53, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 657-688; Richard Drinnon, Facing West : The 
Metaphysics of Indian-hating and Empire-building (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), Eric 
Hinderaker, Elusive empires : constructing colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, At the edge of Empire: The 
Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
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“They Go Around on Horseback, Trading with the Apaches” 
 
In order to understand Apache migrations into Northern New Spain, it is essential 
to peel off the veneer of Spanish rhetoric and consider what the presence of Apaches 
meant for a variety of groups living in the region. In almost any give decade, it is possible 
to find a Spanish administrator writing from Northern New Spain to his superiors in 
Mexico City or Spain lamenting Natives' allegedly unending "murders and robberies."302 
If for some Spanish officials Apache migrations were shadowy, menacing, and 
threatening, for other individuals and groups—Native and Hispanic alike—Apachean 
groups were welcomed as new trading partners and allies.303  
 Who were these “Apache” migrants that began appearing in increasing numbers 
in Spanish records in the early-1700s? They were Athapaskan-speaking groups that 
defined their identities through extended families and clans, rather than pan-tribal 
nations, but who shared a common enemy: the Comanche. In part, as we have seen, 
Comanches attacked Apache rancherias for captives, which they sold for essential 
commodities—horses and guns—in New Mexico and Louisiana. Comanche-Apache 
conflict was also rooted in a struggle over land, however. Both groups sought to control 
key river valleys that provided water, food, and shelter during harsh seasons and 
droughts. For the Comanches, such valleys were essential for grazing horses key to their 
long-distance mobility. For Apaches, river valleys provided irrigation for crops that they 
had cultivated more frequently over the course of the 17th century as they developed a 
                                                            
302 This trope is truly ubiquitous. For discussion of Indians' "muertes y robos" in the eighteenth century Rio 
Grande, see for example AGN-Historia, Vol. 52; AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 191; AGN-PI, Vol. 171; AGN-
PI, Vol. 69; AGN-PI, Vol. 42.  
303 On Apaches integrating into Native trading economy I draw here upon Gary Clayton Anderson, The 
Indian Southwest, especially Chapter 5, "The 'Apacheanization' of the Southwest." If his emphasis is on 
Texas, I consider more source material from regions south of the Rio Grande in the ensuing pages. The 
Tobosos' role in Rio Grande trading fairs was discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation.  
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mixed hunting and farming economy. This diversified economy had provided security 
against an unreliable climate and uncertain trading partners, but after the emergence of 
the Comanche around 1700, Apaches' ties to the soil at particular times of the year 
became a military liability.  As Pekka Hämäläinen has explained, "Apache farmers were 
defense-less against their mounted rivals who turned the once-protective farming villages 
into deathtraps."304   
 Obligations to extended family groups and clans worked against pan-Apache 
organization, producing further military challenges. Though the recognition of kinship 
ties and linguistic and cultural similarities could work to forge temporary alliances 
between Athapaskan groups, such alliances often proved fleeting amidst the intensity of 
the Comanche onslaught. As the Comanche either killed their kin or carried them off as 
captives after 1700, Apache groups sought safety through settlement near the Spanish, 
retreat into the mountains, or new alliances with Native communities near the Rio 
Grande. Such flight was likely also a response to casualties of war, reflecting the belief in 
Apachean cultures that staying among the dead was risky given that the ghost of the dead 
lingered and could do harm to the living. Camps where death had occurred were 
immediately moved, and the name of the deceased was not to be mentioned again aloud. 
If such customs sought to encourage ghosts to accept their fate and leave the land of the 
living, they also spurred Apaches to find some place where they could “live in safety," as 
                                                            
304 Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 27-41 [quote on 32]. For another invaluable account of Comanche 
expansion and captivity practices see Joaquín Rivaya Martínez, "Captivity and Adoption Among the 
Comanche Indians, 1700-1875," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2006).  For 
Apache divisions and identity see Morris Opler, An Apache life-way: the economic, social, and religious 
institutions of the Chiricahua Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); Grenville Goodwin, 
Western Apache raiding and warfare (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971); William Griffen, 
Apaches at war and peace: the Janos Presidio, 1750-1858 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998). 
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one headman explained.305 
If Joseph de Berroterán later explained the emergence of the Apache as something 
new to the 1740s, Apache groups’ role in the regional political economy was in fact well 
established by then. The northernmost Apaches, the Jicarillas (or Tinde) were perhaps the 
most affected early in the century by the Comanche, as they fled present-day Colorado to 
settle in Eastern New Mexico, seeking some measure of Spanish protection.  Their 
neighbors to the south, the Faraones, traded livestock for buffalo hides with their 
relatives, the "Mescal people," or Mescalero and Natagé Apaches, who migrated towards 
the Rio Grande and eventually forged alliances with the Jumanos, Cibolos, Julimeños, 
and Tarahumaras. The Lipan appeared near San Antonio by the 1720s, also migrating 
between the South Plains and the Rio Grande valley seasonally as they forged a new life 
between Spanish and Comanche spheres of influence.  Western Apaches—who Spaniards 
tended to lump under the term "Gila" or "Gileños"—were perhaps the least affected by 
Comanches, as their appearance on the Western frontier in Sonora had more to due with 
lure of trade, hunting, and gathering opportunities than Comanche pressure.306   
                                                            
305 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation for further discussion of the Comanche trade in Apache slaves. See 
Opler, An Apache Lifeway, p. 475, for Apache fears of death, which is evident historically in common 
references in primary sources to Apaches fleeing camps where death had occurred. Quote on finding a safe 
place from Alfred B. Thomas, After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727, 
p. 113: “These had killed many of their nation and carried off their women and children captives until they 
now no longer knew where to go to live in safety.” On fleeting alliances see Hämäläinen, Comanche 
Empire, 32.  
306 William Edward Dunn, "Apache Relations in Texas, 1718-1750," Quarterly of the Texas State 
Historical Association 14 (January 1911): 198-274;  Anderson, Indian Southwest, especially 93-127. For a 
discussion of Apache-Spanish relations in Texas see Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman : 
Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 
159-196. Early sources noting Apache presence in Nueva Vizcaya or Coahuila [south of  New Mexico and 
the Rio Grande] include AHP 1704A, fr. 217-237 (1704); SANM, rl. 4, f. 48-61 (1707); AHP-1711A, f. 
429-436 (1709); AHP-1727A; fr. 211-216 (1727). Of course Spaniards had long carried Apaches south as 
captives and slaves, and servants in Nueva Vizcaya were often identified as "Apaches" in the eighteenth 
century. See for example AHP-1711b, fr. 860-876; AHP-1714, fr. 691-712; AHP-1729c, fr. 1616-1633; 
Ciudad Juarez Municipal Archives, Microfilm on file at University of Texas at El Paso, MF 513, pt. 2 r. 5, 
fr. 364-376 (1757); Ibid., paging sequence 3, fr. 69-75 (1758).  
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In fact, references to Apache migrants in Northern New Spain early in the 1700s 
suggest that the Comanche role in displacing Apache groups should not be overdrawn.  A 
devastating regional drought that began in 1703 and continued into the 1720s also played 
a key role.  Natives’ inability to gather sufficient food and game, the retreat of buffalo 
north in search of forage, and mission communities’ failed agriculture contributed to 
Apache entrées to Spanish communities further south than usual. In January 1704, for 
example, a group of Apache men arrived at the Presidio of El Paso. They requested peace 
and offered to “submit to royal obedience,” explaining that other Apaches were headed 
south of the Rio Grande to Janos to do the same. In some respects this visit was 
completely ordinary; Native groups in the region were well aware of the proper ceremony 
to trade with Spanish communities—one need only carry a cross or some other Catholic 
image and request peace or baptism. Military officers explained what was unusual about 
recent events when they informed officials in Parral that they had little experience with 
these Apaches and were not sure whether they should trust their promises of allegiance. 
As local residents met in the ensuing weeks to decide whether to grant peace to Apaches 
and other Native groups—the same meetings that recommended Toboso banishment—
they explained that with the Apaches, “they had no experience, and so could not give any 
advice.”307  
Residents of the region gained greater experience with Apaches in the 1710s and 
1720s, noting in the process that Apache migrants indirectly benefitted Spanish interests. 
In 1726, the commander of the Janos presidio explained that it was because of war with 
the Apaches that 143 Suma Indians had recently arrived offering to live alongside the 
                                                            
307 For another vivid account of Apache peace ceremonies in this period see Thomas, After Coronado, 
especially 61-71; See also Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman, especially Chapter 1. On 
1704 Apache entrées to Janos, see AHP 1704A, fr. 217-236. 
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Spanish military fort and receive missionaries.308 The same year, refugee Tobosos that 
had survived years of war with the Spaniards sued for peace for similar reasons. When 
asked why they were seeking peace, they explained that, “The Apaches had attacked and 
killed their people, and finding themselves outnumbered and under assault they wanted to 
settle at Guajoquilla [under Spanish protection].”  Apaches, in sum, indirectly helped 
bring an end to the Toboso wars while leading some local Natives groups to accept life in 
mission towns.309    
Such violence between Apache migrants and local Native groups in Nueva 
Vizcaya and Coahuila was not universal, or enduring, however. Along the Rio Grande, 
for example, Mescalero Apaches encountered Jumano and Cibolo Indian communities in 
the early-1700s that had a long history of trading with hunter-gatherer peoples. The 
Apaches brought dried meat, hide clothing, and horses to exchange for the Spanish 
clothing and metal tools these people received from nearby missionaries, as well as food 
items. At the same time, the degree to which Apaches alone supplied Spanish livestock 
should not be overstated. A number of other groups in the region—the Julimeños, 
Cholomes, and Sumas, for example, some of whom lived at least seasonally in 
missions—also brought horses and mules to trade near the Rio Grande or the Pecos 
River.310 
The Apache dispersal in the early-1700s should not be understood as a definitive 
                                                            
308 Antonio Becerra, Presidio of Janos, to Governor Carbajal, 18 December 1726, AHP 1727A, fr. 211-216 
309 AHP 1727A; When asked why they had come now: “an respondido que por haverles dado los Apaches y 
Matadoles algunos de cuya Naz.on…se allan conbatidos y sin yguales fuerzas para resistirles por cuya 
razon quieren Poblarse en el Referido puesto de Guajoquilla.”  
310 On relations between Sumas, Cholomes, and Apaches see especially "Testimonio de los autos que se 
formaron a pedimento de Don Jph de la Tierra S.e los robos de los Suma infieles," AGI-Guadalajara, 
Legajo 191 (1751). See also AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 194 (1754). On Jumanos see Nancy Hickerson, The 
Jumanos: hunters and traders of the South Plains (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). 
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or fixed relocation, as groups like the Mescaleros adapted to life in the Comanche-era 
through cyclical migrations. They made their camps for part of the year near the Pecos 
River in present-day Texas, from which they hunted buffalo and fattened their horse 
herds. During the summer, they often camped near agricultural villages and mission 
communities along the Pecos and Rio Grande to trade. It was in the fall that they moved 
south, gathering and roasting the agave roots—the "mescal”—that formed their 
namesake, while at times pursuing Spanish livestock. On occasion, Spaniards also 
reported encountering Apache milpas or fields, suggesting that they might have also 
engaged in some agriculture in isolated mountain valleys of the Sierra Madre.311  
Trade between Mescalero Apaches and Cibolo and Jumano Indians was reported 
as early as 1715 during Spanish expeditions to La Junta on the Rio Grande—long a site 
of both Native trading fairs and sporadic Spanish missionization efforts. In addition to ten 
towns of Cibolo and Jumano Indians with a population of more than 1,400, Spanish 
observers described “a friendly Apache band living just north of the Cibola/Jumano 
village, and a visiting Apache had agreed to bring his people to meet the Spanish 
missionaries, backing out only on receiving the news that smallpox had broken out in his 
village.”312 In fact, Apaches camped near the Rio Grande at La Junta for most of the 
summer, as one Spanish captive who had been among the Apache noted in 1723. He 
described a lively exchange in meat, hide clothing and horses for food items such as 
“beans, sugar, and salt.” This trade persisted into the 1730s, when friars returned after 
                                                            
311 For cyclical migrations see Anderson, Indian Southwest, 118 and AGN-PI 25, 35, 102; AGI-Guadalajara 
191 and 194. For Apache "milpas" see especially, "Diario seguido desde el dia siete de Septiembre en que 
ha dado Cuenta con el ultimo al Exmo. Señor virrey," Hugo O'Connor to Viceroy, 1 December 1775, 
AGN-PI 88: "En el Parage en que hize alto, y en todas las orillas del Arroyo, hallé infinitas Milpas que 
sembraron los Enemigos, y muchas Xacalerias Viejas en que se conoce viven durante el tiempo de la 
Cosecha.” 
312 Anderson, Indian Southwest, 64.  
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being cast out again in 1725 and noted that La Junta was “a passage and exit for many 
nations of Zibolos and Apaches.” One friar worried that the Apaches were preventing 
“many souls [from being] won to God.”313  
Thirty years after the first references to the Apache trade at La Junta, Don Pedro 
de Rabago y Theran’s fall 1747 expedition to explore for a presidio site near La Junta 
provided the most detailed explanation yet of Apache-Native relations along the Rio 
Grande. As the governor of Coahuila, Rabago y Theran had received repeated reports 
from area landholders about livestock thefts, which the journey north towards the Rio 
Grande verified. Soon after beginning the march, the expedition encountered “many signs 
of enemy camps, including 35 lights.” Though this enemy went unnamed, they came 
across a dead mule, “with the brand of a Monclova citizen,” suggesting that individuals in 
the nearby camps were responsible for recent raids in Coahuila.  This was but the first 
hint of the Native trading economy that was built in part on rustling Coahuila residents' 
free-roaming cattle. As they continued the march they came across more the tracks of 
"the enemy," as well as stray horses with the brands of Coahuila residents.314 
It was upon arriving at La Junta on November 31st, however, that the question of 
who was in fact "the enemy" began to blur. After “imponderable colds, floods, snows, 
and freezes, with a loss of many horses and mules,” Rabago y Theran and his 
companions initially rejoiced at having reached the Spanish mission of "Our Lady of 
Guadalupe." They embraced the mission's lone friar, who met them by ringing the bell, 
happy to have company for the next six days. As the initial jubilation waned, however, 
                                                            
313 Nicolás Flores y Valdez to Aguayo, 21 October 1723, AGN-PI 181; see also Anderson, Indian 
Southwest, 118-122.  
314 "Diario de la campaña executada por el Govern.or de Coahuila Don Pedro de Ravago y Terran en el año 
de 1747 para el reconocimiento de las margenes del Rio Grande del Norte," 1 January 1748, AGN-Historia 
52, especially fr. 111-141. Hereafter cited as "1747 La Junta Expedition, fr. #."  
 180 
the friar explained that the Indians in his mission were in no way subject to God or King. 
They came and went as they pleased, and when they were in the pueblo they asked him, 
“when are you leaving, father?” Worse, they engaged in frequent trade with Mescalero 
Apaches. The friar lamented that he was powerless to stop them, but that he did his best 
to instruct them in Christianity, when they were willing.315 
 Though Coahuila residents had blamed "enemy Indians" for rustling livestock, the 
ensuing days in the La Junta missions suggested that both Apaches and mission Indians 
were involved in this trade and it was in fact unclear who was the main supplier. Rabago 
y Theran and his men passed through missions with no missionaries, and numerous 
mules, horses, and mares, “with different brands of Saltillo, Nuevo Leon, Santa Rosa, Rio 
Grande, and Monclova.” Some members of the expedition wanted to reclaim them, but 
Rabago y Theran ordered them to let them be, since they appeared too lean to survive the 
journey back to Coahuila anyway.316  
 More than just livestock circulated between Apaches and the La Junta missions.  
At San Francisco de la Junta, for example, the expedition found two Indian captives that 
the Apaches had sold “when they came into trade with the mission towns.” These 
captives were originally from the missions of San Bernardo and San Juan Baptista, more 
than three hundred miles downriver. Rabago y Theran took it upon himself to explain to 
the Indians that they could not sell these women, "since they were not slaves...as both 
were baptized." The masters proved unwilling to part with them, however, until Rabago y 
Theran had given them gifts to compensate them for their losses. "What little fear of God 
                                                            
315 1747 La Junta Expedition, fr. 124: "despues de los imponderable travajos de frios, aguas, niebes, y Yelos 
con perdida de basttantes cavallos y mulas y rodar sierras";  "le preguntan: Quando te vas Padre? Cuias 
expreciones, y ottras que se omiten, me compadezieron..."  
316 Ibid, fr. 125: "manadas de Yeguas, Cavallos, y mulas con diferentes hierros de los vecinos de la Villa del 
Santiago del Saltillo, Nuebo Reyno de Leon, Santta Rosa, Rio Grande, Santiago de la Monclova..." 
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they have," Rabago y Theran summarized in his diary, echoing the sentiments of the lone 
friar who served these communities.317 
 In fact, the Apache trade was not limited to missions at La Junta. Returning south 
of the Rio Grande along the Conchos River, the expedition found missions there similarly 
engaged in trade with Apaches. At the mission of San Juan, for example, they observed 
the nations of the Conexos, Cacolotes, Mesquittes and others, living in distinct 
settlements along the banks of the river, divided by a league or two. As their ministers 
explained, “they heard mass, when it suits them, they pray, when they want to,” but most 
of the time, "they went around on horseback, trading with the Apaches.” Rabago y 
Theran understood from what he observed and heard that these mission communities, 
“were lost.”318  
Royal officials had commissioned the La Junta expedition to explore for a new 
site for a presidio that would guard against the potential "deaths, fires, and robberies" of 
the Apaches. Along the way, the expedition had discovered an Apache-Mission Indian 
trade that signaled to a Spanish governor that these Indian subjects had "little fear of 
God" and they had lost their way.  The Conexos, Cacalotes, and other groups' decisions 
to trade with Apaches illustrate that they saw matters quite differently, however. They 
farmed and traded the produce to Mescalero Apaches; they bought slaves and sold horses 
                                                            
317 Ibid.: "me dieron quenta aver en estta Mission una Yndia cautiva de la nazion Pampopa, que dizen, les 
vendieron los Apaches, quando entran a el trafique a esttos pueblos, cassada de la Mission de S.n Bernardo, 
y ottra de la de San Juan Bapttistta, ambas de la Jurisdicion del rio grande del nortte de la Governazion de 
Coaguila, vendida por dhos Yndios en la mission de S.n Fran.co de la Junta. Con cuia nottizia vi a los 
Yndios que las tenian compradas, dandoles a enttender no poder ser vendidas, assi por no ser exclavas, 
como por que la una es cassada, y vive su marido, y ambas bautizadas en dhas missiones..."; "ningun temor 
a Dios, ni a sus Ministros..."; The idea that Indians that had been baptized should not be enslaved reflecting 
the long-standing link between religious status and legal enslavement.  
318 Ibid., fr. 126b: " oyen missa, quando se les anttoxa: resan, si quieren, como todos los demas de los 
Pueblos (segun dizen sus Ministtros) y no tienen ottro assilo, que el andar a cavallo, y comerziar con los 
Apaches; con que tengo comprehendido, que por todos modos, esttán perdidos." 
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and mules, and went to mass “when they wanted to.” At the moment, they saw no 
contradiction in having a Spanish friar living among them while receiving visits from the 
Apache. While occasional rumors of Apache attacks on Rio Grande missions suggest that 
relations with Apache groups were not always friendly, the descriptions of the Rabago y 
Theran expedition nonetheless indicated that Apaches were hardly seen as a grave threat 
by many area residents.319 
Among Apache groups, the Mescaleros near La Junta were especially well 
positioned in their new territory. They benefitted from access to Spanish goods and 
livestock, as well as mission agriculture, even as they could quickly reach seasonal 
encampments distant from Spanish settlements or military garrisons. Though the Lipans 
built a similar migratory trading pattern, they faced greater scrutiny from Spanish 
officials in Texas who had more capability to pursue them for their alleged raids—and to 
employ Lipan captives taken in punitive expeditions in San Antonio households. During 
the 1730s and 1740s, some women and children that Spanish soldiers had taken in 
campaigns against Lipan rancherias labored as criados in San Antonio de Bexar, for 
example, echoing longstanding Spanish practices of distributing Native captives of war 
for personal service. In fact, in 1739 the Lipan rancheria led by Cabellos Colorados faced 
the same treatment granted to the Tobosos twenty years earlier in Nueva Vizcaya. As 
Spanish officials explained, "thirteen Indian men and women prisoners in the said 
presidio, [shall be taken] tied to each other, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, to the prison 
of the capital in Mexico City...the two-year-old daughter of chief Cabellos Colorados, 
                                                            
319 1747 La Junta Expedition, on broader Spanish inquiries into interethnic raiding activities and concerns 
about Apache-mission relations, see AGN-Historia 20 and 52; AHP 1749, fr. 3-15; AGI-Guadalajara 191; 
AGN-PI 194, fr. 333-369; AGN-PI 25, fr. 74-99. On the Native peoples of present-day Texas north of the 
Rio Grande see Maria Wade, The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799, 1st ed. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003). 
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María Guadalupe, shall be treated in the same manner." Cabellos Colorados and his 
family ultimately traveled 102 days on foot, the men shackled in leg irons, before 
reaching Mexico City. Within six months, only five of the fourteen Apaches originally 
sent south remained alive. As Juliana Barr notes, "whether any of [these five] survived is 
unknown; the last records say only that prison officials sent two men to a hospital, while 
two women, although very ill, went into servitude in prominent Spaniards' private 
homes." Such banishment, imprisonment, and forced labor in Mexico City echoed past 
practices even as it presaged future forced migrations of Apaches out of the Greater Rio 
Grande.320  
If some Lipan Apache groups faced capture and exile at the hands of Spaniards in 
Texas, enmity towards Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila was far from universal. 
In fact, there is a danger in dividing too neatly the "Spanish" and "Native" approaches to 
Apache migration into the region. Relations between Apachean and other Native and 
Hispanic groups in the Greater Rio Grande are best understood as a shifting mosaic of 
rivalry and trade that varied across time and place.  By mid-century, such interactions 
were in fact characterized more by mutually beneficial coexistence than unending cycles 
of violence.321  
 
“Imaginary fears of future dangers…” 
 
 
As Mescalero, Lipan, and Gila Apaches were displaced by Comanche violence or 
drought and lured by new lands and trade opportunities, they encountered Hispanic 
                                                            
320 For the cycles of violence and truce that characterized Spanish-Apache relations near San Antonio in the 
1730s and 1740s see Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman, 159-196 [quote on p. 169]. See also 
Dunn, "Apache Relations." 
321 On the danger of homogenizing the Northern Frontier, see Ortelli, Trama de Una Guerra, 51, especially 
note 144.   
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groups engaged in their own migrations and settlement-building. The four-year tour of 
Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera across Northern New Spain between 1724 and 1728 
provides a panoramic view of the Greater Rio Grande amidst Comanche expansion, 
Apache groups’ southward migrations, and the end of war with the Tobosos in Nueva 
Vizcaya. If the situation for Spanish subjects in New Mexico and lands north of the Rio 
Grande was precarious amidst vast Native-controlled terrain, south of the Rio Grande 
Rivera described a peaceful region with a burgeoning population and largely idle 
presidios. Hispanic residents were petitioning for land grants and grazing permits and 
building new haciendas and ranches in the countryside of the Lower Rio Grande. In fact, 
a population boom had begun in the midst of the Toboso wars, as mining strikes north of 
Parral at Chihuahua City fueled new migration to the region, and the lure of silver and 
land proved stronger than fears of migratory Indians. Nueva Vizcaya's Hispanic 
population of less than 10,000 residents in 1700 ballooned to 30,000 by 1730 and would 
surpass 50,000 by 1750. This expansionary trend spread beyond Nueva Vizcaya, as 
Spaniards had settled in Texas at San Antonio de Bexar and Los Adaes. Most striking 
perhaps was the colony of Nuevo Santander, where Spanish settlers, rather than 
missionaries or soldiers, directed the establishment of new towns on and near the Gulf 
Coast.322  
 In recommending cutting the number of permanent posts on the Northern frontier, 
it is striking that Rivera demonstrated little concern about Apache migrants in Nueva 
                                                            
322 For Rivera's tour of Northern New Spain see Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America, p. 214-
216. On Spanish settlement and expansion see Cheryl Martin, Governance and society in colonial Mexico: 
Chihuahua in the eighteenth century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Oakah Jones, Los 
Paisanos: Spanish Settlers on the Northern Frontier of New Spain (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1996); Peter Gerhard, La Frontera Norte de la Nueva España (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1996).  On Nuevo Santander colonization see Omar Santiago Valerio-Jiménez, 
"Indios Bárbaros, Divorcées, and Flocks of Vampires: Identity and Nation on the Rio Grande, 1749-1894," 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2001). Population numbers from Gerhard, 214.  
 185 
Vizcaya. In fact, he explained that there were few Indians that threatened the province, 
and any raids that did occur could easily be quelled by extant presidios, if only soldiers 
were not so occupied in tending their captains' livestock and fields. Rivera’s 
recommendations and reform of the region’s presidios were formalized in the 
Regulations of 1729, which immediately met opposition from some local residents, and 
especially the military establishment, who argued that the situation with local Indians 
remained precarious and cuts to military forces were thus dangerous. Invoking the same 
rhetoric that had followed the Pueblo and Tarahumara revolts in the 1680s and 1690s, 
Governor Barrutia argued in 1728, for example, that Indians’ "lax customs" indicated that 
a new rebellion might occur at any time, threatening the kingdom in much the same way 
as the great revolts of the 1690s.323 Rivera challenged this argument head on in a response 
to the viceroy, rejecting the idea that Tarahumaras posed any real threat. He explained 
that even if they were to rebel the Spanish population alone was now more than large 
enough to contain six or seven thousand warriors. Moreover, he noted that many of the 
reported Indians raids surely had to do with the drought in the area, which for the last six 
years had been so severe that “even the most elder men” could not recall one similar. 
While there was plenty of evidence that some Tarahumara pueblos were destitute and 
starving, in other words, there was little evidence that they were in fact on the verge of 
rebellion.324  
 Continued fears of "enemy" Indians were equally baseless, in Rivera's eyes. If 
                                                            
323 The back and forth exchange between Nueva Vizcaya officials and Rivera is contained in "Expediente 
sobre Visita de Presidio hecha por el governador del Parral D.n Ygnacio Fran.co Barretia," (1728), AGN-PI 
154.  
324 Ibid.: "de seis años a esta parte se ha experimentado en la tharahumara una seca, que los mas ancianos 
no avian reconocido; causa por que los Yndios de aquellos Pueblos, usando de el derecho de las Gentes, 
constituidas en la extrema necessidad, y sin apelacion a otro recurso humano, han descendido de la sierra a 
los Valles…y han muerto Reses, y Cavallos para alimentarsse."  
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Governor Barrutia claimed "any man of even middling intelligence knew that this 
province is surrounded by an infinite number of bellicose barbarous nations," Rivera 
countered that the governor’s warnings of impending Native violence were nothing more 
than "imaginary fears of future dangers." Rivera explained to his superiors that the 
testimony of military officials like Joseph de Berroterán himself had suggested that the 
number of remaining Tobosos—who he believed to believe the last “rebel” Indian group 
in Nueva Vizcaya—did not exceed 50 men of arms. Reminding his readers of the 
“valiant” actions of Don Martin de Alday in 1722 and 1723, he explained how the more 
than 300 prisoners that Alday had removed to Mexico City and the Caribbean had 
completely splintered Native resistance below the Rio Grande.  An occasional Indian raid 
or two, he noted, hardly could be said to truly threaten the entire kingdom.325 
 These back and forth exchanges during and following Rivera’s tour of the 
Northern provinces painted a portrait of Nueva Vizcaya as the most opulent of provinces, 
the most populated, and the Spanish jurisdiction in Northern New Spain with the fewest 
“enemy” Indians. It is striking that for Rivera, the Apaches’ seasonal migrations south of 
the Rio Grande hardly even registered. For Rivera, the only “problem” in Nueva Vizcaya 
was corrupt officials, who sought to maintain the advantages they could by describing the 
province as the frontier it no longer was.326  
 
                                                            
325 Ibid.: "ningun hombre de sano Juicio, de mediana intteligencia...creera que por medios regulares en 
muchos años pueda cesar en la Vizcaya la necesidad de manttener tropas para su Conservacion, asi por que 
su dilattadissima fronttera es havitada de Ynfinittas naciones de Yndios velicosos..."; "la representaz.n 
melancolica, que el Govern.or hace solo son recelos imaginados de futuros peligros..."  
326 Ibid. Rivera pointed out that given that Nueva Vizcaya was the "most populated" province, it was ironic 
that it was the only place he encountered opposition to his reforms: "“Es digno de toda tencion, Veer que en 
la Vizcaya, (como unico de reparo) ha tenido oposicion la Visita; sin que en ninguna de las otras mas 
Provincias, se haya oydo hablar palabra sobre la materia…” 
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“Mi compadre…the Apache headman” 
 
The expanding settlements and relative peace that Rivera noted continued in 
Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila into the 1740s. In this context, and amidst debate over 
whether the region even needed the presidios that had been established in the late-
seventeenth century amidst Native rebellions, presidio captains like Joseph de Berroterán 
faced new scrutiny. One Nueva Vizcaya resident explained this broader sentiment when 
he noted that “it had been a long time since [soldiers] had been on a campaign,” and they 
currently “spent their time tending their captains’ herds.” Military officials in general, he 
believed, were “all occupied in their own pursuits.”327  
One presidio captain in particular—Joseph de Berroterán—the captain of the 
Conchos presidio, was occupied in his own pursuits with Apache Indians.  In the early 
1740s, the Apache headman Pascual visited Conchos ever three months or so to trade 
buffalo and deerskins for “tobacco, flour, sugar, arms, and clothing.” Pascual had even 
allowed some Apache children to be baptized as a part of these exchanges. Pasqual and 
Berroterán collaborated militarily in addition to their peaceful trade relations. Berroterán 
had drawn upon Apache headman Pascual's aid to help track and capture twelve Indian 
fugitives from the town of Conchos. During this joint mission, however, one of Pasqual's 
men had been killed in the Sierra Mojada. Berroterán aided the Apaches in taking 
revenge on the responsible party, providing them with provisions, and arranging for some 
of his men to join them. In February 1743, twenty-five leagues east of Conchos, they 
captured nineteen Toboso "fugitives," including an Apache captive who was restored to 
                                                            
327 Domingo Vélez del Rivero, as cited in Ortelli, Trama de Una Guerra, p. 41: “es cosa de perder el juicio, 
porque no sabe en qué se pueden entretener los soldados de los cinco presidios, si sirviendo a los capitanes, 
o cuidando la caballada que tienen, o ejecutándose negocio de los capitanes, porque como hace tanto qu 
eno hacen campaña los juzga ocupados en negocios propios.” 
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her family. Berroterán sent these Tobosos that had eluded past forced removal campaigns 
south to Mexico City, as mandated by the law.328  
Amidst ongoing debates about frontier defenses, Berroterán’s peaceful dealings 
with an Apache “compadre” seemed to affirm Rivera’s conclusion that enemy Indians 
were not a significant threat.  So did his landholdings—two haciendas and a ranch—
which included  “a water-powered flour mill, five thousand head of cattle, two hundred 
riding horses and pack mules, several small adobe houses, stockyards, and a large 
wooden rodeo corral.” The farm at his principal residence, San Antonio de la Ramada, 
included “ten milk cows, seventy plow oxen, ten herds of mules, more than 2,000 head of 
sheep, almost 1,000 head of goats, and a heard of cattle.” It also had a recently 
constructed eighteen-room adobe house, with movable windows, locking doors, and 
furnishings including three “French-style” wooden chairs.329  
When Berroterán was commissioned to write his famous 1747 report, however, he 
made no mention of such landholdings and de-emphasized his peaceful relations with 
Apache Indians. Faced with the potential disbandment of his presidio, the loss of his 
soldiers’ labor, and personal legal trouble, Berroterán emphasized future war over present 
peace. "All the mountains and rough country are impassable to our forces, but accessible 
to the enemy," he explained, noting that the dry basin that stretched from the Rio Grande 
south along the boundary of Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila—the Bolson de Mapimi—
posed the greatest danger. If the Apache south of the Rio Grande now numbered only 
400, he believed there to be “countless” more north of the Rio Grande, and he envisioned 
that once they migrated south, “once they penetrate and move into that long, narrow strip 
                                                            
328 Berroterán Narrative, p. 193; Ortelli, Trama de Una Guerra, 50-51.  
329 Inventory of Berroterán landholdings is in AGI-Guadalajara 513 and Berroterán Narrative, 171-172. 
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[the Bolson] they will occupy almost all of the eastern side of Nueva Vizcaya and the 
western side of Coahuila, and will easily destroy both these important jurisdictions.” 
Even as he traded with Apaches like Pascual, in other words, Berroterán warned that the 
Bolson de Mapimi could be both a launching pad and safe haven for raids, if the Apache 
so desired. 330   
 The Indian "threat" was a highly malleable rhetorical tool, as Berroterán's 
interpretation of recent raids on area haciendas further illustrated. While he explained that 
the haciendas of El Alamo, Sierra de Albino, San Juan del Rio, Rama Zarca, and Cadena 
had all been raided at the beginning of 1747, "with sixteen to eighteen lives lost," he was 
unclear about who had perpetrated these raids. Some attributed these actions to the 
Apache, but Berroterán was not sure whether those responsible "were [those] who 
remained of the defeated enemy [the Tobosos], some of those who are scattered from 
[mission] pueblos, or the more than 400 Apaches who are ensconced in the hill 
country.”331 In fact, small scale raids could be invoked to make any number of arguments: 
that mission Indians were backsliding in the faith, that civil authorities were failing to 
prosecute crimes, or that the military forces were needed to contain the attacks of 
"enemy" Indian groups. Berroterán’s description of the rugged Bolson de Mapimi as a 
safe haven for a vague but menacing enemy, highlighted this malleability:  “The heathen 
enemies, unconverted and apostate," he stated, "come from settlements tucked away 
there, and their movement will always continue like the waves of the sea.” Whether it 
was backsliding Natives in mission pueblos—the “apostates”—or Apache Indian 
migrants—the “unconverted”—Berroterán suggested that the Indian threat was as 
                                                            
330 Berroterán Narrative, 194.  
331 Berroterán Narrative, 200.  
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permanent as the ocean. The subtext, of course, was that his own position, and that of the 
military more broadly, should be beyond reproach.332  
 This was exactly the kind of rhetoric that Pedro de Rivera had challenged as 
hyperbole twenty years earlier, when he had explained to royal officials that Nueva 
Vizcaya was in fact the most populous of the Northern provinces and that its Hispanic 
settlements and mission Indian communities could easily quell any enemy attacks.  
Perhaps because such arguments were so familiar to them by the mid-1700s, royal 
officials in Mexico City and Spain did not take Berroterán's bait. After another botched 
exploration in 1749, Berroterán was hauled off to face trial in Mexico City, and while he 
was eventually cleared of any misconduct, he failed to prevent his presidio from being 
disbanded two years later. As a crown attorney in Mexico explained after reviewing 
Berroterán’s reports, it made no sense to continue to spend money on useless presidios in 
order to chase "a few Indian bandits who lived only off what they rustled and robbed.” 
After all, “even in this capital of Mexico,” he explained, “and all the cities, villas, and 
major populations of the kingdom, there are thieves and all kinds of evil doers.” In those 
settlements local citizens were enough to handle such crimes, even if they could not 
prevent them entirely. Noting that almost all area Indians “had been vanquished,” he 
accused Berroterán of inviting in the Apaches. Embracing both his menacing tone, and 
his description of peaceful relations, the attorney noted that “according to Berroterán 
himself” Pasqual, who had brought 400 Apaches into Nueva Vizcaya, was his 
“compadre"—his good friend.  Ascribing agency to Berroterán, but not to Apaches like 
Pasqual, the crown attorney argued that under no circumstances should Berroterán have 
                                                            
332 Berroterán Narrative, 191 [emphasis added]. 
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allowed “on this side of the river” heathen Indians, unless it was to congregate them into 
missions.333  
If Berroterán in the end failed to convince royal officials to maintain area 
presidios, he succeeded in drawing new scrutiny to Apachean groups’ presence south of 
the Rio Grande and their interactions with Spanish subjects, Native and Hispanic alike.334  
As Rabago y Theran “discovered” an Apache-mission Indian trade, and Berroterán faced 
accusations he was “inviting in” heathen Indians, Spanish officials in Mexico City and 
Spain began a broader reappraisal of what could be achieved in the Northern domains of 
their empire. With the exception of California, by 1750 the Spanish empire had reached 
its maximum extent in North America. Expansion in the early 1700s had been checked by 
the emergence of the Comanche trading empire by 1750s, and despite outposts in Texas, 
royal officials and local military men alike began to describe the Rio Grande as a 
dividing line.335 Though they saw it as a boundary between civilization and barbarism, we 
might more accurately see it as a borderland between the Spanish and Comanche 
empires, and a homeland for a diverse Native population, including several thousand 
Mescalero and Lipan Apaches.336  
Apaches’ status outside the Catholic monarchy—as the “unconverted”—appears 
                                                            
333 Fiscal to Viceroy, the Marques of Altamira, 5 December 1748, AGI-Guadalajara 191:  "es contra toda 
razon, ocasionarle [a su magestad] nuebos freq.tes gastos por solo, que cuatro indios salteadores que viven 
solo delo, que Urtan, y rrovan se lleven algunas, cavalladas... pues ni en esta corte, y capital de Mexico ni 
en todas las ciudades, villas, y mayores poblasiones del Reino faltan Ladrones, y todo genero de mal 
hechores ni en sus immediasiones ni contornos faltan salteadores publicso de caminos, y con todo eso, solo 
las poblasiones, y vezinos bastan, al remedio." 
334 On disbandment of presidios see AGN-PI 69.   
335 Decree of Marques de Altamira, Mexico City, 7 Dec 1748, AGI-Guadalajara 191: "no permitir en 
manera alguna Yndios algunos barvaros de la banda de aca de dho Rio"; "por todos los quatro Veintos, y 
mayor circunferencia posible de las referidas sesenta o mas leguas se castiguen, y escarmienten los insultos, 
y ostilidades de todas, y qualesquiera de aquellas Barvaras nasiones de forma que queden de una Vez bien 
intimidadas, y aterrorisadas, y pase el nombre, y terror de las armas catolicas a mayores distancias de unas 
en otras nasiones Barvaras p.a q.e no Vuelvan a sus Ostilidades, y antes soliciten su christiana reduz.on." 
336 On broader reappraisal of frontier defenses see Weber, The Spanish Frontier, especially 204-235.  
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to have engendered some toleration for small-scale livestock rustling through the 1750s 
and 1760s. After the Bishop of Durango's visita tour of the region in 1761, for example, 
he noted that while the Apache took a few animals, “it was not with the excess of past 
years with the [Tobosos].” Most Apaches remained in the mountains, he explained, 
traveling at times to "the regions of the north, which have no known end," likely to 
trade.337  The governor of Coahuila wrote similarly about Apache trade relations in the 
early 1760s and explained that his jurisdiction was at relative peace, with the exception of 
an occasional raid. He explained how the men he had sent out to track some stolen mules 
and horses had come upon a great meeting of Native traders in July of 1760 eighty 
leagues north of the Presidio de Santa Rosa, along the Rio Puerco in present-day Texas. 
More than 1500 Indians had recently camped there, “as evidenced by the fires and huts.” 
Two leagues away, 500 Apaches were camped, preventing the party from passing any 
further north. The governor noted, however, that these Apaches “maintained themselves 
without harming any person, though they did enjoy taking some horses and mules.” They 
did so in parties of three or four, taking animals from Coahuila that the governor himself 
admitted “roamed free.” It was often days, he explained, before anyone noticed they were 
gone, making it difficult to track and punish the perpetrators. The only solution, in his 
mind, echoed a common mantra of the period: “more settlements.”338 
Trade relations and relative peace characterized El Paso and other communities 
                                                            
337 Bishop of Durango to Viceroy, the Marques de Cruillas, 9 September 1760, AGN PI 69: " ya no es con 
el exceso que años pasados...; "otros que suben de las regiones del Norte para donde se estiende esta 
ensenada, sin conocerle el fin, pero los daños no son tantos como antes...";  
338 Jacinto Barria to Viceroy, the Marques de Cruillas, 15 November 1760, AGN-PI 25, fr. 146: "que en el 
ya cittado paraje avian esttado como mill y quinientos Yndios, segun reconosieron por los Pueblos, y 
fuegos, y que a dos Leguas disttante de el, esttarian como quienientos Apaches, y que no pudieron penettrar 
el desttino les conduxo; Los Apaches de mantienen sin hazer daño a las personas... y como estas manadas 
estttan a su liverttad, luego que los hechan menos hazen dilixenzia de buscarlos y quando abisan de el robo 
han passado ya tres o quattro dias, y aunque salgan luego partidas en su seguimientto, es inutil qualquiera 
dilixencia...estto no encuenttra…otro remedio, que otros esttablecimientos." 
 193 
along the Rio Grande as well in the early 1760s, involving more than just presidio 
captains. In 1762, for example, the Captain of the Presidio del Norte, Manuel Antonio 
San Juan, issued an order warning that no residents, whether Spanish, Indian or “of 
broken color” could trade with the Apaches in seeds, firearms, or livestock. Captain San 
Juan explained his fear that residents, in seeking their own personal gain, would bring 
danger to themselves by inviting Apaches into their homes to trade. Strikingly, however, 
he did not restrict dealing with Apaches who came at peace altogether, but ordered that 
trade be carried out "in the light of day" in the town plaza. Military officials elsewhere 
also reported that Apaches came frequently (and peacefully) to sell their wares. In Janos 
in the late-1750s, for example, they described repeated visits from Apache women, who 
entered the fort carrying wooden crosses and asked to sell firewood to the soldiers.339  
Glancing across the Greater Rio Grande in the 1760s, it seems possible to imagine 
an alternate future in which Spaniards continued to develop new ranches and settlements, 
trading peacefully with Apaches who had found shelter from Comanches through 
interaction with, but not submission to, the Spanish empire. After all, reports of Apache 
attacks on Rio Grande missions had faded as these communities began to "go around on 
horseback" dealing with Mescalero Apache visitors. Spaniards noted occasional raids on 
their free-roaming cattle, but concluded that the damage "was not as bad as in the past." 
In the meantime, as Sara Ortelli as shown, some Spanish elites engaged in contraband 
trade and livestock rustling of their own under the cover of Indians’ alleged “murders and 
robberies.” If Mescalero and Lipan Apaches found it increasingly difficult to hunt buffalo 
                                                            
339 "1762 Vando proclamado para que sus havitadores no vendan ni cambien semillas, ni armas...a los 
apaches," Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513 pt. 2, r. 7, paging 2, fr. 212-220; For Janos see “Diario 
de novedades,” January 1757 to November 1758, Janos Microfilm Collection, University of Texas at El 
Paso, Reel #6. 
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on the plains—facing devastating attacks by the Comanches at times when they did—to 
the south they had found a zone of safety and built a diversified subsistence economy that 
merged occasional raids with agriculture, hunting, gathering, and trade with mission 
Indian communities. While some Spaniards would later claim that war with the Apaches 
began in 1748, in fact there is little contemporary evidence that "war" was either 
underway or imminent in the 1750s or early 1760s south of the Rio Grande.340   
 
The False Clarity of “Apache” Raids and the Emergence of War 
 
The spark that ultimately set off war between Spaniards and Apaches was not the 
occasional mule herd stolen by three or four Apache men, but the decision to punish 
Apaches for a much broader livestock rustling economy that multiple groups—Native 
and Hispanic alike—had long been involved in. Spaniards' shifting approach to small-
scale raids in Nueva Vizcaya reflected in part a renewed imperial attention to the 
Northern frontier and a renewed sanction for violence against non-Christian Indians like 
the Apache. Forty years after Pedro Rivera had toured the Northern frontier and reformed 
the military garrisons, the Crown commissioned another expedition to explore the 
Northern domains and prepare new military regulations. The Marques de Rubi's mission 
                                                            
340 For primary source claims that war began in 1748 see "Junta de Guerra y Hacienda," 2 April 1772, 
AGN-PI 132; "Sobre la Junta de Guerra celebrada en Chihuahua," 29 June 1778, AGI-Guadalajara 276. For 
historians similar conceptualizations see for example, Susan Deeds, “Colonial Chihuahua: Peoples and 
frontiers in flux,” in New Views of Borderlands History, ed. Jackson, Robert H. (Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 1998), p. 34; Óscar Alatriste, Desarollo de la industria y la comunidad minera de 
Hidalgo del Parral durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (1765-1810) (Mexico, D.F. Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1983), p. 27; Gerhard, La Frontera, 20, 41; Michael Swann, Tierra 
Adentro: Settlement and Society in Colonial Durango (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 71; William 
L. Merrill, “Cultural Creativity and Raiding Bands in Eighteenth Century Northern New Spain,” in 
Violence, Resistance, and Survival in the Americas, ed. William Taylor and Franklin Pease (Washington, 
D.C. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 126;  Jones, Nueva Vizcaya, 125; Elizabeth John, Storms brewed 
in other men’s worlds : the confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540-1795, 
2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 273; William Griffen, “Aspectos de las relaciones 
entre indios y europeos en el norte de México,” in El contacto entre los españoles e indígenas en el norte 
de la Nueva España, ed. Campbell Ysla (Chihuahua: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, 1992), 53. 
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embodied the broader hopes of Carlos III and his officials that professional management, 
economic reform, and a streamlined bureaucracy might produce greater royal control 
over Spain's American kingdoms and generate a greater stream of revenues to the 
treasury.  These "Bourbon reforms" as they are commonly known, included a renewed 
focus on imperial defenses that reflected startling recent events, as the English occupation 
of Havana in 1762 had revealed the vulnerability of one of the empire's prize ports and 
wealthiest islands. In much the same vein, continued reports of Native violence north of 
the Rio Grande, especially in Texas and New Mexico, raised questions about the 
vulnerability of Northern New Spain to a land attack from imperial competitors to the 
north and east.341 
 Rubi and his men demonstrated little interest in parsing the ambiguities of 
livestock rustling and Indian raids. The expedition's engineer, Nicolás LaFora prepared 
the official diary of the expedition and drew detailed maps that described with scientific 
precision the entrances of the "enemy Indians" and their frequent attacks. He described 
abandoned haciendas, declining mining output, and blamed both entirely on Apaches. If 
Rivera had seen "barbarian Indians" as cattle rustlers that could nonetheless be converted 
to Christianity, Rubi and LaFora saw them as inconvertible barbarians, cannibals that tore 
fetuses from women's wombs.342  
                                                            
341 For Rubi's visit see Lawrence Kinnaird, The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de LaFora’s Description, 
1766-1768 (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958); Nicolás LaFora, Presidios Internos: Relacion del Viaje 
Que Hizo a los Presidios Internos situados en la Frontera de la America Septentrional Pertenciente al Rey 
de España, ed. Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, D.F. Editorial Pedro Robredo, 1939). On the Bourbon 
reforms, see Agustín Guimerá, El reformismo borbónico : una visión interdisciplinar (Madrid: Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciónes Científicas, 1996); Susan Deans-Smith, Bureaucrats, planters, and workers: 
the making of the tobacco monopoly in Bourbon Mexico, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); 
Linda Arnold, Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835 (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1988); for reform measures and colonial frontiers see Weber, Bárbaros, esp. 72.  
342 On distinctions between Rubi and Rivera I draw here upon Weber, The Spanish Frontier, 204-212. In 
the 1570s, the term "conquest" had been replaced by "pacification," reflecting Spain's theoretical emphasis 
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 The expeditions' recommendations, promulgated provisionally in Mexico in 1771 
and then officially instituted by Carlos III the following year, unsurprisingly emphasized 
military solutions over negotiation or diplomacy. While the 1729 regulations informed by 
Rivera had emphasized the formation of peace agreements with enemy Indians—in fact 
Indians who asked for peace had to be granted it—the Regulations of 1772 deviated 
strikingly from past precedent by authorizing an offensive war against non-Christian 
Indians. If they wrote about completely "exterminating Apaches and other intractable 
tribes," Rubi and his advisors also recognized that even a "continuous offensive war" 
alone might not achieve their aims. LaFora, for example, advocated taking Apache 
women and children prisoner to decrease their population and called for Spain to attempt 
to control only those regions that could "be called the dominion and true possession of 
the king." They had witnessed first hand on their tour that Spain's “true possessions” were 
quite limited north of the Rio Grande outside of Santa Fe and San Antonio. The focus, in 
other words, should be on maintaining control only over regions south of the Rio 
Grande.343  
Migratory Apaches represented a small minority of a much larger Native and 
Hispanic population in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila. If Rubi and his expedition blamed 
them for all manner of troubles, local officials had often explained that it was “Indios de 
pueblo”—who contributed most to the lack of security in the Northern provinces. In the 
1750s and 1760s, friars, governors, and presidio captains had reported that Sumas, 
Tarahumaras, Julimeños, were raiding as “ladrones de casa”—thieves within the house. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
on peaceful expansion, and while the circumoluction evident in "defensive" attacks on Native groups must 
be noted, the 1772 Regulations nonetheless marked a new sanction for warfare against Indians. I follow 
Robles' edited Spanish-language publication of LaFora's narrative in this discussion, LaFora, Presidio 
Internos, [hereafter cited as "LaFora Narrative, p. #]. 
343 LaFora Narrative, 277-280.   
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While they often blamed Apaches for having “perverted” these Christians Indians, they 
also reported on observing a much larger trading economy along the Rio Grande that 
illustrated that mission Indians needed little convincing to join with Apaches when it was 
mutually beneficial. If some local officials wanted to end the loss of livestock, they found 
themselves facing legal constraints such as the lack of witnesses and what they described 
as “the delicate matter” of dealing with Indians living in missions.344  
As “unconverted” outsiders, Apaches represented an easier target than either 
missionized Native groups or local Spanish elites. Some military commanders shared 
Rubi and LaFora's bellicose sentiment, and even before offensive war had been formally 
approved, expeditions had begun to track and attack Apaches in their own rancherias. In 
fact, the signs of Indian raids and abandoned Apache camps that Rubi and LaFora 
observed during their tour reflected in part some of the early symptoms of an ongoing 
escalation of violence as Spanish campaigns to "punish" Apache raids had led to Apache 
revenge, fueling further Spanish punitive expeditions.345  
 Military campaigns in the summer and fall of 1765 reflected early signs of a shift 
in Apache-Spanish relations. Alferez Joseph Patricio Luzero was sent in pursuit of 
Apaches who had allegedly raided ranches near El Paso, even as presidio captains there 
had long noted that Suma and Cholome Indians were the more frequent perpetrators of 
                                                            
344 Such concerns had a longer history. See D.n Ygnacio Francisco de Barrutia to Viceroy 29 April 1729, 
AGN-PI 154. In 1754, for example, a meeting of the principal citizens of Chihuahua presented a joint 
statement warning that the Apaches threatened to "complete break the obedience of the Tarahumaras," See 
AGI-Guadalajara 194: “romper totalmente la obediencia los Taraumares, Nacion dilatadissima, y que con 
la sublevasion de esta provincia quede expuesto a perderse el reino todo.” Both Ortelli and Anderson 
discusses Spanish confusion over ethnic identity and individuals "passing" as Apache in Nueva Vizcaya 
and Coahuila, see Ortelli, Trama de una Guerra, especially 113-134; Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 
114-115. On the “delicate” issue of prosecuting mission Indians see V.e Assensio del Raso and Leonardo 
Ramirez to Joséph de Castilla y Theran, 12, 13, and 14 November 1769, AGN-PI 231.  
345 For late-1760s and early-1770s campaigns see AGN-Historia 20, AGN-PI Vols. 22, 42, 69, 82, 97, 102, 
103, 128, 132, 154, 231.   
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such actions.346 Luzero commanded 104 militiamen, 114 Indian auxiliaries and twenty-
one soldiers. In September, the party of more than two hundred men came across an 
Apache rancheria of twenty-three men, women, and children in the Sierra of Sacramento. 
Outnumbered nearly ten to one, the Apaches had little chance to escape; six were killed 
and seventeen taken captive. Lucero distributed the spoils of this battle to the militiamen 
and Indian scouts: buffalo hides, antlers, clothing, saddles, bows and arrows, corn, and 
other items.  The mules and horses they found seemed to confirm that the attack was 
justified, as they were found to carry various brands: “some from this presidio, others 
from New Mexico, others from further into Nueva Vizcaya, and some without a brand." 
As Luzero explained his logic, he knew Apaches had stolen these animals because "they 
don't buy them or raise them."347  
 This campaign shed light onto the Apache world beyond the Spanish sphere, 
revealing that Mescalero Apaches and Comanches continued their longstanding 
skirmishes north of the Rio Grande. Within the Apache camp, soldiers found two scalps 
that one of the Apache prisoners explained they had taken from the Comanches in recent 
battles. It may have been as much out of fear of Comanche attack, as of future Spanish 
attacks, that in ensuing days one Apache woman fled to El Paso with her two children, 
asking to remain and requesting baptism. If Apaches had in fact been responsible for 
perceived increases in raiding near El Paso, the loss of livestock to the Comanches may 
have been a motivating factor. It is also possible that Apaches had acquired branded 
                                                            
346 See AGI-Guadalajara, Legajos 191 and 194 for documents on Suma and Cholome raiding in the mid-
1700s.  
347 "Carpeta, Año de 1765, Correspondencia con el Teniente Governador, y Capitan del Presidio del Pueblo 
del Paso del Norte D. Pedro la fuente," in AGN-PI 102, fr. 49: "De mulas y caballos se encontraron 16 
empie entre las quales se reconocieron Barias marcas, unas de este Prec.o otras de lo Ynterior de este 
Reyno, y de el de la Nueba Viscaya y otras sin marca..."; "ellos ni las compran ni las crian..."  
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livestock through existing trade networks with mission Indians, a possibility Lucero 
discounted in claiming that Apaches "don't buy them."348   
War's self-propelling logic is evident in further campaigns in the late-1760s to 
contain alleged Apache raids. Finding branded animals during attacks on Apache camps 
served as evidence that justified further violence. Apache guilt was asserted, even when 
repeated reports had suggested that Mission Indians might be involved. In fact, given that 
many herds roamed relatively freely in the countryside, there was often no eyewitness to 
a given raid.349  
 Reports about Indian raids most frequently refer to the perpetrators using the 
phrases "the enemy Indians," "the barbarians," or some other general category. The 
presidio captain of La Bahia explained in 1769, for example, that area residents feared 
that Apaches had been spying on their herds. When one foreman had come upon two 
Indians stealing corn from his employer’s fields, and fired upon them "thinking they were 
Apache," he discovered that they were in fact men from the local mission.  A 1769 attack 
on a man driving his cowherd from Texas to Coahuila further elucidated the problem of 
attributing attacks solely to "Apaches." Headed south into Coahuila from the Presidio of 
la Bahia, Joseph Antonio Carrera had been attacked by a group of "naked" Indians. Firing 
arrows upon him, "from which he miraculously escaped unharmed," he meandered from 
mountain to mountain fleeing the Indians until he arrived in Santa Rosa "without even a 
hat." After officials sent men to investigate, they traced the tracks of the raiders not to 
Apache encampments in the mountains, but into the mission of San Francisco de 
                                                            
348 Ibid. On Apache-Comanche relations and the escalation of violence in the 1760s see Hämäläinen, 
Comanche Empire, 61; See also Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 120-129.  
349 Ibid. On non-Apache livestock rustling see Ortelli, Trama de Una Guerra, especially 139-164. For a 
microhistorical study of interethnic raiding bands in Nueva Vizcaya see Merrill, "Cultural Creativity."  
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Bizarrón. Two days later, Indians from this mission were seen in nearby towns with loads 
of butchered meat, which only provided further evidence that they had rustled the cows 
of Joseph Antonio. Whether Apaches were involved in any way in Julimeño raiding 
activities in the fall of 1769, both groups had in the past exploited the fact that Spaniards 
had a difficult time telling them apart.350 
In Nueva Vizcaya, similar concerns about “ladrones de casa,” boiled over into an 
inquisition-like investigation between 1773 and 1775. The investigation began with the 
apprehension of one “suspicious” Tarahumara man, and from testimony generated 
through torture and coercion the Chief Magistrate of Chihuahua, Pedro Queipo de Llano, 
amassed lists of dozens of suspects of treason and apprehended hundreds of Tarahumara 
and casta men, women, and children in the process. Though the circumstances of the 
production of these records certainly shaped the information contained within them, the 
remarkably resonant testimony collected from distinct witnesses provides useful 
information about both Tarahumara-Apache relations and the Spanish response to them, 
illustrating how late-18th century warfare was not simply a binary reflection of Spanish-
Apache relations.351  
  It was in March 1773 that a Tarahumara man was apprehended near the Pueblo 
of Guadalupe under suspicion that he had participated in a recent string of murders and 
thefts in area ranches. After six lashes, he confessed to the Chihuahua magistrate that he 
had been involved in homicides that had taken place the past November, and that for the 
                                                            
350 V.e Assensio del Raso and Leonardo Ramirez to Joséph de Castilla y Theran, 12, 13, and 14 November 
1769, AGN-PI 231: "le salio una punta de yndios todos en cueros…le tiraron barrios flechasos de los que 
milagrosamente se escapo y salio huyendo de entre ellos dejando todo quanto traia por delante en poder de 
dhos yndios, y extrabiando caminos por que dice lo seguian presurosos, llego aqui hasta sin sombrero..." 
351 The documents surrounding the 1773 investigation are found in AGN-PI Vols. 42, 43, and 132.  A 1783-
1787 investigation that involved many of the same individuals is contained in AGI-Guadalajara, Legajos 
284 and 285. See also Merrill, "Cultural Creativity." 
 201 
past two years he had been turning mules and horses into Apaches along with five other 
men. In March, Magistrate Llano explained to the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, José 
Fayni, the implications of this revelation. He noted that local residents had long been 
convinced that the success of Apache raids must be explained by "secret intelligence and 
collusion" with the Tarahumaras, especially from the many who deserted their pueblos 
without approval from their priest or minister. Of course “vagabondage” as Spanish 
officials explained it derogatorily, was by no means unique to the Tarahumaras. 
Elsewhere in colonial Mexico, and indeed in Spanish America more broadly, unskilled 
workers commonly moved from job to job. What was unique to the Nueva Vizcaya 
context, was the presence of an un-subjugated Native population—the Apache—and the 
beginnings of war. As Governor Fayni explained the implications of Llano's 
investigations to the viceroy, desertion had become synonymous with leaving to “kill and 
rob like bandits committing bloody crimes under the name of the declared public enemy 
the Apache.”352  
As Llanos apprehended the accused, and the accused identified more suspects, he 
gathered nearly 100 men and women in custody within a few weeks of the beginning of 
the investigation. The testimony of the apprehended painted a picture of a large 
interethnic community that sent out raiding parties from their mountain camps. Headed 
by a man named Calaxtrin, identified by one witness as an Apache, but by others simply 
                                                            
352 José Fayni, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, to Viceroy Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, 20 March 1773,  
AGN-PI 132. Though this letter is written by Fayni, he is summarizing the reports sent to him by Llano, the 
corregidor of Chihuahua: "Yndios Tarahumares, inclinadissimos al Robo, y faciles de cometer infinidad de 
Delictos, y separarse de sus reducciones, sin embargo de continuadas providencias, por mi partte 
extendidas, para que se castiguen exemplamentte, los que Decertaren sus Pueblos sin voleta de su Cura o 
Ministro, que explique los fines y el tiempo de su separacion, por desterrar de ellos la voluntariedad y 
arvitrio de vivir por muchos años, emboscados en los campos, y abrigados de las sierras de que salen a 
matar y rovar como vandidos disfrazando sus sangrientas criminalidades, con el nombre del public 
declarado enemigo Apache..." 
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as an Indian, this community was described as varying in size from several hundred to a 
thousand, and included individuals from diverse castes and backgrounds: blacks, Indians, 
mestizos, and a few Spaniards. First and foremost, however, was the large presence of 
Tarahumaras from mission pueblos. By June, Llanos had taken fifty-eight confessions 
and discovered 203 accomplices. He claimed that no less than thirty-five Tarahumara 
pueblos were implicated. He had also uncovered rumors that various Tarahumara towns 
were going to join to “the end with the Spaniards.” In other words, the situation that 
governors and military officers like Joseph de Berroterán had long warned against—
Apaches turning the Tarahumaras and other Native subjects against the Spaniards—now 
seemed a reality.353   
Larger political aims may have motivated some members of the Calaxtrin raiding 
band. But if some mentioned “ending with all the Spaniards,” other witnesses centered 
their grievances on labor demands. They wanted not to kill all Spaniards, but to end with 
the haciendas where they had been employed. The Calaxtrin band, as William Merrill has 
explained, demonstrated immense cultural creativity. Drawing upon Christianity, peyote 
use, and revolutionary ideology, they built long-lasting mountain communities that 
survived, and were in the end perhaps invigorated by, Llano's investigations.354  
Apaches made this existence possible by providing both needed trade goods and 
discursive cover. Raiding for mules and horses supplied their own needs for meat and 
                                                            
353 Llano to Viceroy Bucareli, 20 April 1773, AGN PI 42: "estaban comvocados barios Pueblos de la 
Tharahumara para acabar con los españoles."  Though I reviewed these documents independently, I have 
benefitted from the analysis of William Merrill, who has examined this same investigation in a somewhat 
different context. See Merrill, "Cultural Creativity."  
354 The best discussion of the day-to-day life and trading practices of the raiding bands is contained in 
testimony of the accused in AGN PI 132: "Expediente formado sob.re la colucion y secreta inteligencia de 
los Yndios Tarahumares con los Apaches, y exesos que cometieron en las inmediaciones de la Villa de 
Chiguagua."   
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transport, but such items were also what Apache wanted to purchase, in exchange for 
arrows, hides, blankets, and clothing. These exchanges occurred at desert and mountain 
springs where the Tarahumaras would maintain the herds until the rains came, and the 
Apache arrived to take them north. For years, the Calaxtrin band (and likely others) was 
able to maintain itself because of a confusion of attribution. Because they received arrows 
from the Apache, and dressed in skins that the Apaches had given them, their actions had 
almost always been attributed to the latter.355  
Llano’s investigations, especially in the beginning, were cast as a startling 
revelation: the real culprits behind an “infinity of excesses, “ Fayni noted in commending 
Llano’s efforts, had been proven to be the Tarahumaras. “Rarely” it now seemed, had it 
been the Apaches. As Llano explained the implications: “our forces will make little 
progress even if we finish with the whole Apacheria, because the thief will still be in the 
house. After all, the Apaches haven’t taken even one horse or mule, that wasn’t turned 
into them by the Tarahumaras.”356  
In the end, however, Llano’s hunt for Tarahumara traitors met an abrupt end. By 
late-April, a month after it had begun, the city council of Chihuahua met and decided to 
order a halt to his investigation. His apprehension of dozens of suspects had caused “a 
terrified panic” in the Tarahumara pueblos, and in the interests of “calming them down” 
the council decided not to continue the investigation. Instead, Llano was to proceed 
against only the principal headmen, because to do otherwise would risk needing the force 
of arms and produce logistical challenges. In sum, if officials believed they had 
                                                            
355 Ibid.  
356 Ibid., Llano to Fayni, 23 March 1773: "pues seria mui poco lo que adelantarian las Armas, aunque 
acabasen con toda la Apacheria quedandonos el Ladron dentro de Casa, pues es constantte no se han 
lelvado los Apaches mulada, ni cavallada alguna, de las que llevan Declaradas, que no haya sido entregada 
por los Tarahumares." 
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discovered an Apache-Tarahumara alliance that threatened to "end with all the 
Spaniards," they realized that their own investigations into this alliance might be what 
sent the Tarahumara pueblos into rebellion.357  
Proceeding against the alleged leaders of the gang proved far from an easy 
solution either, however, as Llano ran up against the challenge of proving cases for which 
he had little evidence other than coerced testimony. Some questioned whether he had 
been overzealous, and Llano himself noted that “the fear of punishment makes [the 
suspects] say unimaginable things.” Of the two hundred individuals apprehended in the 
spring of 1773 under suspicion of cooperating with Apaches, some died in prison in 
Chihuahua, while others labored in public works projects from which they were able to 
escape. In fact, ten years later another mass inquisition into Apache-Tarahumara relations 
took place, at the height of which more than 900 Tarahumaras were again apprehended. 
In these later investigations, witnesses explained how for the past twenty years they had 
been dealing with Apaches, who had come to stay with them in their houses “with the 
same security as in their own rancherias.”358  
                                                            
357 Ibid. This decision was affirmed in Mexico by Fiscal Areche in July 1773, whose point-of-view was 
seconded by the viceroy. As Areche noted, "en atencion a que el numero de los Yndios arrestadas es ya tan 
conciderable, y que siendo como es tan General la cedicion no es facil la captura a todos los 
conprehendidos, ni se puede castigar a quantos abraza el delicto, se acomoden desde luego a lo que se 
practica en semejanttes casos, que es arrestar y procesar a los mas principales Cavesillas, para que 
Descargado el golpe sobre ellos de la Justicia, se aterrorizen los demas Delinquentes, y que en este 
concepto se les continuen sus causas a los que ya estan presos, y se suspendan en el arresto de los otros."  
358 Ibid.: "por q.e el temor del Castigo, les hará decir cosas que ni han soñado, sobre que, y de su 
inconstante natural tengo bien larga experiencia.” The investigations from the 1780s are found in AGI-
Guadalajara Legajos 284-286.  This second investigation was remarkably similar to the first, if on a larger 
scale. Officials recognized that past efforts had failed, and that in fact the problem of Apache-Tarahumara 
collusion had grown worse. Llano’s earlier, failed investigation had perhaps attracted even more Spanish 
subjects to a liminal life. In March of 1783, a mulato was apprehended under suspicion of crime and sent to 
Arispe to be questioned. Granted a pardon from death if he confessed, he explained that he was a spy for 
the “many gangs of Yndios Taraomares, Topios, y Tepehuanes, mulatos coyotes mestizos y de otras castas 
de Gente ociosa, perdida, y vagamunda” that were encamped in the Sierra de Barajas and its surroundings. 
“Joined and in collusion” with the Apaches who engaged in their “incessant campaigns of death and 
robbery in this province.” A raid had occurred and the footprints of one of the raiders had been followed to 
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Llano's “discovery” that Tarahumara and Hispanic laborers may have committed 
raids and homicides attributed to the Apache did not change the course of ongoing 
military campaigns in the 1770s and 1780s, however.  In fact, Spanish officials drew 
indiscriminately upon histories of raiding to justify further military action against 
Apaches.  In war councils, military officers like Hugo O’Connor contended that war had 
begun in 1748, and in the years since Apaches alone had committed more than 4,000 
murders, stolen thousands of livestock, and caused more than 11 million pesos in losses 
to the regional economy.359  
 Unsurprisingly, targeting Apaches for their role in a multi-ethnic trading economy 
fueled further violence. While Apaches had frequently faced onslaughts from Comanches 
and had sought "some place where they could live in safety," Apache relations with the 
Spanish sphere south of the Rio Grande had not been characterized by unending cycles of 
war before the late-1760s. A number of Spanish officials themselves commented that the 
violence of the late-1760s and early-1770s was unprecedented. Magistrate Llano had 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the Pueblo of Guadalupe—the same pueblo implicated in the raiding bands discovered in 1773. Francisco 
Luis’s shoes “were the same as the tracks” found leaving the raiding site, and in his hut they had found 24 
bloodied arrows.  
As in the past, witnesses described exchanging horses and mules for hides and arrows, but they 
went into more detail about their alliance and trade with the Apaches. This had begun, they remember, 
about 20 years ago, when they had forged relations with Apaches by allowing them to come and stay in 
their houses “with the same security as if it was their own rancherias.” Many of the same individuals were 
implicated in these later bands: “Por no haverseles impuesto entonces el merecido castigo y haver 
conseguido livertarse de la Prision.” José Antonio Reyes, for example, one of the main accused in the 1773 
events, was apprehended in March of 1784. By November of 1784, 900 Tarahumaras had been 
apprehended, and almost exactly as before, these mass apprehensions had generated a panic in the pueblos. 
This time, however, key leaders of the raiding bands were executed, quartered, and their dismembered 
bodies displayed as a warning not to join with the Apaches. Some languished in prison into 1787, when 
twenty-one were still facing charges.  
359 Junta de Guerra y Hacienda, PI 132: "mas de quatro mil personas de todas clases, y sexos, y que la 
perdida, que sea sufrido aquella Provincia ascendia a quella Provincia ascendia en Octubre de setenta, y 
uno a mas de onze millones de pesos." O'Connor was not alone in citing such figures, noting that they were 
proven "by documents" in the archives. Historians have usually taken Spanish statistics on Apache raids 
had face value. A closer examination at reported raids, however, reveals that in fact it was often unclear 
who had committed raids, and attribution to "Apache" should not be taken at face value.  
 206 
noted in 1770 that while Nueva Vizcaya had suffered “some disturbances” in the last 
twenty years, “never had it arrived to the extreme that we are experiencing today.” Two 
years later, military officials met in a council of war in which they explained that the 
region was experiencing attacks “like never before seen.”360  
By the early 1770s, such descriptions of desolation were not hyperbole, as Nueva 
Vizcaya haciendas and ranches experienced repeated massacres. An attack on a ranch a 
league and a half from Santa Eulalia in February 1770 is representative, shedding light on 
what Spanish residents meant when they lamented violence “like they had never seen 
before.” On 7 February 1770, a boy arrived at the house of Don Juan Joseph Barrandegui 
with the news that his Ranch, a league and a half from Santa Eulalia, had suffered a 
horrific attack. Sending a party of men to investigate, local officials discovered that 
eighteen residents of the rancho were dead, and many head of cattle had been found 
killed as well. Muleteers were commissioned to bring the dead on mules with a military 
escort of seven Yaqui Indians and other men of arms. The bodies arrived on the night of 
the 8th to be buried.  Juan Joseph de Lemus described his feelings upon witnessing the 
bodies arrive. "What horror!" he said, explaining how he first saw the body of Ramon 
Gonzalez, a mulato foreman, stabbed in the chest four times, his genitals mutilated. He 
had been told that Gonzalez was found face down with arrows in his back. The other 
thirteen bodies filed in one by one: first came three Tarahumara laborers, Francisco, 
Joseph, and Miguel, only one of whom had been left with any clothing. The crowd noted 
                                                            
360 Juan Joséph de Lemus a S.or D.n Pedro Antonio Queipo de Llano, 10 February 1770, AGN-PI 42: “pues 
aunque de Veinte años ha estado padeciendo y tolerando esta Jurisdiccion tan combatida y destituida de 
remedio nunca han llegado a el estremo que en el dia se experimenta de tener impedidos todos los caminos 
por donde transitan y se conducen Vastimentos y Viveres para la provicion de estos Vezindarios…” See 
also for example 1772 Junta de Guerra, PI 132, which refers to "attacks like never seen before"—"atacques 
como nunca visto hasta aquel año."  
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"with greatest compassion," the body of a Spanish widow, Ana Andrea Ortega, who had 
been stabbed in the chest three times, "her womb destroyed and filled with beans, her 
shame parts penetrated by a bow." Then came the bodies of nine children, the oldest 
appearing to be about seven years old, the others younger, including a baby of three or 
fourth months. These children had not only been stabbed, but had suffered burns, likely 
because the house they were inside of had been set on fire.361  
 No one, other than the perpetrators, had survived to recount what had happened 
during this massacre at the Rancho of el Portrero. But local residents did not need an 
eyewitness to make determinations for themselves. This massacre proved that "these 
cruel Barbarians want nothing less than to extinguish with the entire Spanish nation, not 
sparing woman or child.”  The events at the rancho corroborated the wider sense that a 
new era of violence was upon them. Lemus explained how everyone had commented on 
the "destruction," "the harm committed." Besides the bodies of the dead, the party of men 
sent to investigate described how "all they had found in the area was destruction": dead 
cattle, chickens, dogs, and cats. Observers noted that if the attackers had simply wanted 
to steal, they could have tied people up, rather than kill them. "Terror" was the word 
repeated most frequently now, as mine and hacienda workers had begun to "leave for 
other parts."  As Lemus summarized, “the citizenry remains completely 
terrorized…knowing that the Indian enemy might attack again night or day.” Lemus 
reminded his superiors that the mines of his jurisdiction, if they could not be worked, 
threatened a "great loss" to the crown, "given that it is on mining that the royal interests 
                                                            
361 Juan Joséph de Lemus a S.or D.n Pedro Antonio Queipo de Llano, 10 February 1770, AGN-PI 42: 
"Rejistramos con la maior compassion el cuerpo de Hana, Andrea Ortega española Viuda de Antonio Bega, 
pasado su Cuerpo por los Pechos con tres Lanzadas, destrozado el Bientre, y dentro le echaron frijoles por 
las Partes mas Vergonzosas le metieron un Arco Dejando su ultrajado cuerpo Desnudo." 
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of his majesty, and the commerce of this citizenry depend.”362  
 
Table 1: Select Attacks on Spanish Settlements, 1769-1770363 
Location Distance from Chihuahua Persons Killed Notes 
San Jeronimo 7 Leagues 49 10 Captives Taken 
Nombre de Dios 1 League 6 Captives Taken Also 
Hacienda de San Lucas  18  
Pasture near Chihuahua 1.5 Leagues 18  
Hacienda del Maiorasgo 
de Valero 
 30  
Pasture of the 
Dominguez 
 19  
Durasno Near Old Presidio of 
Conchos 
30  
Janos  16 500 Horses Taken 
Hacienda de San Antonio 
de la Jabonera 
 19  
 
On the one hand, Llano’s later investigations suggest that Tarahumaras or 
interethnic raiding bands may have been responsible for at least some of the reported 
massacres in the early-1700s. At the same time, however, the destruction reported by 
observers, who noted that few animals were taken, also fits strikingly with Apache 
understandings of war versus raiding. While a raid was taken to acquire horses, mules, or 
other resources from outsiders—“to search out enemy property,” as the Apache term 
                                                            
362 Ibid.: "estos iniquous crueles Barbaros no tiran ya a mas que estinguir en el todo nuestra Nacion 
española no perdonando sexo ni edad que no maten..."; "ha quedado sumamente atemorizado este Real, y 
su Vezindario por que haviendo quedado este Portrero Yermo, y despoblado tan immediato  todos temen 
sirva de Rochela [ara los Yndios enemigos desde donde con mucha facilidad podran asalatarnos de dia, o 
de noche..."; "la mineria...es de donde pende todo el orden y aumento de Reales intereces de Su Magestad, 
comercio, y veicndad de este Real, y esa Villa..." 
363 This chart contains a chronological list of accounts as described in 1772 War Council, in AGN-PI 132,  
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translates into English—raiding parties aimed to avoid encounters with the enemy, and 
rituals associated with raiding were directed towards concealment and thwarting pursuit. 
The purpose of war parties, in contrast, was to avenge Apachean causalities by killing the 
enemy and destroying their camps. Revenge represented an ethical commitment to 
retaliate for slain relatives, “a religious act that bound a man to the larger complex of 
Apache values and ideals.”  Rituals in advance of war parties thus centered on 
demonstrating the heroic acts that warriors intended to perform, and once on the warpath 
men spoke a special ritual language with its own vocabulary.364  
The early years of war would be devastating for both sides. If the ultimate 
uncertainty of attributing massacres to Apaches, Tarahumaras, or interethnic raiding 
bands weighed on the minds of some magistrates like Queipo de Llano, for military 
officers it mattered little. As Spanish forces and their Native allies captured or killed 
hundreds of Apaches, they calculated that between 1771 and 1776, Apaches had killed 
more than 1,500 people, took more than 150 captives, and had forced the abandonment of 




It was only after war began in the late-1760s that Spaniards reinterpreted past 
relations with Apaches. While even in recent years Mescalero and Lipan Apaches had 
been trading with local residents and then "keeping to themselves in the mountains," in 
councils of war and meetings of the principle citizens of Chihuahua City, Apaches now 
                                                            
364 On Apache ideas of revenge see Opler, Apache Lifeway, 370-375; see also Handbook of North American 
Indians, Vol. 10 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978); quote from William B. Griffen, Apaches at 
War & Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750-1858 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), p. 
11. 
365 Delay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 12. 
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became "the most vicious, inhumane, idolatrous" enemy. One crown attorney in Mexico 
City, advising the viceroy about the situation in Northern New Spain, argued that 
Apaches' "perverse customs and inclinations" alone warranted Spanish efforts to conquer 
them and "take charge of their governance." José Antonio Areche warned, however, that 
war was not something to be taken lightly, as "all men confess, that war is a terrible 
danger."  It disturbed the common order of things, "confusing friendship and kinship...as 
commerce leaves, cities are destroyed, the arts abandoned."366  
 Areche's warning was unusually fitting to the unfolding warfare in the Greater 
Rio Grande. Even as Spaniards targeted an enemy they could blame for all manners of 
troubles—fluctuating mining revenues, stagnant populations, banditry, homicides, and 
cattle rustling—they had discovered that the enemy was as much internal, "domestic," as 
it was external. It was not just Tarahumaras and other Natives living in mission pueblos 
that had “invited Apaches into their homes.” In the fall of 1773, officials received reports 
that citizens of El Paso had been harboring Apache Indians. Ordered to turn in “any and 
all Apaches present in their households,” local residents brought forward nine Apache 
boys and fifteen Apache women. Officials also apprehended three individuals, Marcos 
Nasalteco, an Indian woman named Gertrudis, and her daughter Juana, who they charged 
with “giving lodging” to the enemy and escorted south with the Apaches to Chihuahua 
City. 
If, as Areche explained, "God's friend is he whom God's enemy kills," God's 
friends seemed increasingly few and far between.  In sum, the certainty with which 
                                                            
366 José Antonio Areche to Vicreoy, 6 September 1774, AGN-PI 154: …”Todos los hombres confiesan que 
es terrible daño el de la guerra; con ella se descompone el orden y armonia de la republica: la Religion se 
muda: la Justicia se perturva: Las leyes obedecen: La amistad y parentezco se confunde: Las artes se 
abandonan: El Comercio se retira: Las Ciudades se destruyen, y la sociedad se altera…” 
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O'Connor and others described Apaches unending murders and robberies—"4,000 
deaths" and "millions of pesos in losses"—reflected an after-the-fact reinterpretation of 
social relations that had been much more fluid, and far less destructive, than 
contemporary observers now acknowledged.367   
                                                            
367 Ibid.: "Amigo de Dios es quien enemigo de Dios mata."  
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Chapter 5 
“To Put the Sea In-Between”: The Apache Middle Passage to Cuba, 1770-1816 
 
In October 1805, two Apache men petitioned the viceroy of New Spain for their 
freedom. With the aid of a Spanish notary, Carlos and Manuel explained that they had 
worked in the ports of Veracruz and Havana for the past twenty-two years alongside 
convict laborers and enslaved Africans. Citing their good behavior, baptism into the 
Catholic faith, old age, and the fact that they had not committed any crime, they asked to 
be allowed some rest for what remained of their lives. "We suffer," they explained, "only 
because the Almighty chose to raise us among heathens." Six months later, the viceroy 
had still not answered their petition and they continued to labor in exile.368  
Carlos and Manuel’s petition introduces a much broader history of captivity and 
displacement. Between 1770 and 1816, at least three thousand Native captives from the 
North American West lived through a similar saga. Given the fragmentary nature of the 
source record—documents sometimes list only the number of captives who arrived in 
central Mexico or omit numbers altogether—I estimate that the total number of displaced 
Native men and women from across New Spain’s Northern frontier during this period 
ranged between three and five thousand.369  For some, captivity was rooted in warfare, as 
                                                            
368 Carlos and Manuel, "Mecos," to Viceroy José de Iturrigaray, 14 October 1805, AGN-IV Caja 5908, 
Expediente 50. While the file contains several petitions from these two Indian men and documents 
investigating their history, there is no evidence in the file that they were in fact freed. Original quote: 
“Confiesan, para mas explicar su dolor que no han cometido delito civil, ni criminal, y asi solo padecen 
porhaver querido el todo Poderoso criarlos entre Gentiles…” 
369 References to convoys in 1784, 1787, 1800, 1801, 1804, and 1809, for example, contain no precise 
count of captives. For convoys listing only the number arrived, see appendix, where I have listed this data 
using the term “at least.” It seems likely that extant figures are low by at least one-third, which would 
suggest a range from 3,300-4,400. For another discussion of the source material and its challenges see 
Mark Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands: Spanish Deportation of Apache Prisoners of War, 1770-1810 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), especially 201-202. Santiago’s work was not published in 
time to discuss in-depth in this dissertation, though it should be noted his figures do not include evidence 
from convoys displacing non-Apachean groups.  
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Spaniards and their Native allies attacked the camps of enemy Apaches who had 
allegedly raided the livestock of their neighbors. For other groups, it was initiated by 
criminal proceedings in Spanish courts that sought to try Native subjects for “collusion” 
with the Apache or desertion from their mission pueblos. While the crown declared 
banishment “to places from which they may never return” to be the fate of “all the 
Apache nation,” the line between Indian “traitors” under Spanish rule and Apache 
Indians who resisted Spanish sovereignty was far from clear, and hundreds of Native 
captives from non-Apachean groups joined men like Carlos and Manuel in facing 
imprisonment or forced labor in exile.370  
 While a broad range of Native groups faced banishment from Northern New 
Spain during the 1770s and 1780s, this chapter focuses especially on the experience of 
Apachean captives sent away from Nueva Vizcaya. The expatriation of Native captives 
deemed to be especially dangerous or rebellious was not a new phenomenon.  In contrast 
to the discrete forced removal campaigns charted in previous chapters, however, the 
displacement of Apachean captives in the late-1700s was far more systematic and 
characterized by standardized procedures of transport that reflected a newly 
bureaucratized age.371  
                                                            
370 The relationship between mission Indians and migratory Apachean groups is discussed in the previous 
chapter of this dissertation. By 1801, the Spanish monarch had declared that all Apache Indian prisoners of 
war, including children, were to be sent to Havana and never allowed to return to their homelands. See 
AGN-Reales Cedulas, vol. 188, exp. 169. For example of officials citing this decrees see AGN-PI, Vol. 
208, f. 490. For court proceedings leading to exile in Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander see AGN-PI, Vol. 
146, f. 254-270; AGN-PI, Vol. 26, f. 289-291; AGN-PI, Vol. 74. 
371 On age of reform see Linda Arnold, Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1988), David Weber, Bárbaros!: Spaniards and their savages in the Age of 
Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), Susan Deans-Smith, Bureaucrats, Planters, and 
Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1992), Richard L. Garner, Economic Growth and Change in Bourbon Mexico (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1993), and Ignacio del Río, La Aplicación Regional De Las Reformas Borbónicas En Nueva 
España: Sonora y Sinaloa, 1768-1787 (Mexico, Serie de Historia Novohispana 1995). For standard 
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The chapter begins by considering why Spaniards decided to start sending away 
Apache prisoners of war, though it is striking that they discussed the issue relatively little 
in correspondence. In part, I argue that this relative silence reflected the fact that sending 
away especially “rebellious” Indians both as punishment and to prevent their return was a 
generally accepted practice by the late-eighteenth century. In this respect, it is striking 
that when military commanders did discuss their motivations, they referenced past 
actions like the forced removal of the Tobosos in order to argue that the same should be 
done to Apaches.372  
Debates between Spanish administrators tell only so much about captives’ 
experience, status, and ultimate destinations, however. The central aim of this chapter is 
to elucidate the experience of Natives displaced from the Greater Rio Grande. Ironically, 
by throwing themselves to the ground and refusing to march, or by orchestrating 
harrowing mass escapes, Apache men and women helped fuel Spanish efforts to “put the 
sea in-between” them and their homelands, as one Spanish governor explained the 
practice. While some Apaches forged new lives in the households of Havana residents 
who petitioned to receive them, others employed the same strategies of guerilla warfare 
they had honed in the Southwest Borderlands, escaping into the countryside, raiding 
livestock, and pillaging farms. Transporting Apache captives to Cuba did not, in the end, 
produce the “submission to Christian instruction” that Spanish officials had hoped.373 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
procedure for conductor of captive convoys see “Ynstrucion para el govierno de los oficiales que an de 
resevir, y conducir la collera de mecos,” (5 June 1780), AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38.  
372 Hugo O’Conor to Viceroy D. Antonio Bucareli y Ursua, 8 March 1774 in AGN-PI 154; For other 
discussions of why Indians should be sent away see AGN-PI, Vol. 204, esp. f. 474; AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 
171-199 and f. 254-270; AGN-IV, Caja 2425, Exp. 17.  
373 On Christian instruction as secondary aim of displacement see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 152; 
AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Vol. 571, Exp 1; AGN-PI 155, f. 61-86. On “put the sea in-between” 
see Carrion to Unzaga y Ameraga, 30 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: “desprecio de la vida,” “poniendoles 
agua de por medio.” 
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Map 5: Origin and Ultimate Destination of Displaced Native Captives, 1770-1816374 
 
 
The Debate over Captive Fates 
 
After the Marques de Rubi’s tour of the Northern Provinces and his 
recommendations that Apaches be pursued in their own camps began to be pursued in the 
late-1760s and early-1770s, an old question gained renewed focus. The regulations of 
1772, which followed Rubi’s ideas, drew upon past history in mandating that Indian 
prisoners of war be sent to Mexico City for the viceroy to decide their fate. Military 
commanders in Nueva Vizcaya surrounding provinces, however, did not always concur 
with this recommendation, and varied between arguing that Apache captives should not 
be sent away at all, on the one hand, to arguing that they needed to be sent to islands 
                                                            
374 Drawn from references cited in appendix. Base map of Mexico from: 
<http://mapasdemexico.org/maps/caps2.html> (Accessed by author on September 2, 2009). 
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overseas to truly be secure, on the other.375  
 Such arguments reflected the continued limits on Spanish power in the Greater 
Rio Grande. In military planning, Spaniards envisioned driving Apaches back north 
across the Rio Grande, where they would be “forced into the jaws of the [Comanche],” or 
they hoped that the exile of Apache women and children would “scare” them into 
submission and force them to finally stay put in fixed settlements. Even as official 
Spanish policy vacillated over time between bellicose “war by blood and fire” and more 
conciliatory “peace through purchase,” the general practice of Spanish forces remained 
roughly similar: facing elusive, mobile Apaches, Spaniards employed every means at 
their disposal in trying to conquer a formidable enemy.376  
 The administrative reorganization of the northern provinces like Nueva Vizcaya 
in the 1770s gave new power to military officers in determining the fate of Apache 
captives. In 1776, the new position of “commandant general” reflected the replacement of 
governors with a single civil-military authority that would report, at least in theory, 
directly to the council of the Indies in Spain, though in practice they continued to consult 
with the viceroy of New Spain. Even before the 1776 reorganization, however, the 
appointment of one military commander in charge of frontier military forces in the early 
1770s had presaged the broader aim to bring colonial frontiers under direct imperial 
                                                            
375 On Rubi visit and Regulations of 1772 see Lawrence Kinnaird, The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de 
LaFora’s Description, 1766-1768 (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958), Nicolás LaFora, Presidios 
Internos: Relacion del Viaje Que Hizo a los Presidios Internos situados en la Frontera de la America 
Septentrional Pertenciente al Rey de España, ed. Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, D.F. Editorial Pedro 
Robredo, 1939), David Weber, The Spanish frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992), 204-212. 
376 On Apache-Comanche relations and Spanish aim to incite Comanche violence on Apachean groups see 
“Sobre la Junta de Guerra celebrada en Chihuahua, 1778,” [29 June 1778], AGI-Guadalajara 276; SANM 
II, Reel 12, Fr. 32-34; SANM II, Reel 12, Fr 670; SANM II, Reel 13, Fr. 111. See also Matthew Babcock, 
“Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America’s Forgotten Indian Reservations” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Southern Methodist University, 2008), especially Ch. 1; Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, especially 
Ch. 3.   
 217 
control.377  
In the fall of 1770, Bernardo de Galvez arrived in Nueva Vizcaya during the early 
years of war with new ideas for military strategy. He immediately focused attention on 
the fate of Apache captives. Though he was aware of the standing order to send Native 
prisoners of war to Mexico contained in the 1729 presidio regulations, he explained that 
he was going to keep them under his control in the North for now. In explaining this 
decision, he sent along to the viceroy a detailed military campaign diary in which he 
highlighted the loyal and useful service of an Apache captive in his forces’ entrée into 
Mescalero Apache camps in present-day South Texas. Highlighting a common theme for 
military men discussing Apache military service in the future, he told the story of how, 
during the campaign, this Apache had been captured “by his own people,” but that he had 
managed to escape and return to the Spanish camp. If some Spaniards marveled at the 
idea of Apaches “fighting their own countrymen,” others understood that Apachean 
groups, while at times recognizing alliance based on kinship relations, were often as 
divided by enmity and competition as outsiders.378  
While campaigns between 1770 and 1772 produced Apache casualties and 
generated stunning reprisals, Galvez’s combination of force, diplomacy and Apache 
military service did not bring war to a close. His replacement, Hugo O’Connor pursued 
both attacks on Apache camps and the exile of Apache captives to Mexico. In his 1776 
informe to the viceroy, he claimed that such efforts had helped begin to turn war in 
Spaniards favor after 1772. As he explained his overarching aim, he noted that he sought 
                                                            
377 Weber, The Spanish Frontier, 220-225.  
378 Bernardo de Galvez toViceroy Marques de Croix, 7 January 1771, AGN-PI 97. On “fighting their own 
countrymen,” see José Cortés, Memorias sobre las provincias del norte de Nueva España, 1799, in 
Elizabeth A. H. John and John Wheat, eds. and trans., Views from the Apache Frontier (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 32. 
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not only “the much desired punishment of the enemy, but also their displacement from 
our lands, sending them back across to the other side of the Rio Grande.” He hoped to 
accomplish Apache displacement “from Spanish lands,” in part, by sending Apache 
prisoners of war away to prevent their return north. If he destined captives sent way in 
colleras or chain gangs of prisoners in 1773, and 1775, for the viceroy to decide their 
fate, O’Connor hoped to convince royal officials to send them further away than Mexico 
City. He explained his view first by referencing past history. “When [the Tobosos] 
infested these frontiers,” O’Connor noted, “it was necessary for the infamous Don Joséf 
Berroteran…to exterminate them, both by killing them in battle and by sending them 
[away] as prisoners.” Through such measures, O’Connor explained, Berroterán had 
brought peace to the region “for many years.”379  
If O’Connor believed that such actions were extreme—he explained “he would 
not use the same means with the Apache without permission”— exile was the only hope 
to achieve a lasting victory, in his mind. “If fear of death obliges them to settle in towns,” 
he explained, “as soon as the troops withdraw…they will return to the mountains and 
return to their past customs of robbing with even greater animosity.” It is striking that he 
viewed displacement to Mexico City as inadequate as well. “Even if they are sent to 
workshops in the capital,” he noted, “Apache are so warlike, the men as well as the 
women, can easily return to their homelands.” O’Connor’s recommendation thus echoed 
the past arguments of Nueva Vizcayans regarding the Tobosos: “only by transporting 
                                                            
379 Hugo O’Conor to Viceroy, 8 March 1774, AGN-PI 154: “Quando infestavan estas Fronteras los 
Cocoyomes, Acoclames, y Sisimbres, fue necesario que el famoso Partidario D. Joséf Berroteran Capitan 
del Presidio de Conchos los exterminase, ya dandoles muerte en la campaña, y ya embiando los Prisioneros 
a esa Capital con lo q.e se consiguió tranquilizar por muchos años el Paiz.” For references to Indian 




them to windward island in small groups,” O’Connor explained, “will we ever see these 
frontiers free of these enemies.”380  
If the viceroy and his advisors initially rejected the idea of sending Apaches to the 
Caribbean, it was not long before the weight of evidence came to support O’Connor’s 
claims. The idea that even women could break out of jails and return home was manifest 
by Apache captives’ determination to do just that, as groups of women escaped from the 
jail in Saltillo in 1773 and Chihuahua City in 1776.  By the 1780s, soldiers were in fact 
conducting captives beyond Mexico City to the Gulf Coast and embarking them in ships 
to the Caribbean. Attention to the journey of these captives sheds light on why officials 
ultimately sanctioned sending them so far away, what the journey was like for displaced 
captives, and how their ultimate fates relate to broader histories of Native American 
captivity and slavery in colonial North America and the Caribbean.381 
 
The Journey South 
 
 Between 1776 and 1816, convoys carrying Indian prisoners departed from across 
the Northern frontier of New Spain nearly every year, and sometimes as often as three or 
four times per year. The size and makeup of convoys illustrates both the violence of 
military campaigns and the capabilities (and limitations) of the Spanish military forces. 
Though the size of convoys varied, between 80 and 100 Indians usually comprised each 
                                                            
380 Ibid.: Si el miedo de perecer les obliga a reducirse a Pueblos, apenas veran retiradas las tropas de la 
expedicion y las veteranas quando ya havran vuelto a las sierras y a exercitar con mas encono sus antiguas 
costumbres robos, y maldades…”; “Si se remiten en Colelras a esa Capital y se reparten en Poblaciones 
aunque sean divididas y en obrages, son tan campistas asi los hombres como las mugeres que 
insenciblemente y sin mucha retardacion sabrán regresarse a sus Madrigueras de manera, que solo 
transportandolos a las Yslas de Barlovento en pequeñas divisiones podremos ver estas fronteras libres de 
semejantes enemigos.” 
381 José Antonio Areche, Fiscal,  to Vicreoy, 6 September 1774, AGN-PI 154. On women’s escapes see 
Felis Fran.co Pacheco, Saltillo, to Viceroy 27 July 1773, AGN-PI 23; D.n Juan de Ugalde to Viceroy, 
Santiago de la Monclova, 25 January 1778, AGI-Guadalajara 275. 
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shipment. Based on censuses of convoys, Native groups affected include Coahuiltecan 
groups from the Northeast; Chiricahua, Lipan, Mescalero, and Gila Apaches from the 
central frontier; and Seris from the far west. Of convoys where a gender breakdown is 
extant, 56% of displaced Indians were women, 27% men, and 16% children. The gender 
imbalance illustrates both that fact that adult Indian men were more likely to fight to the 
death in battle and that Spaniards were less likely, but not entirely unwilling, to kill 
Indian women and children in military campaigns.382  
  Indians either marched on foot or rode mules on the seventy or more day journey 
south to Mexico City. Practice varied from case to case. In some instances, all Natives 
rode, usually two to each mule; in other cases only the sick or elderly rode, while the 
others marched.383 Officials warned the convoy escort—usually numbering between 
twenty and thirty soldiers—that all Indian men were to be handcuffed and watched 
carefully, given that they are “all adept tricksters” who could “commit crimes sparked by 
their ferocity and barbarity.”384 Women often traveled unshackled on the journey south to 
Mexico City, but the procedure of transport was designed to prevent their escape as well. 
When convoys stopped for the night in the countryside, for example, soldiers separated 
Native men and women and formed a circle around them. On occasions when they 
stopped at roadside inns, soldiers not only separated men and women, but also locked 
                                                            
382 These statistics are drawn from a running tally of all convoy censuses I have discovered; see appendix 
for complete list of references.  
383 On mule and foot travel see for example AGN-PI Vol. 74, f. 202-234 and AGN-PI, Vol. 56, f. 74, which 
notes the example of 96 Indians riding on 48 mules. For a detailed diary of the journey south see AGN-PI,  
Vol. 155, f. 305. On shackles and handcuffs see AGN-PI, Vol. 238 f. 397 and f. 408-409; Carceles y 
Presidios, Vol. 6, Exp. 3.  
384 For quotes concerning Indian character see AGN-PI Vol. 204, f. 62—“ Ellos son mui astutos y saben 
engañar con aparente mansedumbre; cuya advertencia hará V.S. al referido Coman.te para que proceda 
siempre con la mayor desconfianza,” and (referring to Indian escapees from the convoys), Indiferente de 
Guerra, Vol. 77, f. 7—“dichos Apaches no solo cometen los excesos de su ferocidad y barbarie en el 
transito para sus territorios, sino que son despues para los nuestros los mas implacables, inhumanos, 
terribles enemigos, por el mayor rencor y conocimientos que adquieren.” 
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them in guarded and candlelit rooms.385   
 Indians were commonly fed chili and tortillas in the morning, stew with beef and 
tortillas at midday and beans and tortillas at night. The only variation on this diet appears 
to have been to replace tortillas with bread.386 Though officials mandated that Natives 
always be given sufficient food and water, evidence exists that both may have been 
lacking at times. One veteran of the convoys explained that, as they traveled south, 
curious onlookers came from all parts to gawk at the Indians on the march and the mules 
carrying the sick. He explained that the Indians would approach these curious onlookers 
to beg them, likely through signs, for food and water.387  
 After more than two months of travel, convoys arrived in the capital. Here, 
Natives were again imprisoned, awaiting the next chain gang to depart for the port of 
Veracruz. Men were usually sent to the royal jail (La Acordada), while women were sent 
to the poor house (Hospicio de Pobres) or the collection house (Casa de Recojidas). As in 
the North, space in confinement was at a premium. What exacerbated this problem 
further was the fact that the majority of Indian prisoners were women and children, and 
there was little space allocated for them in the jail. Sent to places like the collection 
house, Indian women were confined alongside thirty or forty prostitutes that authorities 
routinely picked up and deposited there. Given that the Indian women were cramped in 
close quarters with strangers, it is perhaps unsurprising that the house director 
complained that, "being so quarrelsome," they not only picked fights with the prostitutes, 
                                                            
385 On military escort size and experience see AGN-PI, Vol. 179 f. 159; AGN-PI, Vol. 156, f. 58; AGN-IV, 
Caja 3364, Exp. 33.  
386 On food and supplies see AGN-PI vol. 130, Exp. 4; Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, Exp. 3; AGN-PI Vol. 
146, f. 162; AGN-PI Vol. 238, f. 285.  
387 AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38 
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but also quarreled among each other.388  
 While the royal treasury paid the costs of Indian displacement, the sums the 
treasury allocated were often insufficient, especially for confinement in Mexico City 
awaiting shipment to Veracruz. Directors of institutions like the royal jail and poorhouse 
complained about the cost of maintaining the Indians; the royal treasury provided the 
paltry sum of one or two reales a day.  And though the treasury allocated funds for one 
change of clothing for each Indian, the funds were either insufficient or Indians refused 
the clothing provided. Certificates of baptism and death often note the "nakedness" of 
Indian men and women alike.389  
If Indians sometimes rode on muleback from the North to the capital, they always 
marched on foot on the 250-mile journey from Mexico City to the coast. Concern for 
security on this leg of the journey was heightened. Soldiers chained Indian men and 
women two by two, with one shackled to the chain that bound together the whole 
group.390  
 These chain gangs bound for Veracruz traveled eight to twelve miles a day (four 
to six leagues) across rugged terrain.  Soldiers described the attitude of Indians on the 
                                                            
388 On imprisonment in Mexico City see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 97; AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 550. The 
description by the director of the Casa de Recojidas in AGN-PI Vol. 155, f. 97 is worth quoting at length: 
“La Casa de Recojidas tiene poca estension por lo que apenas es suficiente p.a treinta o quarenta Mugeres 
prostituidas que es lo menos que regularmente suele haver, por lo que el lugar que ocupan las Mecas hace 
falta, y en la carcel es mui estrecha la pieza dedicada para la prision de Mugeres. A las expresadas Mecas 
como queda insinuado se les aviste con su diario de real y medio por cuenta de la Real Hacienda, cuyo 
gravamen es preciso que siguen las que en el dia existen , siendo dificil darles salida, por estar bui broncas 
y haver algunas entre ellas que se han desertado, y les han buelto a prender tambien por que haviendose 
notado que havian trabajado para quitar una ventana con la idea de hacer fuga, se registraron, y se les hallo 
como ocho o diez cuchillos, sin haver podido averiguar si estaban todas comprehendidas en la maniobra 
que hicieron.”  
389 AGN-PI, Vol. 208 f. 545, for example, notes that “despite the fact that the royal treasury sends one real 
(unit of currency) per day and one change of clothes per year, the cost of feeding and clothing them 
excedes this amount, resulting in great strain on the funds of the poor house.” On nakedness see AGN-PI, 
Vol. 208, f. 525, f. 545, and f. 557.  
390 On route between Mexico City and Veracruz see, for example, AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 285. On shackles 
see AGN-Presidios y Carceles vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 170. 
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march as "die first, walk tomorrow." Natives sometimes threw themselves to the ground 
and refused to march any further. After beating an Indian with a rod, for example, one 
soldier managed to get him to walk another ½ mile, until "seeing his resistance, and 
insistence on throwing himself to the ground," he had to put him on muleback.391  
 Chain gang conductors frequently described similar actions of resistance. On one 
occasion, three or four Indians starting throwing themselves to the ground en route to 
Veracruz. The conductor explained that he could tell that one of them "did it with such 
ostentation that I knew his resistance was rooted not in exhaustion, but in furor." In fact, 
the Indian man inclined his head to the ground as he fell eight or nine times, and any one 
of these impacts would have cracked his skull, "but for the fortune that we were traveling 
through land with soft, loamy soil."392  
 When the chain gang arrived on the coast, Natives again faced confinement. 
Because Spaniards complained that native names were virtually impossible to 
determine—one official explained that even those with Christian names “claim to be 
Peter today and then John tomorrow”—they assigned most prisoners numbers.  
Commonly referred to as a group by the term "meco," which derived from the 
disparaging term "chichimeco" long applied to nomadic Indians from the North, 
individual Indians who did not carry Christian names might be referred to as "Meco 
                                                            
391 AGN-Presidios y Carceles, vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 172: “dandole de palos… pudo conseguir que anduviera 
otro quarto de legua, pero biendo su resistencia, e insistiendo en tirarse al suelo, y que los amenasas no 
alcansavan, informado por señas de los mismos Yndios que su resistencia Nasia de la imposivilidad de 
hallarse enfermo, providenció tomar un bagage menor en el camino, condusiendolo en el, hasta la referidad 
venta, con este exemplar a las dos leguas hizo otro lo mismo…” On die first, walk tomorow attitude (“ellos 
havian resuelto morir antes que caminar el siguiente dia”) see f. 205-206.  
392 “Notó que unos tres, o cuatro Yndios se venian tirando en el suelo, y particularmente uno de ellos con tal 
ostinacion que se conosia que su resistencia no era de imposibilidad, sino de furor, por que a su bista se tiró 
con el mayor esfuerso, y fortaleza inclinando la caveza al suelo sobre ocho o diez ocasiones, que qualquiera 
de estos atentados si huviera sido en suelo firme…se huviera roto la caveza, pero la fortuna de haver 
encontrado un suelo blando y humedo le preservó de esta desgracia, See Ibid., f. 173-204.  
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number 3" or "Meca number 134." They were housed in the castle of San Juan de Ulua 
until the next ship was available to carry them on to Cuba.393   
 
Death 
 Not all Natives journeyed the entire distance from the Borderlands to Cuba. 
Imprisonment, more than the march itself, led to deaths. In fact, Spaniards often 
commented on the dangers of confining a large number of humans to a small place while 
feeding them unfamiliar foods.  Indian fatalities, stated one Spanish official, could be 
explained in large part "by the inevitable corruption of a place where many people are 
confined for some period of time, by the sadness of losing their liberty, and by changes in 
their diet."394  
 Confinement to prisons in the Borderlands, Mexico City, and Veracruz 
contributed to the severity of smallpox epidemics and "putrid fevers," likely caused by 
cholera. Officials at the royal jail and poor house meticulously documented sicknesses 
and made decisions about which Indians were fit to continue the march, and which would 
remain in confinement. In February 1798, for example, the medic at the poor house 
ordered that Meca No. 502 and Meca No. 508 be kept behind and not sent onto Veracruz. 
He explained that No. 502 had a fever and No. 508 was coughing up blood, and neither 
was fit to continue, because the exercise of the march would "overcook their blood" and 
                                                            
393 AGN-PI, Vol. 123, f. 55: “…de cuios nombres como tan variables, por que el que oy es Pedro, mañana 
es Juan, no se ha podido hazer lista formal; ni tampoco conseguir noticia cierta de los que sean 
baptizados…” On use of numbers for prisoners see AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 525, for example.  
394 AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 231: “Este accidente [Indian deaths] proviene en su mayor parte de la corrupción 
inevitable en un lugar donde existen algun tiempo muchas personas encerradas, y de la tristeza de que se 
apoderan sus animos con la perdida de su livertad, influiendo tambien el mismo efecto la variación de 
alimentos.” 
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worsen their illnesses.395  
 On other occasions, the decision about moving sick Indians appears to have been 
rooted more in whether an illness was deemed contagious than in the consequences to an 
individual Indian’s health.  A number of women in Veracruz awaiting transport to Cuba 
had fallen ill with "putrid fevers" in January of 1797, for example. The governor decided 
that they should continue to their destination, because the boat captain had consulted with 
a doctor who explained that these fevers were not contagious, "but result from the change 
of country, nakedness, and many other causes." Surveying the women, the boat captain 
noted that "these Indians are full of miseries because they are virtually naked, and the 
only clothes they do have are made of wool, which traps their sweats and causes all kinds 
of illnesses, and especially fevers, as a result."396  
 Changes in diet led to deaths attributed to scurvy and diarrhea. In addition to 
smallpox and fevers, doctors noted that scurvy "was an illness to which this nation is 
especially susceptible." Most displaced Natives were semi-nomadic or nomadic peoples 
accustomed to a diet that included fruits and vegetables that they cultivated or gathered. 
The tortillas, beans, and meat they received from convoy conductors lacked key nutrients 
that would have prevented scurvy’s onset.397  
                                                            
395 AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 525: “Acaba de poner esta noticia caieron enfermas dos Mecas el N.o 502, con 
calentura y el n.o 508 echando sangre por la boca y como están todas tan gruesas no hai que fiar por la 
sangre requemada de la Caminata q.e traen..” On Smallpox epidemics and decisions about whether to 
transport infected Indians see AGN-IV, Caja 5676, Exp. 66.  
396 AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 580: “haviendome informado p.r el Medico q.e las asiste le pregunté…de q.e 
enfermedades padecen y me dixo q.e de calineturas putridas y q.e de esa enfermedad havian fallecido 
quatro de ellas; y haviendole preguntado q.e si reconocia q.e podia ser enfermedad contagiosa, me dixo q.e 
no, q.e sus enfermedades provenian de la mutacion de Paiz, de la desnudez q.e padecian y de otras muchas 
cauza.” The boat captain, who surveyed the Indians before disembarking with them for Cuba, noted that:  
"llenas de miseria p.r hallarse desnudas y la pocaropa que tienen, ser de lana y tenerla entrapada con los 
sudores, y no tener con q.e mudarse: esto puede ser causa de muchas enfermedades y singularm.te los 
calenturas.”  
397 See AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 415 for quote on scurvy being an especially common illness: “venian [los 
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 Though Spaniards cited "the sadness of losing their liberty" as another cause of 
death, it is more difficult to explain or measure. Several instances of suicide are extant in 
convoy documents. In December 1789, the conductor of a convoy bound from Chihuahua 
to Mexico City noted that as they were readying the mules in the morning a sergeant 
came across an old Indian woman who had slit her own throat. Investigating the matter, 
he discovered from the other Indians that "for days she had wanted to kill herself, but that 
they had stopped her." On another occasion, Spanish soldiers encircled Natives who had 
escaped from a convoy, but rather than give themselves up, the men threw themselves off 
a nearby cliff, falling to their deaths.398  
 
Escapes 
 If deaths thinned the number of Natives who arrived in the Caribbean, so too did 
escapes. In fact, the specter of Indian escapes may have weighed on the minds of the 
conductors of the convoys. They were repeatedly told about past escapes that had 
occurred and the dire consequences that would ensue if these "barbarian” Indians got 
free.399  
 Just before Christmas 1796, for example, Francisco Gonzalez approached the 
town of Jalapa escorting a convoy of Indian prisoners bound for the Caribbean coast. The 
mayor reported that Gonzalez came bearing injuries he had received during a violent 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
indios] contagiadas de escorbuto, enfermedad a que regularmente está sugeta esta nación, segun aseguran 
los medicos y cirujanos For more on scurvy deaths see also AGN-IV, Caja 4848, Exp. 24.  
398 On Indian woman’s suicide see AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 305: “estando aparejando las mulas para marchar 
me dio parte el Sarg.to que una Yndia vieja se havia degollado sola, y habiendome informado de las demas 
supe que hacia dias, que se queria matar, y que ellos no la habian dejado por cuio motivo se le quitaron las 
oregas, y di parte con ellas al S.or Comand.te General…” On Indians who threw themselves off the cliff see 
Juan José Valverde to Vicreoy Branciforte, 17 February 1797 in AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77: “q.e 
dos mui mal eridos se presipitasen a una barranca, de manera q.e suponiendose estos muertos p.r hir el uno 
traspasado p.r el Pecho de vala, y el otro dos vezes p.r el estomago de Rayoneta…” 
399 See official instructions on how to treat and conduct Indian convoys in AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38 for 
emphasis on preventing escapes.  
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escape at a nearby roadside inn. Around midnight, Native men had sounded the war cry, 
trampled the guard at the door of their quarters, stolen his gun, and rushed out into the 
main hall of the inn. The rest of the troop took up arms to prevent their escape to the 
mountains, but the Apache men resisted by lashing out with jagged shards of stone that 
they had torn from the walls.400 
 Though Spanish bayonets injured many Natives, eighteen managed to slip out into 
the night. Dozens of Spanish soldiers and militiamen set off on a long distance pursuit of 
the escapees that led to the eventual recapture of twelve of them. Gonzalez, meanwhile, 
was imprisoned and court-martialed for his negligence in failing to prevent the escape. 
Ironically, he spent more than sixteen months in the same castle in Veracruz where 
Indian prisoners were held awaiting transport to Cuba.401  
 Such escapes were not uncommon. More than 250 Indians escaped from convoys 
and prisons in Central Mexico and the Caribbean during the late-18th century, of which 
slightly over 100 are documented to have been recaptured.402 Escapes commonly 
occurred either early in the morning when at least some soldiers were sleeping, or at 
dinnertime, when Indians hands were freed in order for them to eat. Faulty construction 
of the handcuffs was a factor facilitating such escapes. Iron handcuffs were rough, heavy, 
and unpolished, slicing into the prisoners' wrists and causing significant pain and 
suffering, but they also tended to be too wide in width, and Indians proved able to slip out 
of them.403  
                                                            
400 AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77, f. 8-9.  
401 Ibid. This volume is unfortunately largely unnumbered, but Gonzalez’s sentence can be found near the 
end of the bound volume and dated 2 April 1798: “que sufra dos meses de Prision en el Castillo de S.n Juan 
de Ulua, con cuio arresto y el de un año y quatro meses que ha sufrido en el mismo destino.” 
402 See “Escapes” in appendix for further references.  
403 On handcuffs see AGN-Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3; AGN-PI, vol. 238, f. 397 and 408-9.  
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 Escapes appear to have been especially common in the forested mountains on the 
descent to the coast. Perhaps soldiers in Northern New Spain, who were more familiar 
with Natives, tended to be more watchful. Or perhaps Indians, having already endured 
months of imprisonment and a long journey south, were willing to take greater risks to 
secure their freedom. 
 The "sadness from losing their liberty" that Spaniards saw in Indian actions 
reveals itself in the determination of Indians to return to their homelands against the odds. 
When twenty-seven men attempted to escape in August 1801, for example, Spanish 
soldiers were immediately aided by local residents to contain them. The Indians 
continued to fight fiercely, however, dislodging stones from the walls to lash out and 
throw at their captors. In the end, the soldiers shot and killed twenty-three of them.404  
 On another occasion in March 1792, twelve men attempted an escape at 
dinnertime while camped in the countryside on the road south to Mexico City. Despite 
warnings that soldiers would use deadly force if they did not calm down, the Indians 
persisted in lashing out. The officer in charge gave soldiers permission to meet violence 
with violence: after shooting and killing the Natives, they mutilated their bodies. First 
removing their ears to take to the viceroy, they later had to return to cut off the Indians' 
decaying right hands, since the ears had been left outside and wild animals had eaten 
them.405   
 It was not only men that attempted and succeeded in escaping.  Just after midnight 
in February 1799, a group of Indian women sat silently in the dark inside their quarters. 
Outside the door, the guard wondered why the light had gone out but decided it must be 
                                                            
404 AGN-Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 164-243. 
405 AGN-PI, Vol. 142, f. 329.  
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because of the strong north winds. In the dark the women were slipping out of their 
shackles. After a shout—“The Indians are trying to escape!”—the soldiers on night watch 
all dashed to the men’s quarters. Meanwhile, more than fifty women and a little boy 
escaped into the night. Struggling to secure the Indian men who also had slipped out of 
their handcuffs, the soldiers gave chase to the fugitive women too late, catching up to 
only one lone straggler who clung to a tree on the mountainside. As the soldiers 
surrounded her, she bombarded them with rocks until one of them sliced her wrist with 
his machete.406 
 Indians attempted dangerous escapes once they arrived at their destinations as 
well. On the Caribbean coast, officials noted that Indian men would throw themselves 
from the seaside castle of San Juan de Ulua into the water. Not only had officials 
witnessed them in the act, but they had found drowned Indian men washed up on the 
shore.407 Despite hopes that Natives would resign themselves to labor after being shipped 
across the sea, they continued to attempt escapes. When a shipment of prisoners arrived 
in Havana in December 1802 for example, six immediately deserted. Though the 
governor managed to recapture several of them, he reported that two other “fierce 
Indians” were still on the loose in the countryside committing “atrocities” alongside 
several runaway mulatto slaves. Their story, which introduced this dissertation, will be 
explored in greater depth below.408 
 Some Natives succeeded in their efforts to return home. By the mid-1780s, 
                                                            
406 AGN-Presidios y Carceles, vol. 6, exp. 3. By April more than 20 Indian women had been recaptured. 
See AGN-IV, Caja 4817, Exp. 50.  
407 On Indians throwing themselves into the sea, see AGN-PI, Vol 155, f. 61-86.  
408 AGN-PI, Vol 238, f. 475: “si se hace comparación con los extragos que dos Yndios feroces de la misma 
nacion han causado hace tiempo y estan causando en el territorio de la nueva Poblacion de Philipina 60 
leguas a sotavento de esta plaza donde hasta ahora no ha podidio lograrse exterminarlos [o] 
aprehenderlos…de que resulta continuar sus atrocidades.” 
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escapees from the Caribbean coast had shown up back in Nuevo Santander in 
Northeastern New Spain. In more than ten letters between 1782 and 1785, the governor 
of the province pleaded with the viceroy that he make sure the convoys were secure. He 
explained that these escapees "were the fiercest and most inhumane of enemies." Not 
only did they themselves commit violent acts of retribution, but the governor alleged that 
they spread their feeling of vengeance to previously peaceful Native groups, recruited 
allies to their cause, and thus circumvented the purpose of expatriation in the first 
place.409  
Some were sent south more than once. In April 1796, for example, El Verde and 
Disoqué faced exile from their homelands near Tucson to the Caribbean coast, after they 
had already journeyed hundreds of miles in their escape from a chain gang of Apache 
captives near Mexico City.  Traveling at night along the road back north, they had 
subsisted on horsemeat and corn gathered from local haciendas until they arrived at the 
camp of the Apache headman El Vivora. Newly allied with the Spanish, El Vivora had 
turned the men in promptly to military officials at the nearby fort of Janos. “I didn’t 
understand why,” El Verde explained, “when we hadn’t done any harm.” El Verde’s 
testimony to officials in Janos sheds more light on what had been a string of bad luck. He 
explained that he had escaped chain gangs bound for central Mexico not once, but twice, 
walking and riding nearly 4,000 miles in two years time.410 
 In the end, these escapes generated a response. Military officials investigated 
                                                            
409 For quote see AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77, f.7: “los mas implacables inhumanos, terribles 
enemigos.”  For discussion of Indians returning to their homelands see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 123, f. 
126.  
410 “Declaraciones tomadas a dos Apaches que se huyeron de las Colleras,” [Statements taken from two 
Apaches that escaped from the chaingangs] Roque de Medina to Commandant General of Interior 
Provinces, 8 June 1796, AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 448.  
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handcuffs, the quarters of roadside inns, and made recommendations about how to 
improve the security of both. Moreover, at least three convoy conductors, including 
Gonzalez, were arrested, imprisoned, and court-martialed when escapes did occur. 
Though two of the three were cleared of wrongdoing, Gonzalez was found solely 
responsible for the escape of the Indians in his chain gang and sentenced to sixteen 
months in prison.  The push to punish Gonzalez may have emerged from the unusually 
severe plundering of the Apaches that had escaped. They had stolen dozens of horses and 
other livestock, set fire to ranches and homes, injured and killed Spaniards on the road 
north, and had allegedly cannibalized several children. Natives clearly were not passive 
victims of Spanish efforts to exile them.411  
 
Labor 
 Despite the violence, disease, crowded prisons, and escapes that characterized the 
journey south, a surprising number of Natives survived to labor in Central Mexico and 
the Caribbean. In fact, of those convoys where both the original number and the number 
who arrived in Mexico City are known, approximately 70% survived their imprisonment 
and march south. If this survival rate is applied to the total number known to have been 
displaced, it suggests that at least 2,400 Indians arrived in convoys to Central Mexico in 
the final decades of the colonial period. While extant records are more fragmentary for 
the journey to the Caribbean, at least 60% of Indian captives marched out of Mexico City 
arrived on the coast, and at least 400 of these men and women are known to have arrived 
in the Caribbean, though additional research in Cuban archives may prove this final 
                                                            
411 The three tried in court martials were Juan de Dios Cos, D. Pedro Paez, and Gonzalez. See AGN-
Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 164-243; AGN-Indiferente de Guerra vol. 77; and AGN-Carceles y 
Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3, respectively.  
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figure to be low.412    
 Natives who survived long-term imprisonment and the arduous journey labored in 
distinct settings based on their age and gender. Children were often distributed to the 
homes of citizens, sometimes en route, and often upon arrival to Mexico City. In many 
respects the fate of these children resembled that of Indian captives distributed in frontier 
regions as rewards to soldiers who had served in military campaigns. Some were adopted 
into Spanish families, became Catholic and integrated themselves into colonial society. 
Others attempted to escape and return north to their homelands.413  
 Adult prisoners' fates often broke down on gendered lines. Women were 
distributed as household servants in Mexico City, Veracruz, or Havana.  Men were 
generally assigned to labor alongside convicts and African slaves on port and castle 
fortifications in the Caribbean, though both men and women were on other occasions 
distributed to lime kilns or tobacco fields, and some men labored in households in Cuba. 
Over time it became more rare for either men or women to be distributed in New Spain 
itself, as escapes generated greater adherence to the mandate that all Indians be sent to 
Havana. By 1798, royal decrees affirmed that all Natives, regardless of age and gender, 
were to be sent there, where the gendered division of labor was to be continued: women 
and children as household servants, men for manual labor.414  
 Given that the majority of displaced Indians were women and children, household 
labor was the most common task assigned to the Indian prisoners of war. Petitions for 
household labor highlight the scarcity or poor quality of slave and free labor in the 
                                                            
412 Statistics calculated from charts in appendix. A research trip to the national archives in Cuba will 
hopefully allow me to expand upon the information presented here in my final book manuscript. 
413 For discussions of children and their fate see AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 86, 90, 229, and 235.  
414 For royal decrees at the turn of the 19th century see AGN-Reales Cedulas, vol. 188, exp. 169. For 
example of officials citing this decress see AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 490.  
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Caribbean basin. In 1781, for example, Don Miguel Lasso de la Vega petitioned for six of 
the Indians that had recently arrived in Veracruz from Northern New Spain. In his letter 
to the viceroy, he stressed that "it is well known how lacking servants are in this city."415 
An 1802 petition was even more explicit. Diego Garcia Panes wrote to the viceroy noting 
that his wife and daughter had asked him to request two Indian girls from a recently 
arrived convoy. He explained that "servants in this city are so scarce and of so poor 
quality, whether slave or free, that decent families like mine have simply had to go 
without." Panes went on to note that the present scarcity of laborers was worse than he 
had seen in his forty years as a citizen of Veracruz.416   
 In Mexico City during the 1770s and 1780s, Indians had also been granted to 
particular households through a petition process, though citizens were not always 
satisfied with the results. In 1778 the Viceroy noted that "having experienced the poor 
service of the Indian women and the ease with which they escape, there are not currently 
any households that want to receive them."417  Despite moments of dissatisfaction, 
however, the redistribution of Indian women and children in the capital continued. This is 
evidenced by labor petitions like the one from Santiago Hampier in 1789, who was 
subsequently granted an Indian woman and a boy "no older than 7."418  
 Glimpses of what these Indians' lives were like can be gleaned from the 
documentary record. In April 1792 three Indian boys escaped from their assignment to 
                                                            
415 AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 119: “siendo tan sabida la falta de sirvientes en esta ciudad suplico a V.E. que 
siendo de su superior agrado…concederme seis de los Mecos venidos ultimamente a esta ciudad.” 
416 AGN-IV, Caja 4502, Exp. 28: “en realidad está tan mala y tan revajada la servidumbre de criadas y 
criados en esta Plaza tanto de Esclavos como de livres que las familias desentes como la mia, se ven 
constituidas a careser de la cervidumbre presisa, lo que no he visto anteriormente en mas de 40 años que 
conosco la Veracruz.” 
417 AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 414: “por averse experimentado el mal servicio de las Mecas, su genio indocil, y la 
facilidad con que se huien no se encuentran en el dia casas en que quieran recivirlas…” 
418 AGN-PI, Vol. 156, f. 1-15. 
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the kitchen of the royal palace in Mexico City, stealing a horse and carrying tools and 
supplies from the kitchen with them. When they were captured, they explained that they 
had escaped because workers in the kitchen constantly teased and bothered them. One 
man in particular bumped them on the head and told them to go back to where they had 
come from. Needless to say Spanish officials were not pleased that the boys had 
attempted to do just that.419   
 Native labor was not limited to household tasks, however. In the spring of 1782, 
for example, 101 Indian men, women, and children set off from Mexico City, and the 
viceroy noted that since it was well known that the tobacco planters in Orizaba and 
Cordova were experiencing a lack of workers, the Indians should be taken through these 
towns so that they might fill this need. As in the case of household labor, the results for 
tobacco cultivators were mixed. Eighteen Indians were distributed in Cordova in March 
of 1782, but by January 1783, only four remained because "their bad character motivates 
them to desert." This news motivated the viceroy to order that all the Indians distributed 
to tobacco planters be sent on to Veracruz.420 
 In Orizaba, however, it appears that labor distribution had been more successful. 
Sixty-nine Indians had been left with tobacco planters in March of 1782, and while by 
November of 1783 many of the men had escaped, the women and children remained. 
According to the mayor, all these Indians testified to the great pain and conflict it would 
cause them to be separated from their masters, "given the good treatment they have 
received and the fact that many have been baptized." Though such testimony must be 
read with a grain of salt, it at least suggests that their labor had been useful enough that 
                                                            
419 AGN-IV, Caja 1383, Exp. 3.  
420 AGN-Alcaldes Mayores, Vol. 5, f. 5-6v, 19, 242-244, 246-247; AGN-Alcaldes Mayores vol. 9, f. 162-
165: “su mala inclinación les motiba a la deserción.”  
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citizens of Orizaba did not want them to be removed and sent on to Veracruz.421  
 By the 1790s, almost all Indian prisoners who arrived in Mexico City, with the 
exception of the youngest children, were sent on to Veracruz and Havana, Cuba where 
they performed a variety of tasks commonly assigned to African slaves. The experience 
of Natives from the Rio Grande in the Caribbean Basin in these years warrants closer 
examination.  
 
Arrival in Cuba 
  
In the twenty or so years after the first boat carrying Apache prisoners of war 
arrived in the port of Havana in 1784, the arrival of "mecos," as these captives were 
commonly known outside the Greater Rio Grande, became a remarkably familiar 
occurrence. Local residents petitioned to receive a man or woman in their household, 
institutions asked to receive groups in their service, and local priests noted their presence 
in parish registers. But when the brigantine "General Galvez" and the packet boat "Oliba-
blanca" arrived in March of that first year, carrying 18 Indian women and 33 Indian men, 
the governor of Havana sent a missive to his counterpart in Veracruz to explain he had 
received no news about these Indians, where they had come from, or what he should do 
with them. Moreover, he was deeply concerned about the presence of these "unbelievers" 
in his jurisdiction, given their "fierce and indomitable" character.422 
                                                            
421 AGN-Alcaldes Mayores, Vol. 4, f. 90; vol. 8, f. 185-186: “todos generalmente manifiestan con las mas 
vivas demostraciones el dolor y sentimiento queles causa la separación de sus amos, ya por el buen porte y 
tratemiento que han experimentado en sus casas y ya como agradecidos a la ynstruccion que han adquerido 
en los dogmas, y misterios de nuestra religion y santa fe…muchos de ellos han recivido ya el Santo 
Bauptismo.”  
422 Unzaga y Ameraga, Governor of Havana, to Carrion, Governor of Veracruz, 14 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 





The Governor of Veracruz responded by noting how Apache escapes had fueled 
efforts to find a secure location. They had "such disregard for life" that they often threw 
themselves into the water from the castle of San Juan de Ulua with their chains still 
attached, as twelve had recently done. Given that the military commanders of the 
Northern provinces believed that such escapees fomented resistance to Spanish rule on 
the frontier, he noted that there had been no choice but to "put water in between them 
[and their homelands]."424 The same would be done with both women and men given 
                                                            
423 The term “Meco” derived from the term “Chichimeco” long applied to migratory Indians who were 
deemed “uncivilized” or especially “barbarous.” Image from Joaquín Antonio de Basarás’s “Origen, 
costumbres, y estado presente de mexicanos y philipinos” (1763) as reproduced in Ilona Katzew, Casta 
Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 
169. 
424 Carrion to Unzaga y Ameraga, 30 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: “desprecio de la vida,” “poniendoles 
agua de por medio.”  
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reports that even the women were not secure in the homes where he had sent them for 
their education and Christian instruction. The viceroy thus had decided to send them to 
Cuba to prevent their escape and return to their country by placing them in "decent 
homes, where they might be taken care of and educated."  In March, May and August of 
1784, shipments of Apache prisoners arrived in Havana and captives were distributed to 
individual homes.  Households in Havana had welcomed Indian women and children’s 
labor. In June, the governor noted that local citizens "solicited them with eager desire." 
He had distributed the captives within days to families who had requested them.425   
Native captives occasionally arrived later in the 1780s, usually among shipments 
of convict laborers. It is not always clear that these records distinguished between Apache 
Indians and other Native and Spanish criminals, complicating efforts to identify precisely 
how many Natives from the North arrived in Cuba. But records provide more detailed 
info in the 1790s, allowing for insight into how officials distributed captive laborers and 
who received them. "Mecos" arrived in Havana in various shipments throughout 1790 
and 1791, as evidenced by extant petitions that show how local residents received such 
Indians for domestic service.426  
 Upon arrival, captives were housed at La Cabaña or at the quarters of the royal 
slaves. Distribution was orchestrated by these "slaves of his majesty," members of the 
black artillery company. Residents received "mecas" and "mecos" by noting that they 
                                                            
425 On viceroy’s decisions see AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Caja 1083, Exp 8; On shipments 
arriving in Havana see Unzaga y Ameraga to Viceroy of Mexico, 14 May 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: “en 
efecto quedan ya todos empleados en estos terminos, pues estos Vecinos los solicitan con empeño…” 
426 On problem of distinguishing between Native captives and convict laborers see for example Don Pedro 
Corbalan, Intendant of Veracruz to Captain General of Cuba, 5 June 1790, AGI-Cuba 1429. He notes 
simply that he is sending along 159 convicts—118 destined for the royal arsenal and 41 for the plaza. 
Petitions within this same volume clarify that some of these “convicts” destined for the plaza were Native 
prisoners of war.  
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would feed and clothe the given captive, teach them Catholic doctrines, baptize them, and 
"raise them well." Such petitions echoed the rhetoric of Spanish officials and navigated 
within the precepts of royal decrees. Under these terms, for example, Doña Petrona 
Velazco noted that she had received word that various "mecas" had arrived from 
Veracruz, and she hoped that the governor of Havana would grant her one. Similarly, 
Juan Manuel del Pilar, received an Indian man under similar terms, promising to instruct 
him and baptize him "within three months," and to turn in certifications of his baptism 
from the parish priests. He also promised to dress him, feed him, and notify the governor 
if he died or if "after trying him out," he "did not accommodate him well" and he needed 
to return him. It is clear that many petitioners had some social ties to those who shipped 
or imprisoned the captives. Thus, a boat captain might petition to receive an Indian 
woman, or the sergeant of the royal artillery, or the captain of the Pardo militia. All of 
these individuals would have come across the captives as part of their duties.427 
 Not only did the company of royal slaves deliver Apache captives to residents, but 
they picked them up when, as Juan Manuel del Pilar suggested, Apache captives "did not 
[always] suit" their masters. Doña Clara Maria de Sierra noted in 1791, for example, that 
she had received an Indian woman a month ago, put effort into her instruction, but "it had 
not been possible,” because of her "perverse inclination." Don Francisco Bequet and Don 
Juan Marqueti also returned their Indians and asked to be given others. Reports about 
captives’ “perverse inclination” may have related to residents' difficulties in 
communicating with their new servants, or the fact that they we unaccustomed or 
                                                            
427 Ibid.: “se obliga a vestirla, alimentarla, enseñarle la doctrina bautisarla y ultimam.te darle la major 
ciranza”; “dando p.te en case que muera o profugue, o de bolverlo si no me acomoda despues de 
experimentarlo.” On the “slaves of his majesty” see Maria Elena Diaz, The Virgin, the King, and the Royal 
Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000).  
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unwilling to provide the labor that a Spanish don or doña expected. On the other hand, 
however, it may have reflected the strikingly high numbers of these captives who were 
elderly. In fact, some captives remained imprisoned precisely because of their "disfigured 
appearance and age."428 
The fact that some captives did "not suit" their masters raises questions about 
what Havana residents knew about their Indian captives, what labor they expected, and 
how they interpreted captives’ legal and social status. While most petitions stuck strictly 
to the legal jargon of "education, Christianization, and good treatment," on rare occasions 
a petitioner fell out of this jargon and explained other motives. In March 1797, for 
example, Domingo Correa, a supervisor of public works projects, explained that "he did 
not have a slave for the service of his family, because of the small salary he received and 
the fact that slaves were so expensive." Having received word of the arrival of Indian 
women recently, he hoped that the governor of Havana would be willing to "grant him 
one of said slaves, and he would maintain her and instruct her in the Christian doctrine." 
Correa had his supervisor write a note testifying to his good conduct, and he was granted 
an Indian woman for his service.429  
 Havana residents had little familiarity with Native personal servants, the historical 
tradition of repartimiento or encomienda, or interaction with Native people. It is thus not 
surprising that they might have interpreted their status through the lens of African-
                                                            
428 On Indians not distributed because of age or “disfigure” see AGI-Cuba 1716: “Quedan en casa blanca 
treze los que nadie los apeteze por su mala figura, y carga de años”; “Queda una mui vieja en Casa 
Blanca.” For “perverse inclination” see AGI-Cuba 1516A: “aun que se ha heforsado a su enseñansa, no 
hacido posible poderla persuadir, p.r ser de perversa indole…” 
429 Domingo Correa to Governor of Havana, 16 March 1797, AGI-Cuba 1516A: “que no teniendo esclava 
p.a el servicio de su familia, por el corto sueldo que disfruta y estar sumamente caras, dhas esclavas, y 
teniendo noticia de que en S.n Ysidro se allan depositadas alg.s Yndias Mecas por tanto Supp.ca a v.e. se 
digne conzederle una de dhas esclavas, a la que mantendra, y enseñara en la doctrina cristiana…” 
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American slavery. Black slaves were "expensive," but to a middle or low rank military 
man or laborer, the possibility of receiving a free domestic slave must have been 
tantalizing. Such was the case even with a relatively well-off women like Doña Joséfa de 
Castro, the wife of an attorney, who explained that she was sick, had children, and that 
her husband was absent. She regrettably did not have the means to support a "negra." She 
thus requested a "meca" who she heard had recently arrived among others in February of 
1802. The same was true for Brigadier Vicente Nieto, who explained to the governor of 
Habana that he was a widower and had a daughter. He thus needed a servant to assist 
him, but could not afford one. Since he had heard that “there was a party of Indian 
women in Casa blanca,” he asked to receive one under the "customary" terms, suggesting 
his familiarity with these kinds of distributions in the past.430  
When individuals upheld their promises to send certifications of death, they 
hinted both at the continued impact of disease on displaced Apaches and how they 
understood them in relation to the broader social landscape of Havana. In January 1791 
for example, Juan Manuel del Pilar submitted news that his Indian captive, Maria 
Vicenta, had experienced a "violent convulsion of blood," and that he had brought in 
three doctors and an apothecary to care for her, “sparing no costs to contribute to her 
cure.” But in the end she had died and he had buried her outside the Havana cathedral. 
Others submitted similar notes, from parish priests who had recorded the deaths of 
Apache captives in the ledgers of "Pardos y Negros," reflecting the small Native 
                                                            
430 Havana residents’ familiarity with both “mecos” and what they called “huachinangos”—A Nahua term 
referring to Natives from Mexico—suggests that they may have had more knowledge of Native laborers 
than I suggest here. This issue will be a focus of my research in the future. Maria Joséfa de Castro to 
Governor of Havana, 11 February 1802, AGI-Cuba 1716: “D.a Joséfa de Castro Esposa del Licenciado D.n 
Rafael Binelo con el devido respecto hace presente a V.S. hallarse enferma, con hijos, y el Marido ausente, 
y sin proporcion de sostener una negra q.e le es indispensable p.a su servicio…”; S.or Brigadir D.n Vicente 
Nieto to Governor Havana, 11 February 1802, AGI-Cuba 1716: “Hace presente a V.S. ser biudo, de cuyo 
matrim.o le quedó una Niña p.a la cual necesita de una criada q.e le asista…” 
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population of Cuba and perhaps their association with enslaved laborers.431    
 If men and women alike were distributed to households under such terms, a 
number of men also labored alongside convict laborers and African slaves in Cuba's 
fortification projects. Apaches helped maintain and expand the very sites where they had 
been imprisoned in route to Cuba. The Spanish sought to build or expand fortresses like 
the Castle of San Juan de Ulua and La Cabana in Havana as part of reform efforts 
beginning in the 1760s, especially after the English occupation of Havana during the 
Seven Years War. The supervisors of the ports and fortifications kept detailed records of 
convicts and prisoners of war who had deserted their posts that reveal the presence of 
Apache laborers. Such desertions were common. In October 1798, for instance, 16 men 
deserted the fortifications, including 2 "Mecos"—“José number 1” and José Antonio, 
who fled Casablanca on the 30th of that month. José “number one” may have been the 
same "Meco #1" who arrived in Havana aboard the Fragata de Guera O in November 
1797.432  
Such escapes illustrate that if some captives gained enough knowledge of the 
Spanish legal sphere to petition for their freedom—recall Carlos and Manuel ‘s 1805 
petition to the viceroy—others sought redress through other means. The story of the 
Apache-led palenque, or runaway slave gang, with which I began this dissertation, 
illustrates this point especially vividly, and is worth examining in greater depth. Recall 
the reports flooding into the Havana town council in the fall of 1802 about El Chico and 
El Grande and their slave companions. While many captives were distributed to 
                                                            
431 Juan Manuel del Pilar y Manzano to Governor of Havana, 28 January 1791, AGI-Cuba 1429: “Fue 
acometida de un violento escorbuto de sangre…no habiendo excusado gastos para contribuir a su alivio…” 
432 “Relación de los Precidiarios que han desertado de las obras de Fortificación” [Relation of the Convict 
Laborers who have deserted from the fortification projects], 21 November 1797, AGI-Cuba 1516B.  
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individual households, as I have explained, El Chico and El Grande—like other men—
had been sent to labor alongside slaves of African descent in Cuba’s shipyards, castles, 
and fortification projects, helping to maintain and expand the very sites where they had 
been imprisoned en route to Cuba. It is from such projects that they escaped. Whether 
they escaped with coworkers of African descent or met up with the other members of 
their palenque later is unclear from extant records. Whether El Chico and El Grande 
spoke Spanish, and how they communicated with their companions also remains a 
mystery, but they were clearly able to find some commonality in their endeavors to 
escape bondage and carve out an alternative life raiding in the countryside.433  
This palenque consisted of seven men: at least two Apaches, two men who 
reportedly “looked like Indians,” and three men described as “black and mulatto slaves.” 
They joined together on raids to steal cattle, break into homes, and set fire to vineyards 
and fields, though on some occasions the Apaches were sighted alone. Captain Gavilan 
and his twenty men who tracked them had several skirmishes with the group, and 
reported that the palenque fired upon them with bows and arrows. Apaches would have 
had no problem manufacturing these, their weapons of choice, suggesting one crucial 
contribution they may have made to the gang at large. In the end, it is unclear whether 
these men had some larger aim or plan, other than retribution and survival. On the day 
Gavilan’s party killed El Grande, local residents reported that the other fugitives had 
attacked an hacienda, killed six dogs, and broken into a house to steal clothing and 
furniture. They had also entered the local church in their rampage, breaking off the hand 
of a statue of the virgin of Guadalupe while defiling the holy water.  Though Gavilan’s 
                                                            
433 For documents regarding the Apache-led “palenque” see AGI-Cuba 1720. See also AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 
475. 
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expedition continued even after he had shipped the head of El Grande to Havana to claim 
his 2,500 peso reward, there is no record that the other members of the palenque were 
ever apprehended.434  
In response to this palenque, and reports of other Apache escapes, the Havana 
council fired off a petition to the Spanish crown demanding that no more of these Indios 
feroces—ferocious Indians, as they called them—be sent to Cuba from Mexico, unless 
they were children. Though shipments did slow after 1803, royal officials did not entirely 
heed the Havana council’s demands, as it was not until 1816 that the last shipment of 
Apaches before Mexican independence occurred.  By that time, soldiers and militiamen 
had transported between three and five thousand Apache Indians and members of 
neighboring groups away from the Greater Rio Grande, and at least 400 men and women 
had arrived in Havana. Some died quickly of tropical diseases, their deaths recorded in 
the parish records of free and enslaved Africans. Others like El Grande and El Chico 
escaped and pursued a life of livestock rustling that echoed in some ways their past life 
raiding ranches in the Borderlands. Some captive men and women lived on in Havana 
households, had children, and forged new lives within Cuban society. In 1782, the 
governor of Havana had enthusiastically envisioned just this possibility. He imagined that 
large numbers of Apaches might form a separate neighborhood in Havana from which 
they could provide useful labor to their Spanish neighbors. Though no such neighborhood 
developed, it is fascinating that by the mid-1800s the term “meco” itself had taken on 
new connotations. As a 19th century dictionary of the Spanish royal academy noted, meco 
had come to mean either “a savage Indian” or something that has “the color red mixed 
                                                            
434 Ibid.  
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with black.”  Whether the arrival of Native peoples to the Caribbean and their 
interactions with free and enslaved Africans fueled in any way this shifting meaning 
poses a tantalizing, if perhaps unanswerable question. But certainly it should be noted 
that Apaches were not alone in experiencing displacement to the Caribbean, as this was a 
fate shared by indigenous groups from New England, New France, Southeastern North 
America, Central America, and South America as well.435  
 
Conclusion 
 On the one hand, this history of Apaches exiled to the Caribbean highlights 
change over time from the fate of Native war captives in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century. Once “ransomed” from other Native groups by New Mexican merchants and 
carried south to New Spain to sell for sizeable sums, Apaches were now captured and 
transported under the direction of Spanish administrators who issued regulations for how 
they should be treated during the journey, what they should be fed, and where they 
should be taken. Many faced long-term incarceration in jails in Chihuahua City and 
Mexico City, reflecting broader trends in practices of criminal punishment in the 
                                                            
435 On Indians imprisoned in Mexico City longterm awaiting transport between 1807-1810, see AGN-IV, 
Caja 3357, Exp 9 and AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 545-593. On the difficulty of transport in Independence war era 
see AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 267-299; P.I. Vol. 208, f. 548. Definitions of “Meco” in 1887 Real Academia 
Española accessed by author online at < http://buscon.rae.es/ntlle/SrvltGUISalirNtlle> (5 February 2011): 
“Dícese de ciertos animales, cuando tienen color bermejo con mezcla de negro. Indio salvaje.” On Apache 
neighborhood in Havana see Governor Diego Joséf Navarro cited in Luis Unzaga y Ameraga to Viceroy, 
20 Sept 1783, AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Vol. 1083, Exp. 38:  “y con el tiempo, juntandose 
algun numero destinarseles sitio en q.e hiciesen Poblaciones capaces de rendir al Rey y al Publico las 
ventajas y conveniencias que en esos Payses; juzgando ademas doficil la desercion de ellos y el regreso a 
sus territorios.” Unzaga y Ameraga expressed the counterargument: Indians were far too vicious and 
dangerous and might even set the sugar fields on fire. On Native displacement to the Caribbean see 
especially Allan Gallay The Indian Slave Trade: the rise of the English Empire in the American South 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), German Romero Vargas, Las sociedades del atlántico de 
nicaragua en los siglos xvii y xviii (Managua : Fondo de Promoción Cultural-Banic, 1995), Moises 
Gonzalez Navarro, Raza y tierra. La guerra de castas y el henequen (Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 
1974), Carlos Menendez, Historia del infame y vergonzoso comercio de indios vendidos a los esclavistas 
de Cuba por los politicos yucatecos, de 1848 hasta 1861 (Merida, Talleres Graficos de la Revista de 
Yucatan, 1923). 
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eighteenth century. In central Mexico and the Caribbean, officials distributed those 
captives who survived to masters who paid nothing for them other than promising to feed 
and clothe them, instruct them in Christianity, and “treat them well.” If such fates stretch 
conventional understandings of “slavery,” it is striking that captives’ fates in exile reveal 
that slavery may have remained an important means through which individuals 
understood Apache labor in particular contexts. In a slave society like Cuba, residents 
drew upon familiar referents in petitioning to receive an Apache “slave” or by recording 
their deaths and baptisms in the ledgers of “pardos and negros.”436  
Comparing this Apache experience to that of other categories of captives suggests 
new insights into the history of comparative slavery in colonial North America. By the 
time Native captives arrived in the Caribbean, for example, they had—from the Spanish 
perspective—largely been stripped of their specific ethnic identity, like many enslaved 
Africans arriving from the Atlantic crossing. In Veracruz and Havana, Spanish residents 
and officials called them not “Apaches” but "mecos," a term that derived from the 
disparaging term "chichimeco" long applied to allegedly “savage” or “uncivilized” 
Indians. Recall that Spaniards assigned most captives numbers, thus individual Apaches 
became "Meco number 3" or "Meca number 134.”437  
Both the practice of exiling Apaches and assigning them a new identity fit with 
scholars’ identification of “natal alienation” as a characteristic element of slavery across 
time and place. But Native experiences also diverged from traditional definitions of 
slavery, and the experience of enslaved Africans in the Americas more specifically. In 
other contexts, as we have seen, Apaches had been sold in slave markets for a price, but 
                                                            
436 On eighteenth century shifts in ideologies of criminal punishment see Foucault, Discipline and Punish.  
437 See note 392 above on Spanish “renaming” of Native captives. 
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in this case they were held in a public square to await distribution to public works 
projects or individual households for domestic service via a petition process. According 
to Spanish officials, Apaches were “prisoners of war” that would be lent out to local 
residents at no cost to them other than the expenses they made in food and clothing. 
Havana residents often echoed the official motives of Christianization, civilization, and 
protection in their petitions to receive captives. Typical was Juan Manuel del Pilar, who 
received an Indian man in 1791 by promising to instruct him and baptize him "within 
three months," and to turn in certifications of his baptism from the parish priests.438  
The official status of Apaches as what we might call “captives of the crown,” 
however, cannot in and of itself explain their lived experiences in Cuba. Another 
comparison is useful in this regard. Royal officials sent both English men captured in 
inter-imperial warfare and Hispanic criminals sentenced to forced labor to Havana, but 
they were neither “lent out” to individual households nor was their status permanent—
they remained in captivity only until the English and Spanish negotiated routine 
exchanges of prisoners or in the case of convicts, until they had served their criminal 
sentences. Apaches, in contrast, were by royal decree, “sent to places from which they 
may never return.”439  
The case of a group of Apaches tried for the murder of an African slave in 1803 
                                                            
438 On natal alienation as a defining characteristic of slavery see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social 
Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). For recent critiques that have 
emphasized that “social death” was an existential problem more than a lived condition see Stephanie E. 
Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), and Vincent Brown, The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of 
Atlantic Slavery (Harvard University Press, 2008). On Apaches slaves sold in markets see Chs. 1-2 above. 
On Juan Manuel del Pilar see note 426 above.  
439 AGN-Reales Cedulas, Vol. 125, exp. 47: “[que] les ponga y destine en parage en donde no puedan 
volver jamas a su Pais, para evitar por este medio sus robos, y mayores Daños.” For comparison to other 
categories of labor I draw from Ruth Pike, "Penal Servitude in the Spanish Empire: Presidio Labor in the 
Eighteenth Century," Hispanic American Historical Review 58, no. 1 (1978): 21-40. 
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and 1804 provides a vivid illustration of what set Apache captives apart from prisoners of 
war or convict laborers: the permanence of their status. While a judge initially sentenced 
Rafael, Cle, and Bitaque to a public execution for their crime, he ultimately commuted 
capital punishment and sentenced the men to terms of forced labor, apparently oblivious 
to the fact that all these men already faced permanent labor in exile. In a startling turn of 
events, one of the accused, Rafael, was sentenced by the court to ten years at the castle of 
San Juan de Ulua in Veracruz. When Cuban officials tried to send him there, the 
governor of Veracruz had to remind officials in Havana that by royal decree Apaches 
were never allowed to return to Mexico, given the risk that they might escape and make it 
back home. Banished from the Rio Grande, forced to labor in Havana, tried for the 
murder of an African slave, Rafael now had no place in either Cuba or New Spain. The 
only place for him was elsewhere; it was recommended that he be sent to Puerto Rico.440 
 In the end, it is the very ambiguities and complexities of the history of the Apache 
exile to Cuba that make it a useful vantage point from which to view the history of 
slavery. Apaches’ status as captives controlled by the Spanish crown, and yet 
permanently exiled and associated with enslaved persons, are illustrative of the diverse 
experiences of captivity and forced labor that emerged in early modern societies in the 
Americas.  In this case, it was imperial interests in territorial security and sovereignty, 
more than markets in human labor, which fueled the capture and forced migration of 
Native captives to the Caribbean.  
 Once enslaved and sold for a price, now exiled at the expense of the Spanish state, 
Native captives from the Greater Rio Grande negotiated shifting circumstances of 
                                                            
440 AGI-Cuba 1716.  
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captivity with the same indomitable persistence, as they orchestrated escapes, threw 
themselves to the ground and refused to march, leaped into the sea in Veracruz, and 
banded with African slaves in raiding parties in the Cuban countryside. Their families 
and neighbors who remained in the Greater Rio Grande adapted to a world in which 
displacement from kin and homeland was an omnipresent threat. Reflecting and 
reinforcing long-standing divisions among Apachean groups, Spaniards began to draw 
upon Apache men’s military service to track and capture neighboring Apachean groups in 
the 1780s and 1790s. Eventually, such alliances helped bring an end to the worst warfare 
by the early-1800s. Relative peace came at a great cost, however, including the diaspora 
of hundreds of Native men, women, and children to central Mexico and the Caribbean.441 
 
  
                                                            
441 I am suggesting a somewhat less rosy portrait of the “relative peace” of the late-colonial era than that 
presented in some recent scholarship. See especially Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian 
Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), Matthew Babcock, “Turning 
Apaches into Spaniards: North America’s Forgotten Indian Reservations” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern 
Methodist University, 2008). 
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Epilogue: 
A Mosaic of Captivity in The Greater Rio Grande 
 
 
Across the North American West in the 1780s and 1790s, Natives and Spaniards 
negotiated alliances that brought about what scholars have termed “an imperfect peace” 
to close the colonial era.  Initially, negotiations built upon an agreement between some 
Native and Hispanic groups to fight Apaches, as in the case of the 1786 accord between 
New Mexicans and Comanches. In the coming years, however, some Apachean groups 
also entered into alliance with Spaniards in the Greater Rio Grande. In contrast to the 
Comanche case, which reflected a new willingness among Spaniards to negotiate with 
powerful Native groups as sovereign nations, peace arrangements with Apaches echoed 
older aims of bringing migratory Indians into fixed places of residence. The “peace 
settlements” or  “establecimientos de paz” for Apaches would be directed by soldiers 
rather than missionaries, however. If some of these peace settlements were short lived, 
those that endured did not turn into Indian “towns” or lead Apaches to give up their 
migratory lifestyles. Apaches used these arrangements as zones of refuge to avoid 
Spanish and Comanche punitive expeditions and petition for the return of imprisoned kin, 
even as most families also returned to previous hunting, gathering, and trading 
practices.442 
                                                            
442 Matthew Babcock, “Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America’s Forgotten Indian Reservations” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 2008), Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: 
Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), esp. prologue; Juliana 
Barr, Peace came in the form of a woman!: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas borderlands (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), ch. 6; Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), ch. 3. I have benefitted immensely from conversations with Matthew 
Babcock about the “peace establishments,” though our views on these arrangements diverge somewhat. In 
particular, I believe that extant rations lists clearly indicate that Apaches continued to be highly mobile and 
practice seasonal migrations that make it difficult to characterize Spanish-Apache agreements as 
“reservations” or “settlements.” For ration list evidence see, for example, Janos Collection, F20, S4 (1812); 
F21, S3I (1815); F23, S2I (1818); Janos F25B, S2 (1823-1824). 
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The Apache peace zones were built upon the specter of captivity and exile, as 
convoys of prisoners of war bound for Mexico and beyond travelled south year after year. 
In fact, Spanish military commanders employed the threatened exile of kin as a strategy 
to coerce Apache men into laying down their arms. When Apache men offered alliance, 
Spanish officials sealed this alliance by releasing relatives to them that they otherwise 
would have sent away in convoys bound for Mexico and Veracruz.443 Between 1786 and 
1793—a period in which Spaniards exiled more than 700 Apachean captives—eight 
peace zones came into existence, from Tucson in present-day Arizona in the west to 
Presidio del Norte in present-day Texas in the east.444  
Violence and captivity remained fixtures of life in the Greater Rio Grande, as 
military campaigns and the exile of Apachean captives continued into the early-1800s. 
Some Apache men joined in this process, serving as “auxiliaries” or scouts and guides for 
Spanish forces.  Such military service provided a means for Apache men to continue the 
traditional work of men within their culture and receive symbols of wealth and status like 
captives and livestock as compensation. It also provided them with standing to petition 
for the return of imprisoned or displaced kin. If Spaniards who marveled at Apaches 
“fighting their own countrymen” underestimated the degree of division among Apachean 
                                                            
443 One of the first Apache groups to enter long-term alliance with Spaniards at a military fort was the clan 
headed by El Compá. The Janos regiment took his wife captive in 1788 along with several other close kin. 
To redeem them, El Compá agreed to aid the Spanish, first at Bacoachi and then at Janos. Correspondence 
between Janos commander Antonio Cordero and Chihuahua City in December 1790 provides further 
evidence of the tactic of taking and threatening to deport captives to leverage Apaches to make peace at 
Janos. Cordero explained that in a recent raid, troops had captured the wife, sons, and other relatives of an 
Apache named Gimiguisen. Cordero suggested that this “disgrace” would likely make Gimiguisen think 
hard about soliciting peace. See Ugarte, Valle de San Buenaventura, to Cordero, September 18, 1788: Janos 
Collection, F5, S2; Cordero, Janos, to Casanova, 4 December 1790: Janos Collection, F6A, S1; Cordero, 
Janos, to Nava, 1 July 1791: Janos Colleciton, F7, S1; Nava, Chihuahua, to Janos Commander, 7 June 
1791: Janos Collection, F7, S1. 
444 For 700 Apachean captives exiled in this period, see Appendix, on eight Apache peace zones see 
Babcock, “Turning Apaches into Spaniards,” 7.  
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groups, the strategic choices of Mescalero and Chiricahua Apaches to aid the Spanish 
were not inconsequential either. One Spanish military commander spoke of having to 
assuage the concerns of an Apache who “worried about what other Apaches thought of 
him.”445  
Old customs died hard for Spanish soldiers too, whose own desires, and 
understandings of manhood, were not so distinct from that of Apaches. In the mid-1790s, 
soldiers repeatedly petitioned to receive Indian children they had captured in battle. In 
March of 1794, for example, the Commandant General in Chihuahua City, Pedro de 
Nava, explained that the little Apache girls that Sergeant Nicolás Madrid and Mariano 
Varela had chosen could be left to them, and that other soldiers that had been on the latest 
campaign should be given the same opportunity, “to select a little Indian girl, to their 
satisfaction.” In September, Nava again approved that infant girls could be left to soldiers 
that had chosen them, “as long as they agreed to nurture and educate them.”446 The 
granting of captive children to soldiers continued into the early-1800s. By the end of 
1804, for example, 35 year-old Lieutenant José Maria Doporto had served in the Greater 
Rio Grande for nineteen years. Doporto had been on ten campaigns against the Apaches, 
and had distinguished himself by killing thirteen enemies, taking fifty-two Apache 
prisoners, and liberating a Spanish captive.447 Doporto’s military service had also brought 
Native captives into his household, in this case two female servants and a little Indian 
                                                            
445 On Apache military service see Babcock, “Turning Apaches into Spaniards”; José Cortés, Memorias 
sobre las provincias del norte de Nueva España, 1799, in Elizabeth A. H. John and John Wheat, eds. and 
trans., Views from the Apache Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), especially 32; Paul 
Conrad, “Bárbaros into Soldiers: Violence, Reciprocity, and Identity on New Spain’s Northern Frontier,” 
(Unpublished Masters Report, University of Texas at Austin, 2007). For Apache man “worrying what 
others thought of him” see Juan José Compa, Carcay, to Varela, 1 May 1833; Varela to Compa, 1 May 
1833: Janos Microfilm Collection, University of Texas at El Paso, Reel #25. 
446 Nava, Chihuahua, to Casanova, 20 March 1794, and 23 Sept 1794: Janos Collection, F10, S1. 
447 “El Segundo Teniente D. Joséph Do-Porto,” 31 December 1804, Janos Collection, F17, S2.  
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girl. Young recruits also received Apaches as compensation.  Cadet Eduardo Garcia, a 
19-year-old new recruit to the army, had already been on three campaigns by 1804. His 
household now consisted of himself and a little Indian boy. By 1804, in fact, 10% of the 
population of the presidio of Janos was comprised of Indian “orphans” or “criados.”448  
The life of one such orphaned Apache encapsulates the diverse fates that captives 
faced in the Greater Rio Grande in these years. Born amidst a devastating war, this boy 
had witnessed soldiers transport his kin away towards Mexico in a collera as a child. 
They had left him behind at the presidio of San Elzeario, however, reflecting the fact that 
it was not uncommon for children or the sick to be distributed among local residents 
rather than face long-distance exile. A Spanish resident of San Elzeario, Mariano Montes, 
had later purchased the boy for the price of a horse and baptized him, giving him the 
name “José Antonio.” As José got older, however, he had abandoned his master and 
traveled from job to job, working as a cowboy or muleteer, or whatever task kept him 
from going hungry.449  
It was as a “peón” for a mortuary house that José Antonio Montes traveled to 
Mexico City and presented himself before the viceroy of New Spain in January 1816 with 
two Indian women. He asked to be named the headman or “capitán” of the Gileño 
Apaches, or any of the Apache groups currently at peace near one of the presidios of the 
frontier. Though the viceroy presented him with gifts—a suit, hat, and fifteen pesos—he 
sent Montes back north to Chihuahua City to meet with officials there, explaining that 
“he had no idea which Apache divisions were at peace and whether this Indian was 
                                                            
448 “Padron que manifiesta el numero de Tropa, Imbalidos, y Vecinos de este Puesto,” Janos, 31 December 
1804: F17, S2 and “El Cadete D. Eduardo Garcia,” 31 December 1804: F17, S2. 
449 Montes’ case is contained in AGN-PI 239, f. 14-21 
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sincere.”450  
As he had done in Mexico City, Montes arrived in front of the Commandant 
General in Chihuahua City, Antonio Garcia de Aexada, with his two female companions 
and asked again to be granted a title of leadership among any Apache group allied with 
the Spanish. Garcia investigated Montes’ past life, reporting on his sale into servitude, his 
“vagabond life” after fleeing his master, and further evidence of his generally 
“debauched” lifestyle. The presence of Montes’ two “wives” in particular had raised 
suspicions, and Garcia reported that the younger of the two was an Apache girl who had 
been left in Chihuahua when a collera had past through en route to Mexico. In Garcia’s 
analysis, she had “not desired to subject herself to a civilized life,” however, and had 
found a fitting partner in Montes. Garcia described the other woman as “an old lady” that 
Montes had acquired in “tierra afuera” or central New Spain. This woman had fled from 
the house where officials had placed her, and though Garcia seemed incredulous, she had 
described her former master as a resident of Veracruz, the port city where Apache 
captives were housed before being embarked to Havana.451  
With his investigations complete, the Commandant General confiscated the 
clothes that the viceroy had given Montes and threw him and his companions in jail, 
explaining that “these three corrupt Apaches could never be useful except in 
confinement.” Concluding that “under no condition could he leave them in liberty,” he 
ordered that they be sent south in the next convoy to depart for Mexico. In fact, this 
                                                            
450 Viceroy, Mexico,  to Comandant General, 7 January 1816, AGN-PI 239: “me ha presentado Indio Jose 
Ant.o Montes expresando ser de la Parcialidad Gileña y haber venido en el ultimo comboy con el objeto de 
conocerme y solicitar sele nombre Caudillo o Capitan de los de su Parcialidad e qualquiera de los Preciidos 
de la frontera; pero como ignoro si los habrá de p.z en alguno de ellos y la conducta y sinceridad de este 
Yndio, he mandado que se le dé pasaporte para que se presente al Comand.te de las armas de Chihuahua..” 
451 Antonio Garcia de Aexada, Chihuahua, 16 April 1816, AGN-PI 239: “tampoco quiso sugetarse a la Vida 
Civil…” 
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spring 1816 collera was the last documented convoy of Apache captives before Mexican 
Independence. In light of the transportation difficulties posed by skirmishes between 
rebels and loyalists, the convoy was routed not through Mexico City and Veracruz, but to 
the northern port of Altamira, from which a total of thirty-five Apache captives, including 
Montes and his two “wives” were embarked to Havana.452  
José Antonio Montes’ life provides a fitting conclusion to the analysis of 
violence, captivity, and slavery charted in the chapters above. Born in Gila Apache camps 
in the mountains of the Greater Rio Grande, he had been captured in war as a child and 
sold into “temporal slavery” at a military post while his family continued a long journey 
to Mexico and perhaps even Cuba. Laboring in odd tasks, Montes seems to have hoped 
for some better life. Having become aware of the benefits some Apache men had gained 
through alliance with Spaniards during the 1790s and early 1800s, he sought after the title 
“capitán,” which could include a salary from the Spanish treasury. If Montes was 
something of a conman, by seeking recognition as a Gila Apache leader he unwittingly 
distinguished his ultimate fate from that of a petty criminal within Spanish society. With 
no trial, and no clear crime committed, he faced imprisonment and overseas exile for his 
“bad customs.”453  
In the end, Montes’ story highlights the indefinite divide between victims and 
villains in the violent colonial past of North America. Whether orphan, slave, peon, 
conman, or exiled captive, Montes was a man trying to negotiate life in a world that often 
seemed to have it out for him. As distant as this world may seem at first glance—a 
                                                            
452 Ibid.: “de ningun modo puede dejarseles en libertad, pues siendo los tres Apaches viciados ya en la 
relacion y malas costumbres, jamas podrean ser utiles sino en un enciero.” On 1816 collera see AGN-PI 
Vol. 227 f. 226-249. 
453 AGN-PI 239, f. 15. On benefits of title of “capitán” and broader context of peace agreements see 
Babcock, “Turning Apaches into Spaniards,” esp. 78; Griffen, Apaches at War & Peace. 
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borderless North American West of captors and captives, chain gangs and slave 
auctions—upon closer inspection it reveals itself to be not so foreign at all. In different 
forms, the underlying moral questions remain with us, as global powers continue to 
deploy practices of violence, captivity, and forced migration in the name of civilization, 





Table 2: Convoys of Indian Captives Leaving the North American West for Central Mexico, 1770-
1816 
 






Men Women Children Group 
1773 Texas454 15   12 3 Apache 
1773 New Mexico455 23     Apache 
1775 Nueva Vizcaya456 At least 93     Apache 
1776 Nueva Vizcaya457 At least 104     Apache 
1777 Nueva Vizcaya458 159 109    Apache 
1778 Nuevo 
Santander459 
36 24    Coahuiltecan 
1778 Coahuila460 20 15    Coahuiltecan 
1778 Nuevo 
Santander461 
54 28    Coahuiltecan 
1778 Nueva Vizcaya462 At least 24     Apache 
1780 Nuevo 
Santander463 
121  32 46 43 Coahuiltecan 
1780 Nuevo 
Santander464 
49 47 16 24 9 Coahuiltecan 
1781 Nuevo 
Santander465 
101 62 58 40 3 Coahuiltecan 
1781 Nuevo 
Santander466 
38     Coahuiltecan 
1781 Nuevo 
Santander467 
97     Coahuiltecan 
1782 Nuevo 
Santander468 
33 33    Coahuiltecan 
1782 Nuevo 
Santander469 
128 85 47 32 34 Coahuiltecan 
  
                                                            
454 AGN-PI, Vol. 22. 
455 AGN-PI, Vol. 102. 
456 AGN-PI, Vol. 43; AGI-Guadalajara 458.  
457 Santiago, Jar of Severed Hands, 46-47.  
458 AGN-IV Caja 3540, Exp. 26. 
459 AGN-PI, Vol. 146. 
460 AGN-PI, Vol. 146. 
461 AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 299. 
462 AGI-Guadalajara 275. 
463 AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 269. 
464 AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 289. 
465 AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 160. 
466 AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 107. 
467 AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 164. 
468 AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 159. 
469 AGN-PI, Vol. 64, f. 178. 
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Men Women Children Group 
1783 Nuevo 
Santander470 
79 75 34 27 6 Coahuiltecan 
1783 Coahuila471 40  12 25 3 Mescalero 
Apaches 





69     Coahuiltecan 
1783 Nueva 
Vizcaya474 
145 47    Mescalero 
Apaches 
1784 Sonora475 “A large 
chunk” 
    Seris 
1784 Nuevo 
Santander476 
At least 17 17    Coahuiltecan 
1787 Sonora477 At least 3 3    Apaches 
1787 Sonora478 At least 54 36    Apaches 
1787 Nuevo 
Santander479 
20     Coahuiltecan 
1788 Nueva 
Vizcaya480 
90 61 5 43 29 Apaches 
1788 Sonora481 118 71    Gileño 
Apaches 




96 73    Apaches 
1789 Nueva 
Vizcaya484 
250 92    Apaches 
1790 Nueva 
Vizcaya485 
At least 33 33  33  “Mecas” 
1791 Nueva 
Vizcaya486 
74 64 7 34 33 Apaches 
                                                            
470 AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 241. 
471 AGN-PI, Vol. 24, part II, f. 290. 
472 AGI-Guadalajara 285.  
473 AGN-PI, Vol. 64, f. 238. 
474 Max L. Moorhead, “Spanish Deportation of Hostile Apaches,” p. 211-212. 
475 AGN-PI vol. 258, f. 382-389. 
476 AGN-PI vol. 123, f. 55.  
477 AGN-IV Caja 1796, exp. 5. 
478 AGN-IV Caja 1796, exp. 5.  
479 P.I vol. 58, f. 1-14.  
480 AGN-PI vol. 130, exp. 4 
481 Moorhead, p. 213-216.  
482 AGN-PI vol. 58, f. 1-14 
483 Moorhead, p. 214.  
484 AGN-PI vol. 155, f. 229.  
485 AGN-PI vol. 155, f. 97.  
486 AGN-PI vol. 142, f. 493.  
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Men Women Children Group 
1792 Nueva 
Vizcaya487 
82 67 17 48 17 Apaches 
1793 Nueva 
Vizcaya488 
16 13 3 3 10 Seris, Apaches 
1793 Nueva 
Vizcaya489 
52     Apaches 
1794 Nueva 
Vizcaya490 
83 81 27 56  Apaches 
1794 Nueva 
Vizcaya491 
95  18 72 5 Apaches 
1797 Nueva 
Vizcaya492 
71 70 13 57 1 Apaches 
1798 Coahuila493 56 29    Apaches 
1798 Nueva 
Vizcaya494 
98 96 25 69 4 Apaches 
1801 Nueva 
Vizcaya495 
86 83 25 58 3 Apaches 
1802 Nueva 
Vizcaya496 






1802 Nayarit497 22     Huichol/Cora 
1802 Nayarit498 177     Huichol/Cora 
1803 Nueva 
Vizcaya499 
82 80    Apaches 
1806 Interior 
Provinces500 
At least 16 16    Apaches 
1808 Interior 
Provinces501 
At least 33 33    Apaches 
1816 Nueva 
Vizcaya502 
35     Apaches 
Totals  At least 3,317 At least 
1,627 
360 755 205  
 
                                                            
487 AGN-PI vol. 142, f. 322.  
488 AGN-IV Caja 4636, Exp. 27.  
489 AGN-PI, Vol. 60, f. 1-22. 
490 AGN-PI vol. 141, f. 148.  
491 AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 446.  
492 AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 482.  
493 AGN-IV Caja 4791, exp. 76.  
494 AGN-IV Caja 3364, exp. 17.  
495 AGN-IV Caja 3920, exp. 3.  
496 AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 328.  
497 Zavala, Los Esclavos Indios, p. 308.  
498 Ibid.  
499 AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 391.  
500 Exact location of departure unknown; correspondence notes that Indians arrived in Mexico City from the North on 
this date: AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 550.  
501 Ibid.  
502 Indians conducted to Cuba: AGN-IV Caja 6375, Exp. 22.  
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Table 3: Native Captives from the Greater Rio Grande transported from Veracruz to Havana 
 
Month Year Total Men Women/ 
Children 
Arrived Source 
March 1784 18 0 18 18 
AGI-Cuba 
1335 
April 1784 33 33 0 33 
AGI-Cuba 
1335 
April 1784 7 0 7 6 
AGI-Cuba 
1335 
May 1784 6 0 6  
AGI-Cuba 
1358 
June 1784 58 33 25 58 
AGN-AHH 
1083, Exp. 8 
October 1784 3 0 2 2 
AGI-Cuba, 
1335, 1338 
December 1785 2 2 0  
AGN-CDA, 
Tomo 39, exp. 
132, f. 313 
June 1790 2   2 
AGI-Cuba 
1429 
June  1790 41   41 
AGI-Cuba 
1429 
June 1790 9 9 0 9 
AGI-Cuba 
1429 
February 1791 10 0 10 10 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
May 1791 5 0 5 5 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
May 1794 3 3 0 3 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
July 1794 9 9 0 9 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
November 1796 89 30 59 89 
AGI-Cuba 
1473 
March 1797 27 0 27 27 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
July 1797 10 10 0 10 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
November 1797  1  1 
AGI-Cuba 
1516B 
June 1798 4 4 0 4 
AGI-Cuba 
1516A 
October 1798 31 10 21  
AGI-Cuba 
1716 
August 1799 41 14 27 39 
AGI-Cuba 
1716 
August 1801 5  5 5 
AGI-Cuba 
1716 
February 1802 26 5 21 26 
AGI-Cuba 
1716 








October 1802 6 6  6 
AGI-Cuba 
1716 
November 1804 39 8 31  
AGN-PI, Vol. 
238, f. 403-4 
February 1810 15 15   
AGN-PI, Vol. 
238, f. 418 
Spring 1810 21 0 21  
AGN-PI, Vol. 
238, f. 283; 
Vol. 201 f. 3-
22 









Table 4: Select Escapes of Native Captives from Prisons or Convoys, 1770-1810 
 





1778 Nueva Vizcaya503 14  Women scale wall of jail 
1780 En route to 
Mexico504 
55   
1782-
1783 
Veracruz505 8 8 Captives escape from Veracruz 
and return to Nuevo Santander 
where they are recaptured 
1783 En Route to 
Mexico506 
56 9  
1789 Mexico City507 2  Women escape from the “casa 
de recogidas.” 
1789 En route to 
Veracruz508 
10   
1792 Mexico City509 1  Captive escapes from Private 
Home 
1792 En Route to Mexico 
City510 
12 12 Attempted escape leaves 12 
dead, ears are removed 
1796 En Route to 
Veracruz511 
18 12 Escapees pursued for weeks 
journeying back north. 
  
                                                            
503 AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 175. 
504 AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp 38. 
505 AGN-PI, Vol. 123.  
506 AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 284. 
507 AGN-PI, Vol. 155. 
508 AGN-PI, Vol. 155.  
509 AGN-IV, Caja 1383, Exp. 3.  
510 AGN-PI Vol. 142, f. 329. 
511 AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77.  
 261 





1797 En Route to Mexico 
City512 
18 1  
1798 Havana, Cuba513 2  Two Apache men escape from 
Habana fortifications 
1799 En Route to 
Veracruz514 
52 29 Women and child escape from 
roadside inn 
1801 En Route to 
Veracruz515 
27 26 23 captives are killed in 
attempted escape 
1802 Havana, Cuba516 6  6 Apache men escape in 
Havana 
1810 Mexico City517 27 9  




                                                            
512 AGN-PI Vol. 208 fr. 483; AGN-IV, Caja 3364, Exp. 33. 
513 AGI-Cuba, Legajo 1516B 
514 AGN-Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3. 
515 AGN-Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11. 
516 AGN-IV, Caja 66, Exp. 49. 
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